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MCCORMICK ****** & JULIET P. STUMPF *******
Abstract: In the wake of President Trump’s election, a growing number of local jurisdictions around the country have sought to disentangle their criminal
justice apparatus from federal immigration enforcement efforts. These localities have embraced a series of reforms that attempt to ensure immigrants are
not deported when they come into contact with the criminal justice system.
The Trump administration has labeled these jurisdictions “sanctuary cities”
and vowed to “end” them by, among other things, attempting to cut off their
federal funding.
This Article is a collaborative project authored by law professors specializing
in the intersection between immigration and criminal law. In it, we set forth
the central features of the Trump administration’s mass deportation plans and
its campaign to “crack down” on sanctuary cities. We then outline the diverse
ways in which localities have sought to protect their residents by refusing to
participate in the Trump immigration agenda. Such initiatives include declining to honor immigration detainers, precluding participation in joint operations with the federal government, and preventing immigration agents from
accessing local jails. Finally, we analyze the legal and policy justifications that
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local jurisdictions have advanced. Our examination reveals important insights
for how sanctuary cities are understood and preserved in the age of Trump.

INTRODUCTION
On July 26, 2017, Donald Trump announced before a crowd in
Youngstown, Ohio that his administration was “launching a nationwide
crackdown on sanctuary cities.” 1 In so doing, he was fulfilling a campaign
promise to “end” sanctuary cities and pressure them to abandon their sanctuary policies by threatening to withhold federal funding. 2 Although President Trump’s definition of “sanctuary jurisdictions” has been imprecise, he
has generally used the term to refer to those local jurisdictions that choose
not to cooperate with federal deportation efforts. 3 Trump’s aim was and
continues to be to punish those localities that do not help carry out his plans
for mass deportation.
This Article—which is a collaboration among law professors specializing in the intersection between immigration and criminal law and enforcement—engages the growing national debate on so-called “sanctuary cities.” 4 We sought one another out for this multi-author project in order to
1
Alana Abramson, ‘I Can Be More Presidential Than Any President.’ Read Trump’s Ohio
Rally Speech, TIME (July 26, 2017), http://time.com/4874161/donald-trump-transcript-youngs
town-ohio/ [https://perma.cc/9HP4-ADFB].
2
Full Text: Donald Trump Immigration Speech in Arizona, POLITICO (Aug. 31, 2016, 10:54
PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/donald-trump-immigration-address-transcript-227614
[https://perma.cc/33MN-5W7A]; see also Donald Trump’s Contract with the American Voter, DONALD J. TRUMP (Oct. 2016) [hereinafter Trump’s Contract], https://assets.donaldjtrump.com/_
landings/contract/O-TRU-102316-Contractv02.pdf [https://perma.cc/E384-B85W].
3
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017) [hereinafter Interior
Enforcement Executive Order]. In one place, the Executive Order appeared to define “sanctuary
jurisdictions” as those that “willfully refuse to comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373.” Id. at 8801. Although,
it was also susceptible to a reading that would encompass jurisdictions that decline to comply with
immigration detainers or have “a policy or practice that hinders the enforcement of Federal law
. . . .” Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 519–21 (N.D. Cal. 2017), reconsideration denied, 267 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1211 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
4
As other scholars concur, the term “sanctuary” lacks a single agreed upon definition. See,
e.g., Barbara E. Armacost, “Sanctuary” Laws: The New Immigration Federalism, 2016 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 1197; Pratheepan Gulasekaram & Rose Cuison Villazor, Sanctuary Networks, MINN. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 8–13), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3038943 [https://perma.cc/T979-2GQ3]. The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has defined sanctuary cities in general terms as “jurisdictions that may have state laws, local ordinances, or departmental policies limiting the role of local law enforcement agencies and officers in the enforcement of immigration laws.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. AUDIT
DIV., COOPERATION OF SCAAP RECIPIENTS IN THE REMOVAL OF CRIMINAL ALIENS FROM THE
UNITED STATES 7 n.44 (Jan. 2007), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/OJP/a0707/final.pdf [https://
perma.cc/WDU6-AYAC]. The Center for Immigration Studies has developed on its own definition of “sanctuary” to construct a map and long list of both state and municipalities that are apparently “obstructing immigration enforcement.” Bryan Griffith & Jessica Vaughan, Map 1: Sanctu-
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promote a deeper understanding of the struggle between restrictive federal
immigration policymaking and local criminal justice priorities. In this Article, we analyze sanctuary policies that seek to disentangle federal immigration enforcement from local criminal justice systems. 5 Our overarching goal
is to understand what jurisdictions are doing vis-à-vis criminal justice disentanglement and the rationales that support such initiatives.
Our Article makes three primary contributions to the literature on sanctuary cities. 6 First, we identify the elements of the enforcement apparatus the
Trump administration is using to conduct mass deportations and attack sanctuary cities. Although the Obama administration deported large numbers of
immigrants and significantly increased the use of immigration detention, 7 it
was eventually forced to adopt reforms that had the effect of reducing local
ary Cities, Counties, and States, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES (July 27, 2017), https://cis.
org/Map-Sanctuary-Cities-Counties-and-States [https://perma.cc/895D-8RDJ].
5
SARAH S. HERMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STATE AND LOCAL “SANCTUARY” POLICIES
LIMITING PARTICIPATION IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 15–16 (Mar. 2017), https://www.hsdl.
org/?view&did= 799960 [https://perma.cc/Z8R9-VABT] (discussing the decision by some state
and local governments to refuse participation in immigration enforcement through “sanctuary”
policies).
6
For examples of important earlier scholarship on sanctuary cities, see SUSAN BIBLER
COUTIN, THE CULTURE OF PROTEST: RELIGIOUS ACTIVISM AND THE U.S. SANCTUARY MOVEMENT (1993); PRATHEEPAN GULASEKARAM & S. KARTHICK RAMAKRISHNAN, THE NEW IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM (2015); HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 58–59,
81–85 (2014); Kristina M. Campbell, Humanitarian Aid Is Never a Crime? The Politics of Immigration Enforcement and the Provision of Sanctuary, 63 SYRACUSE L. REV. 71, 75 (2012); Ming
H. Chen, Trust in Immigration Enforcement: State Noncooperation and Sanctuary Cities After
Secure Communities, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 13 (2016); Stella Burch Elias, The New Immigration
Federalism, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 703 (2013); Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Forced Federalism:
States as Laboratories of Immigration Reform, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1673 (2011) (describing certain
state attempts at immigration reform as being constrained by “forced federalism”); Trevor George
Gardner, The Promise and Peril of the Anti-Commandeering Rule in the Homeland Security Era:
Immigrant Sanctuary as an Illustrative Case, 34 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 313 (2015); Bill Ong
Hing, Immigration Sanctuary Policies: Constitutional and Representative of Good Policing and
Good Public Policy, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 247 (2012); Christopher N. Lasch, Sanctuary Cities
and Dog-Whistle Politics, 42 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 159 (2016); Huyen
Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty and the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373 (2006) [hereinafter Pham, Constitutional Right]; Huyen
Pham & Pham Hoang Van, State-Created Immigration Climates and Domestic Migration, 38 U.
HAW. L. REV. 181 (2016); Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration
Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567 (2008); Rick Su, The Promise and Peril of Cities and Immigration Policy, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 299 (2013); Rose Cuison Villazor, “Sanctuary Cities”
and Local Citizenship, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 573 (2010).
7
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, 2015 YEARBOOK OF
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 103 (Dec. 2016), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
Yearbook_Immigration_Statistics_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/S973-LUDX] (reporting that over
2.7 million immigrants were removed from the United States during the Obama administration);
ALISON SISKIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IMMIGRATION-RELATED DETENTION: CURRENT LEGISLATIVE ISSUES 13 (Jan. 2012), https://fas.org/irp/crs/RL32369.pdf [https://perma.cc/MN3QLAM6] (graphing the dramatic increase in the use of detention from 2001 to 2012).
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law enforcement participation in federal immigration enforcement. These
reforms are now being rolled back by a current administration that appears
intent on setting new enforcement records, 8 in large part by co-opting the bureaucracy of local criminal justice systems. These mechanisms include actions such as accessing local jails to arrest immigrants, asking local jurisdictions to hold immigrants for deportation purposes, and deputizing local police
to enforce immigration law. Our overview reveals a key insight crucial to
understanding the current sanctuary debate: The debate over sanctuary cities,
although more pronounced in the age of Trump, has history and roots that
extend further back in time to transformations in immigration and criminal
justice policy dating to the 1980s. One cannot understand sanctuary cities
without understanding this history.
Second, based on our analysis of ordinances and policies from jurisdictions around the country, we provide a current typology of five major categories of sanctuary policies that the immigration enforcement programs and
initiatives just described have inspired. The five policy types that have been
adopted by jurisdictions to resist entanglement of state and local law enforcement in federal immigration enforcement include: (1) barring investigation of civil and criminal immigration violations by local law enforcement, (2) limiting compliance with immigration detainers and immigration
warrants, (3) refusing U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)
access to local jails, (4) limiting local law enforcement’s disclosure of sensitive information, and (5) precluding local participation in joint operations
with federal immigration enforcement. Whereas some jurisdictions had these
types of policies in place well before Trump was elected, 9 many others
adopted or reaffirmed such policies in the wake of the election. An important aspect of this component of our project is the compilation, in a public online library, of all the policies and laws that we considered in our re8

Since the 2016 presidential election there have been significant increases in “book-ins” and
removals arising from interior immigration enforcement. See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS
ENF’T, FISCAL YEAR 2017 ICE ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT 10–12 (Dec.
2017), https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2017/iceEndOfYearFY2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J57M-V7C3]. The average daily detention population increased to 37,000 in
fiscal year 2017, and President Trump’s budget for 2018 called for funding 48,000 beds. Laurel
Wamsley, As It Makes More Arrests, ICE Looks for More Detention Centers, NAT’L PUB. RADIO
(Oct. 26, 2017, 4:36 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/10/26/560257834/as-itmakes-more-arrests-ice-looks-for-more-detention-centers [https://perma.cc/FDR9-NKQ5].
9
See Annie Lai & Christopher N. Lasch, Crimmigration Resistance and the Case of Sanctuary City Defunding, 57 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 539, 546–48 (2017) (describing three “waves” of
sanctuary policies during the period from the early 1980s to the mid-2010s); Pham, Constitutional
Right, supra note 6, at 1382–87 (tracing the origins of sanctuary policies from the Central American refugee crisis of the 1980s to state and local laws enacted after the events of September 11,
2001).
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search. 10 We recognize that the five types of measures we study complement other types of policies that localities may enact outside the criminal
justice space to integrate immigrants into the broader social fabric of the
community, such as policies that allow immigrants to receive in-state tuition
or obtain driver’s licenses. 11 We also recognize that jurisdictions can adopt
reforms in the criminal justice space beyond those studied in this Article
that have a beneficial impact on immigrants. 12
Third, we examine some of the major legal and policy rationales that
have driven localities time and time again to enact “sanctuary” policies.
Following the November 2016 election, mayors, police chiefs, and other
local officials—in some cases supported by officials at the state level—
came forward to denounce Trump’s vision of mass deportation. 13 They
10
See Understanding “Sanctuary Cities”—Online Appendix: Home, WESTMINSTER LAW
LIBR. (last updated Apr. 8, 2018), http://libguides.law.du.edu/c.php?g=705342 [https://perma.cc/
E2GZ-EPM5]. The policies available in the online appendix can be sorted either by state or by the
adoption date. See id. (follow “Policies sorted by state” or “Policies sorted by date” tabs).
11
See, e.g., MOTOMURA, supra note 6, at 81–85 (describing a spectrum of policies that protect or integrate unauthorized migrants, including municipal identification cards, eligibility for
driver’s licenses, and resident tuition); Peter J. Spiro, Formalizing Local Citizenship, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 559, 563–66 (2010) (describing various kinds of local policies supporting noncitizens, including noncitizen voting in local elections, extending welfare benefits and in-state tuition
to noncitizens, and municipal identity cards available to all members of the local community, and
acknowledging that “sanctuary” policies “may also spring from some sense of locally-delimited
community,” though in Spiro’s view, “sanctuary” contrasts with these other measures because it is
“about defeating federal immigration enforcement”); Peter L. Markowitz, Undocumented No
More: The Power of State Citizenship, 67 STAN. L. REV. 869, 877–88 (2015) (summarizing the
range of policies advanced by states and localities to integrate immigrants).
12
See, e.g., FAIR PUNISHMENT PROJECT ET AL., THE PROMISE OF SANCTUARY CITIES AND
THE NEED FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORMS IN AN ERA OF MASS DEPORTATION passim (Apr.
2017), http://fairpunishment.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/FPP-Sanctuary-Cities-Report-Final.
pdf [https://perma.cc/ULT9-KGUW] (urging cities committed to immigrant-protective policies to
consider a range of changes to address problems with the criminal justice system); TANIA A. UNZUETA, MIJENTE, EXPANDING SANCTUARY: WHAT MAKES A CITY A SANCTUARY NOW? 1 (Jan.
2017), https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B1xgl8UTis-QLUYtbndueGtVaVE/view [https://perma.cc/
A4CM-WUKA] (arguing that cities should address “the criminalization of Black people,
transgender women, and other people of color as a part of the minimum standard in defining a city
as a ‘sanctuary’ today”).
13
See, e.g., Kate Mather & Cindy Chang, LAPD Will Not Help Deport Immigrants Under
Trump, Chief Says, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2016, 3:40 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/lame-ln-los-angeles-police-immigration-20161114-story.html [https://perma.cc/3HLE-8TRT] (“We
are not going to engage in law enforcement activities solely based on somebody’s immigration
status. We are not going to work in conjunction with Homeland Security on deportation efforts.
That is not our job, nor will I make it our job.” (quoting Los Angeles Police Department
(“LAPD”) Chief Charlie Beck) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Liz Robbins, On Staten Island, Immigrants ‘Hope for the Best but Prepare for the Worst,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/16/nyregion/undocumented-latinos-meet-to-plan-for-uncertainfuture.html [https://perma.cc/JR83-XH3F] (“We are not going to sacrifice a half-million people
who live amongst us who are part of our communities.” (quoting New York City Mayor Bill de
Blasio) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Gary Kane, Philly’s Sanctuary City Status Threatened
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made clear that “sanctuary” was necessary to prevent irreparable harm to
their communities. Although the specific rationales of different jurisdictions
are varied, they generally agree that immigrant protective policies are an
important way to preserve local sovereignty, define local priorities, and enhance community trust in law enforcement. Such policies are also understood as crucial to protecting fundamental rights, such as the right to live
free from racial profiling, illegal searches and stops, and arrests without
probable cause. More to the core, many sanctuary city laws and policies are
designed to embrace a diverse and inclusive vision of community. Finally,
while often not the primary rationale, some localities have enacted “sanctuary” policies as a form of expressed disagreement with federal immigration
policy.
Although we rely on the term “sanctuary” in this Article, we realize
that the term is deeply contested and lacks a commonly accepted meaning. 14
The term sanctuary first emerged in the dominant immigrant rights discourse in the 1980s when it was associated with faith communities providing temporary sanctuary within churches to persons fleeing Central American violence. 15 The term reemerged as part of what has been called the New
Sanctuary Movement in 2007, in which coalitions of faith-based and other
groups sought to support and integrate members of the undocumented
Under Trump Administration, METRO (Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.metro.us/philadelphia/phillys-sanctuary-city-status-threatened-under-trump-administration/zsJpkk---5u7en8W5aEanw [https://
perma.cc/9E9A-DM5P] (“We respect and live up to the Fourth Amendment, which means you
can’t be held against your will without a warrant from the court signed by a judge.” (quoting Philadelphia Mayor Jim Kenney) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Journal North Staff, Gonzales
Reiterates Santa Fe’s Pro-Immigrant Stance After Trump’s Election Win, ALBUQUERQUE J. (Nov
15, 2016, 6:04 PM), https://www.abqjournal.com/889149/mayor-reiterates-santa-fes-pro-immigrantstance-after-trumps-election-win.html [https://perma.cc/DG43-H73P] (“[O]ur policy of human
rights for all immigrants . . . has benefited our people, made us a safer, more cooperative community, and strengthened our economy . . . .” (quoting Santa Fe Mayor Javier Gonzales) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
14
See Elizabeth M. McCormick, Federal Anti-Sanctuary Law: A Failed Approach to Immigration Enforcement and a Poor Substitute for Real Reform, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 165, 169
n.12 (2016) (noting that “[t]here is no definition of ‘sanctuary’ in federal law and there is a wide
and diverse range of activities that might qualify as a ‘sanctuary’”); Virgil Wiebe, Immigration
Federalism in Minnesota: What Does Sanctuary Mean in Practice?, 13 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 581
(2017) (discussing varying meanings of sanctuary as applied to the home, church, schools, cities,
and states on the federal level).
15
See generally HILLARY CUNNINGHAM, GOD AND CAESAR AT THE RIO GRANDE: SANCTUARY AND THE POLITICS OF RELIGION (1995) (discussing the history and growth of the sanctuary
movement in the southwest United States in the 1980s); Susan Bibler Coutin, From Refugees to
Immigrants: The Legalization Strategies of Salvadoran Immigrants and Activists, 32 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 901, 906–09 (1998) (describing the social and legal impacts of the sanctuary
movement by religious activists in 1980s); Norma Stoltz Chinchilla et al., The Sanctuary Movement and Central American Activism in Los Angeles, LATIN AM. PERSP., Nov. 2009, at 101
(providing important insights into the start of the sanctuary movement in Los Angeles).

1710

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 59:1703

community. 16 Today, many local governments have affirmatively adopted
the “sanctuary” label. 17 Other jurisdictions have adopted similar policies
with different labels—such as that of an “Inclusive City,” 18 a “Human
Rights City,” 19 or a “Welcoming City” 20—or eschewed labels altogether. 21
Recognizing the definitional tension, we nevertheless use the term “sanctuary” in this Article because it is the term that has been most commonly embraced by both the jurisdictions themselves and critics of local resistance to
federal immigration enforcement. 22
Not only is the word “sanctuary” contestable, but, as the title of our
Article reflects, so is the concept of “sanctuary cities.” Although it is cities
that adopted many of the early policies in solidarity with the faith-based
sanctuary movement in the 1980s, 23 the current sanctuary landscape extends
16

GRACE YUKICH, ONE FAMILY UNDER GOD: IMMIGRATION POLITICS AND PROGRESSIVE
RELIGION IN AMERICA 13–38 (2013) (tracing the roots of the “New Sanctuary Movement” to a
2007 religious effort to humanize undocumented immigrants); Grace Yukich, Constructing the
Model Immigrant: Movement Strategy and Immigrant Deservingness in the New Sanctuary
Movement, 60 SOC. PROBS. 302, 306 (2013) [hereinafter Yukich, Model Immigrant] (same).
17
See, e.g., Watsonville, Cal., Ordinance No. 1353-17 § 2 (May 9, 2017) [hereinafter Watsonville Ordinance], http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id= 3573928 [https://perma.cc/
N4KN-Z5NM] (“The purpose of this ordinance is to reaffirm the City of Watsonville’s status as a
Sanctuary City . . . .”); Boulder, Colo., Ordinance No. 8162, § 12-5-1(b)(7) (Jan. 3, 2017) [hereinafter Boulder Ordinance], http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34430755 [https://perma.
cc/EG4M-56FX] (adding code section stating “[t]he City of Boulder declares that it is a ‘sanctuary’ city”).
18
See, e.g., McMinville, Or., Res. 2017-03 (Jan. 10, 2017) [hereinafter McMinville Resolution], http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34431012 [https://perma.cc/KRV7-EGZ8].
19
See, e.g., Richmond, Cal., Res. 106-16 (Dec. 6, 2016) [hereinafter Richmond Resolution],
http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34432066 [https://perma.cc/59VH-PMQ2].
20
See, e.g., Chi., Ill., Code § 2-173-005 (2012) [hereinafter Chicago Welcoming City Ordinance], http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34434721 [https://perma.cc/628R-2VU9].
21
See, e.g., Denver, Co., City Council Bill No. 17-0940 (Aug. 31, 2017), http://libguides.law.
du.edu/ld.php?content_id=35423250 [https://perma.cc/6EHT-87ZJ] (enacting disentanglement policy
titled the “Public Safety Enforcement Priorities Act”). But “studiously avoiding” the term “sanctuary” did not convince the Trump administration, which included Denver when it launched “Operation Safe City,” a set of immigration raids that explicitly targeted “sanctuary cities.” Chris Walker,
ICE Raids Target “Sanctuary Jurisdictions,” Including Denver, WESTWORD (Sept. 29, 2017, 10:07
AM), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=35423250 [https://perma.cc/5489-G5LT].
22
While we focus on governmental forms of “sanctuary,” including legislative enactments
and formal policy measures, others have noted a burgeoning of other forms of sanctuary, including
that offered by churches and campus. Gulasekaram & Villazor, supra note 4, (manuscript at 30–
33); see also Natasha Newman, Note, A Place to Call Home: Defining the Legal Significance of
the Sanctuary Campus Movement, 8 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 122, 130–31 (2017).
23
Ignatius Bau, Cities of Refuge: No Federal Preemption of Ordinances Restricting Local
Government Cooperation with the INS, 7 LA RAZA L.J. 50, 50–52 (1994) (reporting cities that
joined the sanctuary movement beginning in 1985, but also noting some state-level action); see
also Cambridge, Mass., City Council Order No. 4 (Apr. 8, 1985), http://libguides.law.du.edu/
ld.php?content_id=34434956 [https://perma.cc/T6RU-TW85] (ordering “[t]hat Cambridge be
declared ‘A Sanctuary City’”); Ithaca, N.Y., Human Servs. Comm. Res., Sanctuary for Salvadoran
and Guatemalan Refugees (July 10, 1985), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=3909
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far beyond cities. Whereas some self-styled “sanctuary cities” exist today,24
hundreds of today’s sanctuary policies have been enacted at the county level. 25 For example, several sheriffs that operate jails in more rural areas have
decided to stop complying with immigration detainers. 26 Meanwhile, statelevel sanctuary legislation is also on the rise. 27 Even towns and boroughs
0895 [https://perma.cc/3NUX-HYLD] (declaring Ithaca “a ‘Sanctuary City’ for Salvadoran and
Guatemalan refugees”); cf. Berkeley, Cal., Res. 52, 596-N.S. (Feb. 19, 1985), http://libguides.law.
du.edu/ld.php?content_id=35160626 [https://perma.cc/W7M6-DAE4] (“Declaring Berkeley a City
of Refuge”); S.F., Cal., Res. No. 1087-85 (Dec. 27, 1985), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?
content_id=35739145 (declarating the same for San Francisco).
24
See Watsonville Ordinance, supra note 17; Boulder Ordinance, supra note 17.
25
See LENA GRABER & NIKKI MARQUEZ, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., SEARCHING FOR
SANCTUARY: AN ANALYSIS OF AMERICA’S COUNTIES & THEIR VOLUNTARY ASSISTANCE WITH
DEPORTATIONS 3–4 (Dec. 2016), https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/sanctuary_
report_final_1-min.pdf [https://perma.cc/HJA8-ERJM] (arguing that counties are “the most important policy-makers in terms of establishing sanctuary policies” because “in the majority of the
U.S., the county-level government manages the jails and the legal system, and that is where the
greatest entanglement with immigration enforcement occurs”); KRSNA AVILA ET AL., IMMIGRANT
LEGAL RES. CTR., THE RISE OF SANCTUARY: GETTING LOCAL OFFICERS OUT OF THE BUSINESS
OF DEPORTATIONS IN THE TRUMP ERA 25 (Jan. 2018), https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/
resources/rise_of_sanctuary-lg-20180201.pdf [https://perma.cc/VP4P-MNQQ] (noting that “over
400 counties moved to decrease their engagement with ICE”); Juliet P. Stumpf, D(E)volving Discretion: Lessons from the Life and Times of Secure Communities, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1259, 1280
(2015) (noting that “more than thirty Oregon counties” and “most counties in Colorado” announced they would no longer comply with immigration detainers).
26
See, e.g., National Map of Local Entanglement with ICE, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR.
(Jan. 25, 2018) [hereinafter National Map], https://www.ilrc.org/local-enforcement-map [https://
perma.cc/L8V7-NNH2] (showing numerous rural counties, including Garfield (WA), Park (WY),
Butte (SD), Lake (OR), White Pine (NV), Baca (CO), and Lake of the Woods (MN) do not comply with immigration detainers).
27
A.B. 4, ch. 570 § 1(d), 2013–14 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013) [hereinafter California TRUST
Act], http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34433552 [https://perma.cc/J24E-NZ7A];
H.B. 6659, Public Act No. 13-155, 2013 Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2013), http://libguides.law.du.edu/
ld.php?content_id=34434308 [https://perma.cc/X73B-BN92]. For a discussion of state-level criminal justice reform in California designed to protect immigrants, see Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal
Justice in an Era of Mass Deportation: Reforms from California, 20 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 12
(2017); see also FAIR PUNISHMENT PROJECT ET AL., supra note 12 (highlighting the ways states
can play an important role in reforming the criminal justice system to protect noncitizens from
deportation).
In other cases, states and localities have been pitted against one another. In Texas, for example, a
coalition of cities and counties sued the State of Texas to enjoin enforcement of Texas’s S.B. 4,
which forbade localities from establishing “sanctuary” policies and required them to cooperate with
federal immigration authorities, for example by “comply[ing] with, honor[ing], and fulfill[ing]” immigration detainer requests. City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 885 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 2018) (addressing
litigation brought by local governments and officials); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. Art.
2.251(a)(1)–(2) (West 2017); see also Brianne Pfannenstiel, Iowa ‘Sanctuary’ City Ban Signed into
Law, DES MOINES REGISTER (Apr. 11, 2018, 2:53 PM), https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/
news/politics/2018/04/10/iowa-sanctuary-city-ban-becomes-law-sf-481-reynolds-signs/504176002/
[https://perma.cc/UK4X-SLUH] (describing similar anti-sanctuary law enacted in Iowa). In California, some localities have sided with the Trump administration in its stance against California’s “sanctuary” law. Sarah N. Lynch, California County Joins Trump ‘Sanctuary City’ Lawsuit, REUTERS
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have enacted sanctuary policies. 28 The Trump administration’s continued
preference for the “sanctuary city” moniker, despite its lack of precision,
may betray a strategic targeting of “liberal” urban centers. 29
This Article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, we examine the current
context—specifically, how the election of Donald Trump has catapulted socalled “sanctuary” jurisdiction policies to the forefront of the national debate over immigration policy. 30 We ground the current sanctuary debate in
the rise of a “crimmigration” enforcement regime, and specifically, the increasing reliance on the criminal justice bureaucracy for federal immigration enforcement. 31 And we provide history essential to understanding the
current moment. In Part II we introduce our typology of five primary types
of criminal justice policies that local jurisdictions have adopted to disentangle their law enforcement systems from the federal immigration enforcement machinery. 32 Finally, in Part III we analyze six of the more significant
legal and policy rationales that localities have offered to justify their adoption and maintenance of immigrant-protective “sanctuary” policies. 33
I. THE RISE OF CRIMMIGRATION
Ending “sanctuary cities” has been a central preoccupation of the
Trump presidency since its inception. In order to carry out its plans for vastly expanding immigration enforcement, the Trump administration must se-

(Mar. 27, 2018, 3:03 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-justice-sanctuary-city/californiacounty-joins-trump-sanctuary-city-lawsuit-idUSKBN1H32SA [https://perma.cc/HU8B-64F6]; see
also Sarah Holder, As California Protects Immigrants, Cities Revolt, CITYLAB (Apr. 3, 2018),
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/04/california-cities-fight-their-sanctuary-state/556973 [https://
perma.cc/FMB8-PBLH] (describing other anti-sanctuary actions taken by California localities). An
important forthcoming article is expected to address such state-local conflicts over sanctuary. See
Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Rose Cuison Villazor & Rick Su, Anti-Sanctuary (forthcoming), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3141293.
28
See, e.g., BREWSTER, MASS., SPECIAL & ANNUAL TOWN MEETING WARRANT art. 31 (May 1,
2017), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id= 35739776 [https://perma.cc/3YUP-TEMD];
State College, Pa., Res. 1180 (Jan. 9, 2017), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=3443
6664 [https://perma.cc/CKZ6-LLBN].
29
See, e.g., Ishaan Tharoor, Trump and the Populists See Themselves at War with Big Cities,
WASH. POST (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/03/20/
trump-and-the-populists-see-themselves-at-war-with-big-cities/?utm_term=.b4ca7345ee67 [https://
perma.cc/YS4D-DC9S] (exploring role of anti-urban sentiment in the Trump administration’s
populism).
30
See infra notes 34–165 and accompanying text.
31
One of our co-authors, Juliet Stumpf, coined the term “crimmigration” in her seminal 2006
law review article on the topic. Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and
Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 376 (2006).
32
See infra notes 181–248 and accompanying text.
33
See infra notes 252–356 and accompanying text.
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cure the participation of state and local law enforcement officials. 34 In engaging state and local officials, however, the administration is not starting
from scratch. Since the 1980s the federal government has placed an everincreasing amount of pressure on state and local officials to become involved in immigration enforcement. What began as an invitation to states
and localities in the 1980s and 1990s became a near-command to turn over
local residents for deportation by the end of Obama’s first term. Toward the
end of the Obama administration, several important reforms were adopted
in response to public outcry over the federal government’s actions. But, as
we discuss in this Part, those reforms are now being undone by the new
administration. 35
A. President Trump’s Promise to End Sanctuary Cities
One of Trump’s most common refrains during his campaign came in
the form of a threat—that “[c]ities that refuse to cooperate with federal
[immigration] authorities will not receive taxpayer dollars.” 36 After the inauguration, his administration moved quickly to implement the promises the
President made on the campaign trail. On January 25, 2017, Trump signed
two executive orders on immigration; one focused on border enforcement, 37
and the other was designed to vastly expand enforcement in the interior. 38
34
The President directed ICE to hire 10,000 new agents. Interior Enforcement Executive
Order, supra note 3, at 8800. Nevertheless, former Secretary of Homeland Security John Kelly
thought that these targets would not be reached “within the next couple of years.” Associated
Press, Border Patrol May Loosen Lie-Detector Use in Hiring to Meet Trump’s Jobs Order, THE
GUARDIAN (Mar. 8, 2017, 6:37 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/mar/08/borderpatrol-lie-detector-test-new-hires-trump-jobs-order [https://perma.cc/RYF7-R5AW].
35
See infra notes 98–100, 114–117, 149–154 and accompanying text. See generally Bill Ong
Hing, Entering the Trump ICE Age: Contextualizing the New Immigration Enforcement Regime, 5
TEX. A&M L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
3032662 [https://perma.cc/9VUY-BJD2] (cataloguing the ways immigration enforcement has
intensified and become more extreme under the Trump administration).
36
POLITICO, supra note 2; see also Amita Kelly & Barbara Sprunt, Here Is What Donald Trump
Wants to Do in His First 100 Days, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 9, 2017, 3:45 PM), https://www.
npr.org/2016/11/09/501451368/here-is-what-donald-trump-wants-to-do-in-his-first-100-days [https://
perma.cc/PPU2-VFEE] (noting Trump’s promise to “cancel all federal funding to Sanctuary Cities”).
37
Exec. Order No. 13767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793, 8794 (Jan. 25, 2017) (directing the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) Secretary to “take all appropriate steps to immediately
plan, design, and construct a physical wall along the southern border”).
38
Interior Enforcement Executive Order, supra note 3, at 8800 (expanding priorities for enforcement to include any noncitizen with a criminal conviction, those charged with a crime, those
thought to have committed acts that would constitute a crime, and any other person deemed a
public safety threat by immigration officials). Reports circulated that the expanded priorities could
cover up to 8 million people. See, e.g., Brian Bennett, Not Just ‘Bad Hombres’: Trump Is Targeting Up to 8 Million People for Deportation, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/
politics/la-na-pol-trump-deportations-20170204-story.html [https://perma.cc/X8BF-8AR3].
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The executive order addressing interior enforcement also took direct aim at
“sanctuary jurisdictions,” accusing them of “willfully violat[ing] Federal
law in an attempt to shield aliens from removal from the United States.”39
According to Trump’s order, “[t]hese jurisdictions have caused immeasurable harm to the American people and to the very fabric of our Republic.” 40
The interior enforcement executive order further charged the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security with ensuring that these jurisdictions “are not eligible to receive Federal grants, except as deemed necessary for law enforcement purposes by the Attorney General or the Secretary.” 41 Trump administration officials have even gone so far as to call for
the arrest of city officials who are in charge of these “sanctuary cities.” 42
The false characterization of sanctuary cities as dangerous and harmful
was not unexpected. 43 Throughout his campaign, Trump relied on a rhetoric
of immigrant criminality to support his harsh immigration enforcement proposals. 44 At his campaign launch in June 2015, Trump described Mexican

39

Interior Enforcement Executive Order, supra note 3, at 8799.
Id.
41
Id. at 8801.
42
Adam K. Raymond, Acting ICE Director Wants to Arrest Politicians Running Sanctuary
Cities, N.Y. MAG. (Jan. 3, 2018, 10:34 AM) http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2018/01/actingice-director-wants-to-arrest-pols-in-sanctuary-cities.html [https://perma.cc/D6YW-DCUV]. But see
Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Trump’s Fuzzy Math on Undocumented Immigrants Convicted of Crimes,
WASH. POST (Sept. 2, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2016/09/02/
trumps-fuzzy-math-on-undocumented-immigrants-convicted-of-crimes/?utm_term=.87986e14c121
[https://perma.cc/6L7C-PLHD] (citing data from the Migration Policy Institute showing that the
number of undocumented immigrants with criminal convictions was less than half of what Trump
claimed).
43
The characterization has been consistently contracticed by empirical research showing that
sanctuary jurisdictions are, on the whole, safer than non-sanctuary jurisdictions. See, e.g., TOM K.
WONG, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE EFFECTS OF SANCTUARY POLICIES ON CRIME AND THE
ECONOMY 1 (Jan. 2017), https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Effects-SanctuaryPolicies-Crime-and-Economy-2017-01-26.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6FY-7M7G] (concluding that
“[c]rime is statistically significantly lower in sanctuary counties compared to nonsanctuary counties”); MIKE MALES, CTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, WHITE RESIDENTS OF URBAN SANCTUARY COUNTIES ARE SAFER FROM DEADLY VIOLENCE THAN WHITE RESIDENTS IN NONSANCTUARY COUNTIES 1 (Dec. 2017), http://www.cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj/documents/white_residents_
of_urban_sanctuary_counties.pdf [https://perma.cc/4UTW-G52L] (concluding that White residents are safer in sanctuary areas and non-White residents “generally experience greater safety in
counties with at least some sanctuary policies”); see also Andrew Forrester & Alex Nowrasteh,
Do Immigration Enforcement Programs Reduce Crime? Evidence from the 287(g) Program in
North Carolina 13 (CATO Inst., Working Paper No. 52, 2018), https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.
org/files/pubs/pdf/working-paper-52-updated.pdf [https://perma.cc/7K23-4QLT] (concluding that
participation in the 287(g) program discussed Part I.C.2, infra notes 101–117 and accompanying
text, “did not reduce crime in North Carolina”).
44
Scholars conducting an analysis of Trump’s rhetoric during and after the campaign found it
revealed a classic America as “fortress” trope:
40
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immigrants as drug dealers and rapists: “They’re bringing drugs. They’re
bringing crime. They’re rapists.” 45 After securing the Republican nomination, Trump gave a speech dedicated to immigration issues in Phoenix, Arizona in which he claimed there were “at least 2 million” so-called “criminal
aliens” in the United States and pledged that his administration would have
“[z]ero tolerance for criminal aliens. Zero. Zero. . . . Zero.” 46
Trump’s identification of sanctuary cities as protecting “criminal aliens” appeared most powerfully in his campaign statements about the killing of Kathryn Steinle by an undocumented immigrant in 2015. 47 Trump
mentioned Steinle and other citizens killed by immigrants when he accepted
the Republican nomination, asking “where was sanctuary for Kate Steinle”
and for “all the other Americans who have been so brutally murdered, and
who have suffered so horribly?” 48 For Trump, Steinle’s death was “another

Trump asserts that Fortress America is under attack; many of its cities and towns
have been overrun by ruthless aggressors. Trump characterizes Mexico as the enemy
that sent unauthorized immigrants as invaders. Trump represents himself as the hero,
and Hillary Clinton represents the corrupt and sniveling politicians that let the nation
come to this state of affairs.
CELESTE GÓMEZ ET AL., THE PRESIDENT’S INTENT: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS OF A CRITICAL
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF TRUMP’S SPEECHES AND TWEETS FROM THE DATE OF HIS CANDIDACY
TO MID-SEPTEMBER 2017, at 1 (Dec. 2017), https://www.thepresidentsintent.com/full-report/
[https://perma.cc/KZL7-7FGS]. The myth of immigrant criminality has repeatedly been disproven
by researchers. See Michael T. Light & Ty Miller, Does Undocumented Immigration Increase
Violent Crime?, CRIMINOLOGY, Mar. 2018, at 1, 24 (reporting, based on longitudinal study spanning the 1990–2014 period, that “findings suggest . . . undocumented immigration over this period
is generally associated with decreasing violent crime”); Rubén G. Rumbaut et al., Debunking the
Myth of Immigrant Criminality: Imprisonment Among First- and Second-Generation Young Men,
MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (June 1, 2006), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/debunking-mythimmigrant-criminality-imprisonment-among-first-and-second-generation-young [https://perma.cc/
ZW44-HY86] (demonstrating that “immigrants have the lowest rates of imprisonment for criminal
convictions in American society”).
45
Donald Trump Transcript: ‘Our Country Needs a Truly Great Leader,’ WALL STREET J.
(June 16, 2015, 2:29 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/06/16/donald-trump-transcript-ourcountry-needs-a-truly-great-leader [https://perma.cc/7KM7-A35A].
46
Tara Golshan, Transcript: Donald Trump’s Speech Showed “Zero Tolerance” for Undocumented Immigrants, VOX (Aug. 31, 2016, 11:27 PM), https://www.vox.com/2016/8/31/12743880/
donald-trump-immigration-policy-speech-transcript [https://perma.cc/WL5J-M7K3].
47
See id.
48
Full Text: Donald Trump 2016 RNC Draft Speech Transcript, POLITICO (July 21, 2016, 6:21
PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/full-transcript-donald-trump-nomination-acceptancespeech-at-rnc-225974 [https://perma.cc/8CD9-7BEH]. Three parents of victims (Mary Ann Mendoza, Sabine Durden, and Jamiel Shaw) spoke on the first night of the nominating convention. Jessica Hopper, Family of People Killed by Undocumented Immigrants Speak Out at RNC, ABC NEWS
(July 18, 2016, 10:32 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/family-people-killed-undocumentedimmigrants-speak-gop-convention/story?id=40685407 [https://perma.cc/6YJU-HR6Y].
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example of why we must secure our border immediately.” 49 Notably, more
than two years after the incident, on November 30, 2017, a San Francisco
jury acquitted Jose Ines Garcia Zarate—the man accused of shooting
Kathryn Steinle—of all homicide charges. 50
In carrying out the interior enforcement executive order, Department
of Justice (“DOJ”) officials perpetuated President Trump’s rhetoric of immigrant criminality. For example, former DHS Secretary John F. Kelly issued an implementing memorandum declaring that “[c]riminal aliens routinely victimize Americans and other legal residents.” 51 Attorney General
Jefferson Sessions repeated the President’s assertion that “[c]ountless Americans would be alive today—and countless loved ones would not be grieving today—if the policies of these sanctuary jurisdictions were ended.” 52
Invoking Kathryn Steinle’s death, and claiming that sanctuary policies “endanger the lives of every American” and “violate federal law,” Sessions
vowed to implement the executive order by cutting funding to sanctuary
jurisdictions. 53
Statements conflating immigration and crime have become a mainstay
of the Trump presidency. In July 2017, President Trump told community
members in Suffolk County, New York that undocumented immigrants who
commit crimes of violence are “animals” that render cities “bloodstained
killing fields . . . .” 54 The Trump administration’s immigration plans have
also highlighted the racial impacts of federal immigration enforcement poli49
Doug Stanglin, Trump: San Francisco Shooting Case for Securing Border, USA TODAY
(July 4, 2015, 10:41 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/07/04/donald-trumpsan-francisco-killing-whipping-post/29694403/ [https://perma.cc/CL7P-M8KL] (internal quotation marks omitted).
50
Holly Yan & Dan Simon, Undocumented Immigrant Acquitted in Kate Steinle Death, CNN
(Dec. 1, 2017, 2:21 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/11/30/us/kate-steinle-murder-trial-verdict/index.
html [https://perma.cc/67H3-Y8AD] (reporting that President Trump called the verdict “disgraceful” and that Attorney General Sessions blamed “San Franciso’s status as a sanctuary city” for
Steinle’s death).
51
Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin McAlaneen
et al., Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot. 4 (Feb. 20, 2017) [hereinafter Kelly Immigration Memo], https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Enforcementof-the-Immigration-Laws-to-Serve-the-National-Interest.pdf [https://perma.cc/VYH3-QL39].
52
Jefferson Sessions, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks on Sanctuary Jurisdictions
(Mar. 27, 2017) [hereinafter Sessions Remarks], https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorneygeneral-jeff-sessions-delivers-remarks-announcing-sanctuary-jurisdictions [https://perma.cc/68YCYQ87]; see also POLITICO, supra note 2.
53
Sessions Remarks, supra note 52.
54
Maggie Haberman & Liz Robbins, Trump, on Long Island, Vows an End to Gang Violence,
N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/28/us/politics/trump-immigrationgang-violence-long-island.html [https://perma.cc/5PKZ-XYMM]; see also Graham Lanktree, Trump
Says Immigrant Gang Members ‘Slice and Dice’ Young, Beautiful Girls, NEWSWEEK (July 26, 2017),
http://www.newsweek.com/trump-says-immigrant-gang-members-slice-and-dice-young-beautifulgirls-642046 [https://perma.cc/L48E-8Z9N].
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cy. Consistent with candidate Trump’s statements connecting Mexican nationals with crime, 55 anti-immigrant rhetoric has become a core component
of a vocal white supremacist movement supporting Trump’s deportation
policies. 56
Within three months of Trump taking office, six jurisdictions filed lawsuits challenging his executive order’s anti-sanctuary provisions. 57 On April
25, 2017, a federal judge issued a nationwide injunction halting the executive order. 58 Undeterred, in July 2017 the DOJ announced that local jurisdictions that did not cooperate with federal immigration authorities would
be denied their Byrne Justice Assistance Grants (“JAG”), 59 a leading source
of federal funding for state and local criminal justice systems. 60 Several jurisdictions filed suit challenging this move by the DOJ. 61 The Seventh Cir55

See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text.
Kristina M. Campbell, A Dry Hate: White Supremacy and Anti-Immigrant Rhetoric in the
Humanitarian Crisis on the U.S.-Mexico Border, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 1081 (2015).
57
See Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief Concerning Federal Executive Order
13768, City of Richmond v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-01535-SK (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2017); Complaint
for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00574 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 3, 2017); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, City & Cty. of S.F. v. Trump, No.
3:17-cv-00485-WHO (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2017) [hereinafter S.F. Complaint]; Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, City of Chelsea v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-10214-GAO (D. Mass.
Feb. 8, 2017); Complaint for Declaratory Relief, City of Seattle v. Trump, No. 2:17-cv-00497BAT (W.D. Wash. Mar. 29, 2017); see also Lai & Lasch, supra note 9, at 557–62 (providing a
more detailed examination of the current litigation surrounding anti-sanctuary defunding efforts).
58
Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump (Santa Clara Preliminary Injunction), 250 F. Supp. 3d. 497,
508 (N.D. Cal. 2017). On November 20, 2017, the district court granted summary judgment in
favor of Santa Clara and San Francisco and entered and order permanently enjoining Section 9(a)
of the Executive Order. Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1201 (N.D. Cal.
2017). The case is currently pending before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
59
Welcome to BJA’s Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) Program, BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE: OFFICE OF JUST. PROGRAMS, https://www.bja.gov/jag/ [https://perma.
cc/EG6D-FUKD].
60
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Attorney General Sessions
Announces Immigration Compliance Requirements for Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Programs (July 25, 2017) [hereinafter Sessions Press Release], https://www.justice.
gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-sessions-announces-immigration-compliance-requirements-edwardbyrne-memorial [https://perma.cc/2BHF-62Q4] (requiring jurisdictions, in addition to certifying
compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373, to grant immigration authorities access to any detention facility
to interview inmates about their immigration status and provide at least forty-eight hours advanced
notice of the scheduled release date and time of any inmate to facilitate transfer of custody to
ICE); see also McCormick, supra note 14, at 168–70 (discussing federal anti-sanctuary statutes,
including 8 U.S.C. § 1373).
61
See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, State ex rel. Becerra v. Sessions, 284
F. Supp. 3d 1015 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2017) (No. 3:17-cv-04701), 2018 WL 1156774; Complaint
for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, City & Cty. of S.F. v. Sessions, No. 3:17-cv-04642-MEJ
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2017); Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, City of Chicago v.
Sessions, No. 1:17-cv-05720 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2017); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief, City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, No. 2:17-cv-03894 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2017); see also Lai
56
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cuit Court of Appeals upheld a nationwide preliminary injunction barring
the DOJ from withholding JAG funds based on two of three of the DOJ’s
immigration enforcement conditions. 62
The campaign to “crack down” on sanctuary cities has also had a legislative component. In June 2017 the House of Representatives passed the No
Sanctuary for Criminals Act, a law designed to punish resistant localities by
withholding DOJ and DHS grant funds. 63 And, in March 2018, the administration filed suit to stop the implementation of three California immigrant
protective laws: SB 54 (the “California Values Act”), AB 450 (the “Immigrant Worker Protection Act”), and AB 103. 64 Speaking about the lawsuit,
Attorney General Sessions accused California of undermining the immigration system and promoting a “radical open borders agenda.” 65
The Trump administration’s rhetoric of immigrant criminality and efforts to malign sanctuary jurisdictions have obstructed critical understandings
of the roots of sanctuary city policies. Administration officials have not
backed down, even threatening criminal arrests of city officials and retaliation
by expending increased enforcement resources in sanctuary jurisdictions. 66 In
the next sections, we provide important background for the current debate
about the role of local criminal justice actors in policing immigration. 67

& Lasch, supra note 9, at 559–61 (discussing developments in litigation challenging the Byrne
JAG funding conditions).
62
City of Chicago v. Sessions, No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 1868327, at *18 (7th Cir. Apr. 19,
2018) (upholding District Court’s injunction as to access and notice conditions). See also City of
Los Angeles v. Sessions, No. 17-7215-R, 2018 WL 1771184, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2018)
(granting nationwide preliminary injunction preventing the DOJ from similarly disadvantaging
localities that decline to participate in federal immigration enforcement in Community Oriented
Policing Services (“COPS”) grants by awarding extra points for cooperation in scoring process).
63
No Sanctuary for Criminals Act, H.R. 3003, 115th Cong., § 2(a) (2017). Similar proposals
have been introduced in earlier years; none have become law. See Lai & Lasch, supra note 9, at
553 (cataloguing recent federal legislative proposals to target sanctuary jurisdictions).
64
Complaint at 7–16, United States v. California, No. 2:18-cv-00490 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 6,
2018); see also Carrie Johnson, Justice Department Sues California over Impending Immigration
Enforcement, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 6, 2018, 9:01 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/03/06/
591301485/justice-department-sues-california-over-immigration-laws [https://perma.cc/9SW3-Y3W2].
65
Thomas Fuller & Vivien Yee, Jeff Sessions Scolds California in Immigration Speech: ‘We
Have a Problem,’ N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/07/us/sessionscalifornia-immigration.html [https://perma.cc/V4B3-RRJ6].
66
Acting ICE Director Wants Politicians in Charge of Sanctuary Cities Charged with Crimes,
CBS NEWS (Jan. 3, 2018, 11:51 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/acting-ice-director-wantspoliticians-in-sanctuary-cities-charged-with-crimes/ [https://perma.cc/MU79-HN5E] (quoting acting
ICE Director, Thomas Homan, as saying, in response to the effectuation of the California Values
Act: “[t]hey’re about to see a lot more special agents, a lot more deportation hours in the state of
California”).
67
See infra notes 68–165 and accompanying text.
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B. Crimmigration’s Origins
Over the past twenty years, local law enforcement agencies have increasingly been pressed to engage in federal immigration enforcement efforts. As we discuss, “crimmigration,” or the interweaving of immigration
and criminal law, has led to the creation of interior immigration enforcement policies that depend on the resources of local police and prosecutors to
expand the arrest and detention of noncitizens. 68 Understanding modern
sanctuary policies thus first requires tracing how immigration came to be
entangled with criminal law enforcement.
For much of our country’s history since the late nineteenth century,
immigration enforcement efforts were focused at the border and carried out
almost exclusively by federal officials. 69 U.S. Supreme Court cases also
drew a distinction between the immigration system, which was civil in nature, and criminal punishment. 70 Together with cases limiting the ability of
states to treat immigrants within their borders differently from citizens, 71
these precedents precluded states and localities from having any significant
role in regulating the presence of noncitizens. 72 States and localities gener68
This entanglement of local criminal law systems with immigration enforcement has been
well documented by scholars as part of a growing phenomenon. Stumpf, supra note 31, at 376; see
also, e.g., Katherine Beckett & Heather Evans, Crimmigration at the Local Level: Criminal Justice Processes in the Shadow of Deportation, 49 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 241, 245–46 (2015); Jennifer
M. Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135, 135–36
(2009); Angélica Cházaro, Challenging the “Criminal Alien” Paradigm, 63 UCLA L. REV. 594
(2016); Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 1341–42 (2010);
Mary Fan, The Case for Crimmigration Reform, 92 N.C. L. REV. 75, 126 (2013); César
Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Creating Crimmigration, 2013 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1457, 1513; Bill
Ong Hing, The Immigrant as Criminal: Punishing Dreamers, 9 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 79
(1998); Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 614–15 (2003); Yolanda Vázquez, Constructing Crimmigration: Latino Subordination in a “Post-Racial” World, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 644–46 (2015).
69
Cf. Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776–1885), 93
COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1834 (1993) (analyzing state regulation of transborder movement of persons prior to 1875 and concluding that it existed “primarily at the state level, but also supplemented by federal legislation”).
70
See generally Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (holding that
immigration proceedings, which determine “whether the conditions exist upon which congress has
enacted that an alien . . . may remain within the country,” are civil in nature, and that “deportation
is not a punishment for crime”); Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local
Power over Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1571–78 (2008) (describing consolidation of
immigration enforcement power in the federal government).
71
See generally Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376–80 (1971) (striking down state
laws conditioning welfare on U.S. citizenship and residency); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
374 (1886) (holding that San Francisco’s discriminatory application of a misdemeanor ordinance
to Chinese residents violated the Equal Protection Clause).
72
See Stumpf, supra note 70, at 1571–78. This doctrine of exclusive federal power over immigration concerns the relationship between the federal and state and local governments. It is not
the same as the much-criticized “plenary power” doctrine, which addresses only the limits on
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ally could not use immigration law to divest their noncitizen residents of
membership. 73 And criminal law was applied, at least formally, to all defendants regardless of citizenship or immigration status.
This division of responsibility between largely federal governance of
immigration and state power to enforce criminal law began to shift in the
1980s, when a fundamental reframing of the nature of immigration enforcement upset these long-established roles. 74 In the 1980s the Reagan administration’s “war on drugs” provided politicians with an opportunity to promote
a myth of immigrant criminality that would ultimately lead to an unprecedented entanglement of immigration enforcement with the criminal justice
goals. 75 This conflation of immigrants with criminality paved the way for

federal power, holding that the federal government may exercise power in the immigration arena
relatively unconstrained by constitutional norms such as equal protection. See MOTOMURA, supra
note 6, at 113–71 (discussing federal, state, and local involvement in the enforcement of immigration laws and policies); Lucas Guttentag, Immigration Preemption and the Limits of State Power:
Reflections on Arizona v. United States, 9 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 18 n.88 (2013) (highlighting the
various “intense scholarly criticism[s]” of the plenary power doctrine); Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court, 2009–13: A New Era of Immigration Law Unexceptionalism, 68
OKLA. L. REV. 57, 64 (2015) (concluding that modern Supreme Court jurisprudence has, without
eliminating the plenary power doctrine, “silently moved away from anything that might be characterized as immigration exceptionalism” and continued to “bring U.S. immigration law into the
legal mainstream”); Michael Kagan, Plenary Power Is Dead! Long Live Plenary Power!, 114
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 21, 27 (2015) (observing that “immigration law scholars have
been predicting the imminent demise of the plenary power doctrine for at least three decades”);
Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and the
Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 925, 934 (1995) (predicting that “[l]ittle by little, exceptions
and qualifications will reduce the doctrine to a shadow of its former self without an express overruling of contrary precedent”).
73
See Stumpf, supra note 70, at 1557–58.
74
A burgeoning scholarship has traced these developments in the intermeshing of immigration and criminal law and enforcement. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1835–49
(2007); Eagly, supra note 68; Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic
Boundaries of the Post-September 11th “Pale of Law,” 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 639,
650–55 (2004); Annie Lai, Confronting Proxy Criminalization, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. 879, 882–88
(2015); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of
Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 471–73 (2007); Teresa A. Miller, Blurring
the Boundaries Between Immigration and Crime Control After September 11th, 25 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 81, 86–95 (2005); Stumpf, supra note 31.
75
César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 UCLA L.
REV. 1346, 1360 (2014) (tracing the historical impact of the war on drugs on immigrant detention
and positing that “the concerns that led Congress to prosecute the nascent ‘war on drugs’ were
intertwined with concerns that immigrants were bringing the scourge of drug use and drug trafficking into cities across the country”); Vázquez, supra note 68, at 641–42 (describing the criminalization of immigrants as a spillover effect of war on drugs); see also Peter Andreas, Redrawing
the Line: Borders and Security in the Twenty-First Century, 28 INT’L SECURITY 78, 87 (2003)
(describing the “narcoticized” southern border); Miller, supra note 68, at 626 (describing the notion of the “U.S. border as a ‘crime scene’”).
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local law enforcement participation in policing immigration. 76 The narrative
of immigrants-as-criminals made it appear more natural for local law enforcement to become involved in immigration enforcement. 77
As low-level drug crime became a national obsession, criminal arrests
were converted into a gateway for deportation. This transformation of local
criminal law enforcement missions was buttressed by changes in the immigration law, which attached the consequences of deportation to even lowlevel drug offenses. For example, in 1986, Congress passed the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act, which provided—in Subtitle M, the Narcotics Traffickers Deportation Act—for the exclusion or deportation of virtually all immigrants
who commit controlled substance offenses. 78
In 1996, Congress took a bold step in the direction of merging federal
immigration enforcement and local criminal enforcement by creating the
287(g) program. 79 The 287(g) program provides for voluntary partnerships
in which local officers are deputized to perform certain immigration en76
Leo Chavez has argued that this immigrant “threat narrative” was constructed and replenished over the course of a century. See Leo R. Chavez, “Illegality” Across Generations: Public
Discourse and the Children of Undocumented Immigrants, in CONSTRUCTING IMMIGRANT “ILLEGALITY”: CRITIQUES, EXPERIENCES, AND RESPONSES 84, 86 (Cecilia Menjívar & Daniel Kanstroom eds., 2014) (describing Latino threat narrative “which posits that Latinos, led by Mexicans
and Mexican Americans, are unwilling to integrate socially, unwilling to learn English and U.S.
culture, and preparing for a take over [of] the Southwest of the United States”). Nicholas De Genova provides an excellent account of the shifting legal responses to—or embodiments of—this
threat narrative. Nicholas De Genova, Immigration “Reform” and the Production of Migrant
“Illegality,” in CONSTRUCTING IMMIGRANT “ILLEGALITY,” supra, at 37, 39–58; see also GERALD
P. LÓPEZ, UNDOCUMENTED MEXICAN MIGRATION: IN SEARCH OF A JUST IMMIGRATION LAW
AND POLICY (1981) (tracing the history of undocumented Mexican migration to the United
States); Gyung-Ho Jeong et al., Cracks in the Opposition: Immigration as a Wedge Issue for the
Reagan Coalition, 55 AM. J. POL. SCI. 511, 514–15 (2011) (describing evolution of immigration
from an economic issue to a social issue).
77
See, e.g., Ian F. Haney López, Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1023, 1036, 1037 n.62 (2010) (noting that
“fighting crime became a seemingly ‘obvious’ framework for responding to social problems,”
including unauthorized immigration).
78
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, sec. 1751, 100 Stat. 3207-47 to -48
(amending what is known today as the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”)
§ 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (2012) and § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)). In introducing the A”nti-Drug Abuse Act, the legislators relied explicitly on
the alleged connection between immigration and crime. See, e.g., 132 Cong. Rec. H6716-03 (daily
ed. Sept. 11, 1986) (statement of Rep. Smith) (“Often, those dealing drugs have entered this country illegally and show absolutely no fear of United States law. . . . My amendment will help to
alleviate this problem. It serves to enhance the performance of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service’s Investigative Branch in its battle against illegal aliens who use our streets to peddle
death.”).
79
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104208 § 133, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2012)). For a thoughtful
discussion of 287(g) and other related programs, see Gerald P. López, Don’t We Like Them Illegal?, 45 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1711, 1782–90 (2012).
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forcement functions under federal supervision. 80 At the same time, the immigration system expanded its reliance on detention and other tools that had
traditionally been associated with criminal law enforcement. 81 In addition,
immigration enforcement during this time period began to coincide increasingly with criminal prosecution of immigrants for illegal entry and
reentry. 82
The push to involve local police in federal immigration enforcement
intensified after the September 11th terrorist attacks. 83 In 2002, the DOJ
Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) issued an opinion stating that local law
enforcement had “inherent authority” to enforce federal immigration laws,
reversing a longstanding view that local police did not have the authority to
make civil immigration arrests. 84 Immigration restrictionists supported this
pro-enforcement policy change, arguing that that local police could play a
valuable role as a “force multiplier” in the federal immigration enforcement
effort. 85
States and localities reacted in varied ways. Some local jurisdictions
rushed to participate in the 287(g) program. A number of states and locali80

López, supra note 79, at 1782–90.
See, e.g., García Hernández, supra note 75, at 1372–77 (characterizing detention as example of “penal norms” in immigration enforcement); Stumpf, supra note 31, at 386–91 (arguing that
“[i]mmigration enforcement has come to parallel criminal law enforcement”).
82
See Eagly, supra note 68, at 1352–53 (tracking the steady rise in immigration crime prosecution from 1923 to the present era); David Alan Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc
Instrumentalism, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 157, 166–75 (2012) (describing rise in illegal entry and
reentry prosecutions of immigration crimes since 1996).
83
See generally Anil Kalhan, Immigration Enforcement and Federalism After September 11,
2001, in IMMIGRATION, INTEGRATION, AND SECURITY: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 181 (Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia & Simon Reich eds., 2008) (detailing efforts to
enlist local law enforcement in federal immigration enforcement efforts after 9/11); Leisy Abrego
et al., Making Immigrants into Criminals: Legal Processes of Criminalization in the Post-IIRIRA
Era, 5 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SECURITY 694 (2017) (discussing the legislative changes that
paved the way for intensified criminalization of migrants after 9/11); Jennifer M. Chacón, supra
note 74, at 1831 (describing “blurred boundaries” between immigration, crime, and national security control after 9/11); Gallya Lahav & Marie Courtemanche, The Ideological Effects of Framing
Threat on Immigration and Civil Liberties, 34 POL. BEHAV. 477, 478 (2012) (discussing a “securitization of migration discourse” after 9/11) (internal quotation marks omitted); Miller, supra note
74, at 87–88 (describing post-9/11 allocation of crime-control resources to immigration control).
84
Letter from David N. Kelley, U.S. Attorney, to Omar Jadwat, Esq., ACLU Immigrants’
Rights Project 9–10, 14–15 (July 22, 2005), https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/olc-memo-stateand-local-law-enforcement-immigration-laws [https://perma.cc/GJ9W-DQ8T].
85
See, e.g., Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of
Local Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 181, 199–201 (2005) (proposing
relying on criminal justice actors to vastly expand deportation and arguing that states have inherent authority to make immigration arrests deriving from state sovereign power); Peter H. Schuck,
Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57, 85–91 (concluding that
state immigration laws are not preempted when they align with federal goals).
81
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ties also passed their own restrictionist immigration measures, 86 many of
which were premised on the association of immigrants with criminality.87
As discussed in more detail in Part II, other jurisdictions resisted the push to
entangle their local criminal justice systems, 88 maintaining instead that federal immigration enforcement is not the job of state and local law enforcement officials. 89 These policies—implemented in response to federal pressure—are now frequently labeled sanctuary policies.
C. Crimmigration’s Enforcement Mechanisms
Central to the entanglement of local government resources with federal
immigration policy are a core set of federal programs that put state and municipal law enforcement in the service of federal immigration enforcement
goals. Each of these programs has inspired sustained legal and political controversy. Each has been given new life under the current administration.
This section introduces the principal federal enforcement mechanisms
that play starring roles in the Trump administration’s crimmigration regime:
the Criminal Alien Program, 287(g) agreements, ICE administrative warrants, the Secure Communities Program, and joint operations with local law
enforcement. Understanding how these programs function and their resur86
As Linus Chan has explained, the purpose of some of these laws was to create a hostile
environment that would cause immigrants to self-deport. See R. Linus Chan, The Right to Travel:
Breaking Down the Thousand Petty Fortresses of State Self-Deportation Laws, 34 PACE L. REV.
814, 816 (2014).
87
See, e.g., Jamie G. Longazel, Rhetorical Barriers to Mobilizing for Immigrant Rights:
White Innocence and Latina/o Abstraction, 39 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 580, 585–86 (2014) (discussing how Hazleton, Pennsylvania enacted restrictionist legislation in response to the construction of “an artificial and highly racialized crime wave”). Local enforcement of federal immigration
law did not slow until the Supreme Court struck down most of Arizona’s immigrant policing law
and limited the nonfederal role in immigration enforcement. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S.
387, 410 (2012) (“Congress has put in place a system in which state officers may not make warrantless arrests of aliens based on possible removability except in specific, limited circumstances.”); see also id. at 413 (noting that detention of individuals by local law enforcement “solely to
verify their immigration status would raise constitutional concerns”).
88
See infra notes 181–248 and accompanying text; see also Rodríguez, supra note 6, at 600–
05 (describing sanctuary laws and arguing that many serve “as direct legislative and administrative responses to the federal government’s expanding efforts to enlist state and local police voluntarily in the enforcement of immigration laws”).
89
See generally MOTOMURA, supra note 6, at 113–44 (examining the role of state and local
governments in both enforcing immigration laws and integrating unauthorized migrants); Huyen
Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position: Why Inviting Local Enforcement of
Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 965, 968 (2004) (suggesting
that state and local involvement in the enforcement of immigration laws raised constitutional concerns); Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1084, 1088 (2004) (discussing the increasing involvement of local officials in the enforcement of immigration laws and the risk of “racial profiling and selective enforcement”).
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gence under the current administration is critical to later understanding the
sanctuary policies that we introduce in Part II. 90
1. The Criminal Alien Program
The stated purpose of the Criminal Alien Program (“CAP”) is to identify, arrest, and deport “priority” noncitizens encountered in federal, state,
and local prisons and jails. 91 Created in the 1980s, the program places ICE
agents in participating local jails to identify individuals for deportation. 92 In
conducting their work within the local jails, ICE agents may search biometric and biographic data, as well as interview arrestees and inmates. 93 In
the period between 2004 and 2015, CAP was associated with at least
1,435,000 immigration arrests. 94
CAP has triggered two key concerns. First, several researchers have
provided evidence that CAP is associated with racial profiling practices by
police. In a study conducted on the program’s implementation in Irving,
Texas, CAP was associated with increased arrests of Latinos for minor offenses. 95 Second, although CAP was purportedly designed to go after serious criminals, research suggests that individuals without criminal records,
or only minor convictions, were also targeted. 96 Indeed, documents obtained
from ICE in response to a Freedom of Information Act request revealed that

90

See infra notes 181–248 and accompanying text.
See Immigration Enforcement: Criminal Alien Program, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (2018) [hereinafter Criminal Alien Program], https://www.ice.gov/criminal-alienprogram [https://perma.cc/N2SH-DW5C]. CAP also pursues noncitizens who are not currently
incarcerated but may meet the criminal removal grounds. Id.
92
See WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., INTERIOR IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: CRIMINAL ALIEN PROGRAMS, app. B at 23 (Sept. 8, 2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/
R44627.pdf [https://perma.cc/89E2-4BUL].
93
Id. at 10.
94
Id. at 15 (listing number of arrests from CAP program for each year for which data was
available from 2004 to 2015).
95
TREVOR GARDNER II & AARTI KOHLI, CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. ON RACE, ETHNICITY & DIVERSITY, THE C.A.P. EFFECT: RACIAL PROFILING IN THE ICE CRIMINAL ALIEN PROGRAM (Sept. 2009), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/policybrief_irving_0909_v9.pdf [https://
perma.cc/E75N-M5QA] (documenting a correlation between the introduction of CAP in a local
jail in Irving, Texas and the profiling of Latinos); see also Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Profiling in
the War on Drugs Meets the Immigration Removal Process: The Case of Moncrieffe v. Holder, 48
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 967, 968–69 (2015) (observing that the “group of noncitizens subject to
removal tends to be racially skewed,” in part, because it reflects racially disparate impacts of the
criminal justice system).
96
See, e.g., GARDNER & KOHLI, supra note 95, at 4 (describing the incentive of local officers
under the CAP program to make arrests for petty offenses, which would then lead to deportation).
91
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seventy-nine percent of immigrants targeted by CAP had either no criminal
record at all, or convictions for only traffic or minor offenses. 97
The Trump administration has made clear that it plans to rely heavily
on CAP to deport noncitizens. 98 According to the agency’s current website,
immigrants identified through the program will be treated as a priority for
deportation action. 99 In addition, the agency pledges to use CAP to identify
immigrants to be “aggressive[ly] prosecut[ed]” by federal prosecutors for
violations of criminal immigration laws. 100
2. The 287(g) Program
In 1996, Congress enacted section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), which grants DHS the ability to enter into agreements with local law enforcement agencies to engage in immigration enforcement. 101 Pursuant to these optional written agreements, nonfederal officers receive training at local expense to carry out certain immigration enforcement functions, such as arrests and detention, to the extent consistent
with state and local law. 102 The 1996 statute specifies that DHS must supervise the deputized officers and must also require, as a condition of the written agreement, that the deputized officers know and adhere to federal law
regarding the federal function they are fulfilling. 103 The 287(g) program has
a “task force model,” applying to street-level policing, and a “jail model,”

97

NAT’L DAY LABORER ORG. NETWORK ET AL., BRIEFING GUIDE TO “SECURE COMMUNITIES”—ICE’S CONTROVERSIAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM NEW STATISTICS AND
INFORMATION REVEAL DISTURBING TRENDS AND LEAVE CRUCIAL QUESTIONS UNANSWERED 1–
4 (Apr. 2011) [hereinafter NDLON BRIEFING GUIDE], https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/

assets/files/Secure%20Communities%20Fact%20Sheet%20Briefing%20guide%208-2-2010%20
Production.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5H8-P9GJ]; see also NYU SCH. OF LAW IMMIGRANT RIGHTS
CLINIC ET AL., INSECURE COMMUNITIES, DEVASTATED FAMILIES: NEW DATA ON IMMIGRATION
DETENTION AND DEPORTATION PRACTICES IN NEW YORK CITY 10 (July 2012), http://www.
immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/NYC-FOIA-Report-2012-FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4ZBK-9KJV] (finding that 37% of noncitizens taken into custody through CAP
had no criminal history).
98
See Kelly Immigration Memo, supra note 51, at 3.
99
Criminal Alien Program, supra note 91. See generally Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecution of
Immigration Crime in the Trump Era, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (on file with
authors) (outlining the Trump administration’s policy agenda to prosecute immigrants and refugees for crossing the border).
100
Criminal Alien Program, supra note 91.
101
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-208,
sec. 133, § 287(g), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–563 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2012)).
102
8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1), (3).
103
Id. § 1357(g)(2).
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which is mostly concerned with identifying and transferring inmates from
local to immigration custody. 104
The 287(g) program was widely criticized for fostering civil rights violations and failing to conform to federal enforcement priorities. In March 2010
the DHS Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”) reviewed the program and
found, among other things, that ICE officers provided insufficient supervision, failed to consider a jurisdiction’s civil rights record before entering into
a 287(g) agreement, and improperly implemented local immigration policies
rather than federal priorities. 105 In 2011, a DOJ investigation concluded that
the 287(g) program in Maricopa County, Arizona “created a ‘wall of distrust’
between officers and Maricopa County’s Latino residents . . . that has significantly compromised” community safety. 106 Among other practices, the investigation revealed evidence of racial profiling of Latino drivers and the initiation of immigration enforcement in response to “complaints that described no
criminal activity, but rather referred . . . to individuals with ‘dark skin’ congregating in one area, or individuals speaking Spanish . . . .” 107
In the wake of this controversy, the Obama administration announced
in 2012 that it would stop renewing any 287(g) task force agreements. 108
The number of agreements under the program dropped by half, 109 leaving in
104
The 287(g) Program: An Overview, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.
americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/287g-program-immigration
[https://perma.cc/VU5V2T4F]. A third “hybrid” model, which combines elements of both, has not been frequently used. Id.
105
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OIG-10-63, THE PERFORMANCE OF 287(G) AGREEMENTS 8–34 (Mar. 2010) [hereinafter OIG 287(G) REPORT], https://
www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_10-63_Mar10.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QHA-H83L]; see also
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-109, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: BETTER
CONTROLS NEEDED OVER PROGRAM AUTHORIZING STATE AND LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAWS (2009), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09109.pdf [https://perma.cc/
7U7R-SPTX].
106
Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Bill
Montgomery, Cty. Attorney, Maricopa Cty., Ariz. 2 (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/crt/
about/spl/documents/mcso_findletter_12-15-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/H87L-UT9M].
107
Id. at 2–3. An investigation into the 287(g) program of Alamance County, North Carolina
revealed similarly disturbing evidence of racial profiling. Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant
Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Clyde B. Albright, Cty. Attorney, Alamance Cty., N.C. &
Chuck Kitchen, Attorney, Turrentine Law Firm 5 (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/
iso/opa/resources/171201291812462488198.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Y6D-EYV8] (describing discriminatory traffic enforcement and checkpoint practices).
108
See John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, Statement Regarding a Hearing on “U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Request” Before
the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations and Subcommittee on Homeland
Security 13 (Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.aila.org/content/fileviewer.aspx?docid=38896&linkid=244
574 [https://perma.cc/9R22-JHM5] (announcing that “ICE will begin by discontinuing the least
productive 287(g) task force agreements . . . and will also suspend consideration of any requests
for new 287(g) agreements”).
109
News Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, FY 2012: ICE Announces Year-End
Removal Numbers, Highlights Focus on Key Priorities and Issues New National Detainer Guide-
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place only thirty-four section 287(g) agreements at the end of the administration. 110 All agreements were limited to officers providing jail support,
rather than authorizing the kind of “task force” immigration policing in
community settings that the Arizona abuses typified. 111
The 287(g) program has been linked to racial profiling and distrust in
local law enforcement. Amada Armenta’s insightful study of the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department’s participation in a 287(g) program underscores this concern. Through two years of field work, Armenta found that
the enforcement of immigration law through a 287(g) program in the county
jail undermined the Latino community’s trust in the police on the street. 112
The jail program also empowered some officers to be “unnecessarily punitive” and seek out and arrest Latino immigrants, a decision that could result
in their deportation. 113
President Trump campaigned on a promise to revive the 287(g) program. 114 Signaling a definitive shift in direction, President Trump’s executive order on interior enforcement directed DHS to pursue 287(g) agreements “to the maximum extent permitted by law.” 115 Since he took office,
the number of 287(g) agreements has nearly doubled. 116 Eighteen of these
additional agreements are in Texas. 117
lines to Further Focus Resources (Dec. 20, 2012), http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1212/121221
washingtondc2.htm [https://perma.cc/6NHP-UDCS] (announcing that “ICE has . . . decided not to
renew any of its agreements with state and local law enforcement agencies that operate task forces
under the 287(g) program”).
110
Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S.
IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (2018) [hereinafter 287(g) Fact Sheet], https://www.ice.gov/
factsheets/287g [https://perma.cc/PB6Y-ZJMQ].
111
See, e.g., OIG 287(G) REPORT, supra note 105, at 9 (expressing concern that ICE lacked
assurance that the 287(g) program was meeting its intended purpose to target “aliens who pose the
greatest risk to public safety and the community”).
112
Amada Armenta, Between Public Service and Social Control: Policing Dilemmas in the
Era of Immigration Enforcement, 63 SOC. PROBS. 111, 114–23 (2016) [hereinafter Armenta, Between Public Service and Social Control] (studying the implementation of 287(g) in Nashville,
Tennessee). See generally AMADA ARMENTA, PROTECT, SERVE, AND DEPORT: THE RISE OF
POLICIING AS IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT (2017) (finding that a 287(g) agreement at a Nashville, Tennessee jail from 2007–2012 most negatively affected immigrants arrested for minor
infractions, and consequently undermined the community’s trust in local police authority).
113
Armenta, Between Public Service and Social Control, supra note 112, at 119–22.
114
See POLITICO, supra note 2 (“We will expand and revitalize the popular 287(g) partnerships, which will help to identify hundreds of thousands of deportable aliens in local jails.”).
115
Interior Enforcement Executive Order, supra note 3, at 8800 (calling on DHS to enter into
287(g) agreements with local governments).
116
287(g) Fact Sheet, supra note 110 (noting that there were sixty-one 287(g) agreements as
of August 27, 2017). All are “jail enforcement” agreements. Id.
117
News Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, ICE Announces 18 New 287(g)
Agreements in Texas (July 31, 2017), https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ice-announces-18-new287g-agreements-texas [https://perma.cc/EYL8-CMFW] (noting that each of the new 287(g)
agreements operate under a jail enforcement model).
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3. ICE Administrative Warrants
As noted earlier, after the September 11th attacks, the OLC issued a
memorandum reversing its view that local law enforcement had no “inherent authority” to enforce federal civil immigration law. 118 This threw open
the door to immigration arrests by nonfederal officers even without a 287(g)
agreement. Based on the OLC’s conclusion that local law enforcement did
have such authority, the federal government began to enter thousands of
records—relating to persons that immigration authorities believed had ignored a removal order or not complied with a requirement of the National
Security Entry-Exit Registration System (“NSEERS”)—into the FBI’s National Crime Information Center (“NCIC”) database. 119 These records were
added to an NCIC file called the Immigration Violators File (“IVF”). 120
Previously, the IVF contained only records of individuals with felony convictions who had unlawfully re-entered the United States following a prior
deportation. 121
Once the FBI started putting a large number of civil immigration records into the NCIC database, local law enforcement agencies began detaining individuals they encountered who had a “hit” in the database, which
would typically appear in the database as an arrest warrant. 122 Nevertheless,
unlike criminal arrest warrants, these ICE administrative arrest warrants are
issued by an immigration officer, not a judge. 123 In addition, these adminis118

See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text.
HANNAH GLADSTEIN ET AL., MIGRATION POL’Y INST., BLURRING THE LINES: A PROFILE
OF STATE AND LOCAL POLICE ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAW USING THE NATIONAL
CRIME INFORMATION CENTER DATABASE, 2002–2004, at 7 (Dec. 2005), https://www.migration
policy.org/pubs/MPI_report_Blurring_the_Lines_120805.pdf [https://perma.cc/P2FW-HGEZ]. The
NCIC is a system used by law enforcement agencies to exchange criminal history information and
identify individuals with outstanding wants and warrants. Id. at 3. NSEERS is a program that was
created after September 11th that required certain people—largely males from majority Arab and
Muslim nations—to report for registration and fingerprinting. Id.; see J. David Goodman & Ron
Nixon, Obama to Dismantle Visitor Registry Before Trump Can Revive It, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/22/nyregion/obama-to-dismantle-visitor-registry-beforetrump-can-revive-it.html [https://perma.cc/S5M6-2EEA] (discussing current status of NSEERS
program).
120
GLADSTEIN ET AL., supra note 119, at 3.
121
Id. at 6–7.
122
See D.C. Metro. Police Exec. Order No. 17-010, Administrative Warrants in NCIC (Mar. 24,
2017), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=38629549 [https://perma.cc/42JF-M2UQ]
(illustrating the difference between an NCIC response concerning an ICE administrative warrant
and a criminal warrant).
123
8 C.F.R. § 287.5(e)(2) (2017) (authorizing various immigration enforcement officers to
issue arrest warrants); see also El Badrawi v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 579 F. Supp. 2d 249, 276
(D. Conn. 2008) (noting that administrative immigration warrant “was signed by . . . an ICE Agent
intimately involved in the investigation” and “[n]o neutral magistrate (or even a neutral executive
official) ever examined the warrant’s validity”).
119
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trative warrants are issued not upon probable cause of a crime—the “usual
predicate” for arrest by local law enforcement 124—but instead upon probable cause of removability. 125
In 2012, in Arizona v. United States, the Supreme Court put an end to
the “inherent authority” theory for local enforcement of immigration law,
clarifying that local law enforcement officials could not arrest or detain
noncitizens based only on suspected removability except in very limited
circumstances. 126 After Arizona, it was clear that local law enforcement had
no legal basis to hold persons based only on an administrative warrant. 127
Compounding the problem for localities was the reality that the immigration
records entered into the NCIC are often unreliable. 128
Today, ICE administrative warrants remain in the NCIC database.
They also sometimes accompany immigration detainers. 129 Because administrative warrants and detainers are often issued in reliance on informational
databases, concerns over their accuracy and expansion are especially salient. As Anil Kahlan writes, these databases are accessible by a “large number of actors,” which can often result not only in errors, but extreme difficulty in correcting such errors. 130 Kalhan also warns of the tendency of the
use of the databases to “morph[]” into an ever-increasing surveillance by
the government. 131

124

Arizona, 567 U.S. at 407.
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FORM I-200, WARRANT FOR ARREST OF ALIEN (2016)
[hereinafter FORM I-200 WARRANT], https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Document/
2017/I-200_SAMPLE.PDF [https://perma.cc/YX4Q-M2Q6] (reciting probable cause of removability).
126
Arizona, 567 U.S. at 410, 455.
127
WENDY WAYNE & ANTHONY J. BENEDETTI, MASS. COMM. FOR PUB. COUNSEL SERVS.,
IMMIGRATION IMPACT UNIT, A PRACTICE ADVISORY ON ICE USE OF ADMINISTRATIVE WARRANTS
AND TRUE WARRANTS IN IMMIGRATION AND CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT 1–2 (Feb. 19, 2013), https://
www.publiccounsel.net/iiu/wp-content/uploads/sites/15/2014/07/ICE-Warrants-Practice-Advisory.
pdf [https://perma.cc/U865-GHME].
128
GLADSTEIN ET AL., supra note 119, at 12–13 (noting that ICE was unable to confirm an
immigration violation following a hit in the database in 42% of cases from 2002 to 2004).
129
In an attempt to address a federal court decision that held ICE routinely exceeded the arrest authority granted to it by the INA, ICE enacted a policy requiring detainers to be accompanied
by administrative warrants. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, POLICY NO. 10074.2: ISSUANCE OF IMMIGRATION DETAINERS BY ICE IMMIGRATION OFFICERS ¶ 2.4 & n.2 (Mar. 24, 2017)
[hereinafter ICE POLICY 10074.2], https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Document/
2017/10074-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UW8-DR8Q] (citing Moreno v. Napolitano, 213 F. Supp. 3d
999, 1008–09 (N.D. Ill. 2016)).
130
Anil Kalhan, Immigration Surveillance, 74 MD. L. REV. 1, 73 (2014); see also Margaret
Hu, Big Data Blacklisting, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1735, 1785 (2015) (setting out the underlying basis for
errors in government screening databases and the consequences of such errors).
131
Kalhan, supra note 130, at 77–78.
125
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4. The Secure Communities Program
In 2008 the federal government undertook another far-reaching effort
to harness state and local criminal justice systems for federal immigration
enforcement by activating the Secure Communities program. Secure Communities created an automatic information-sharing system that allowed
DHS to engage in immigration enforcement by using the biometric data
collected by local police and sheriffs. Once Secure Communities was activated across the country, the fingerprints of every person that state and local
officials booked into custody were forwarded automatically from the FBI to
DHS. 132
Although the transmission of fingerprint data opened up local jails to
DHS for the purposes of identifying enforcement targets, it was still necessary for DHS to take custody of its targets. For this, immigration officials
relied on immigration “detainers,” which take the form of a piece of paper
faxed or emailed from federal immigration officials to local officials. 133 The
paper form used for detainers when the program began contained language
suggesting compliance was mandatory, stating that federal regulations “require that you detain the alien.” 134
The detainer form caused confusion about whether detainers were voluntary requests or mandatory commands to local officials. 135 This confusion
was further perpetuated by DHS’s actions that suggested to jurisdictions
that they could not “opt out” of participating in Secure Communities. Initially, DHS suggested that jurisdictions could stop fingerprints submitted for

132
Secure Communities: FAQs, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.
gov/secure-communities (select “What Is Secure Communities?” subheading) [https://perma.cc/
4XEY-4AB5] (explaining that “[u]nder Secure Communities, the FBI automatically sends fingerprints to DHS to check against the immigration databases. If these checks reveal that an individual
is unlawfully present in the United States or otherwise removable, ICE takes enforcement action”).
133
Lopez-Aguilar v. Marion Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 1:16-cv-02457-SEB-TAB, 2017 WL
5634965, at *6 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 7, 2017) (citing Christopher N. Lasch, Federal Immigration Detainers After Arizona v. United States, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 629, 634 (2013)).
134
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., FORM I-247 IMMIGRATION DETAINER—NOTICE OF ACTION (1997), http://www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/
immigrantjustice.org/files/Detainer%20Form%20(April%201997)%20(Clean).pdf [https://perma.
cc/72TR-NEQA] (stating that “[f]ederal regulations (8 CFR 287.7) require that you detain the
alien for a period not to exceed 48 hours (excluding Saturdays, Sundays and Federal holidays) to
provide adequate time for INS to assume custody of the alien”).
135
DHS perpetuated this misunderstanding through various iterations of the detainer form.
See generally Christopher N. Lasch, Rendition Resistance, 92 N.C. L. REV. 149, 205–09 (2013)
(discussing the uncertainty surrounding the commanding or voluntary nature of an immigration
detainer by analyzing different iterations of the form).
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FBI checks from being transmitted to DHS. 136 When local communities
tried to prevent the transmittal of fingerprints, however, they were told that
participation in the program was mandatory. 137
Secure Communities pushed nonfederal criminal justice officials to the
front line of immigration enforcement in two ways. First, because any arrest
could open the door to deportation, an encounter between a noncitizen and a
police officer became a de facto brush with immigration enforcement. 138
Second, Secure Communities relied on police and sheriffs to hold noncitizens beyond their normal release. And because detainers were issued upon
arrest (rather than conviction), Secure Communities regularly failed to meet
its stated purpose of reducing crime rates, 139 often ensnaring noncitizens
with no criminal conviction at all. 140
Even before the Trump administration added Secure Communities to
its toolbox, the program had attracted a litany of critiques leading the prior
administration to abandon it. Although billed as making no change to the
operation of local law enforcement agencies, Secure Communities did in
effect turn local law enforcement officers into immigration agents. Secure
Communities therefore exacerbated divisions between the police and local
communities, making immigrant communities afraid to come into contact
with the police. 141 In addition, Secure Communities was critiqued as en136
M. Alex Johnson, Cities, Counties Can’t Stop Federal Immigration Checks, NBC NEWS
(Oct. 15, 2010, 6:13 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/39576754/ns/us_news-security/t/citiescounties-cant-stop-federal-immigration-checks/#.WsuqdkxFx-M [https://perma.cc/4N8E-VF3W]
(discussing ICE documents that portrayed participation in Secure Communities as being contingent on a statement of intent by county and local governments).
137
See Stumpf, supra note 25, at 1272–73; Secure Communities: FAQ, supra note 132 (follow “Can a State or Local Law Enforcement Agency Choose Not to Have Fingerprints It Submits
to the FBI Checked Against DHS’s System?” subheading) (stating that “state and local jurisdictions cannot prohibit information-sharing” under Secure Communities).
138
See MOTOMURA, supra note 6, at 128–31 (discussing how the discretion and influence of
local authorities in conducting arrests ties into immigration enforcement); Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1126, 1148–49, 1212–15 (2013) (describing the mechanics of Secure Communities and observing
that a locality’s model of noncitizen justice can vastly affect federal immigration enforcement
outcomes); Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809 (2015) (describing how arrests now lead to a range of consequences, including deportation).
139
Elina Treyger et al., Immigration Enforcement, Policing, and Crime: Evidence from the
Secure Communities Program, 13 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 285 (2014) (concluding that there
was no significant change in crime rates after the implementation of Secure Communities).
140
See, e.g., NDLON BRIEFING GUIDE, supra note 97; TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS
CLEARINGHOUSE, FEW ICE DETAINERS TARGET SERIOUS CRIMINALS (Sept. 2013), http://trac.syr.
edu/immigration/reports/330 [https://perma.cc/8GFH-EX5E] (reporting that 47.7% of those subject to immigration detainers over a sixteen-month period had no criminal conviction at all).
141
See NIK THEODORE, INSECURE COMMUNITIES: LATINO PERCEPTIONS OF POLICE INVOLVEMENT IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 5–17 (May 2013), https://greatcities.uic.edu/wp-content/up
loads/2014/05/Insecure_Communities_Report_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/ARA5-A5C2] (report-
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couraging race-based policing. 142 Finally, despite federal claims that Secure
Communities made communities safer, a study of its implementation found
that it had no impact on crime rates. 143
In addition to policy-based critiques, a series of judicial decisions also
raised legal questions about the use of immigration detainers. 144 In 2014, in
Galarza v. Szalczyk, the Third Circuit held the County of Lehigh, Pennsylvania liable for violating the Fourth Amendment rights of Ernesto Galarza,
a U.S. citizen improperly targeted by immigration officials and held by the
County pursuant to an immigration detainer. 145
Galarza and subsequent decisions made clear that local authorities
could not be required by federal authorities to honor ICE detainer requests:
compliance was voluntary. 146 Those decisions also made clear that localities
that detained individuals based on ICE detainers exposed themselves to liability for illegally detaining individuals without a judicial warrant or probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 147 These and other concerns inspired many localities to decline to participate in the Secure Communities program and to enact local policies limiting their compliance with
immigration detainers. 148
ing on the impact of police involvement in immigration enforcement on Latinos’ perceptions of public safety and their willingness to contact the police).
142
See generally Kevin R. Johnson, Doubling Down on Racial Discrimination: The Racially
Disparate Impacts of Crime-Based Removals, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 993 (2016); Vázquez,
supra note 68. A 2014 study of the Secure Communities program found no significant impact on
arrest rates by ethnicity, although the authors did discuss the obstacles to disaggregating arrest
rates of whites and Latinos. Treyger et al., supra note 139, at 306–08.
143
See Thomas J. Miles & Adam B. Cox, Does Immigration Enforcement Reduce Crime?
Evidence from Secure Communities, 57 J.L. & ECON. 937, 970 (2014) (finding that the Secure
Communities program has no observable effect on the “overall rate of FBI index crime calls”).
144
See Stumpf, supra note 25, at 1279–81.
145
Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 645 (3d Cir. 2014).
146
Galarza, 745 F. 3d at 639–45; Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cty., No. 3:12–cv–02317–
ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at *4–*8 (D. Or. Aug. 22, 2014) (relying on Galarza and other authorities
in rejecting the notion that local officers’ compliance with immigration detainers is mandatory);
see also Mercado v. Dall. Cty., 229 F. Supp. 3d 501, 514–15 (N.D. Tex. 2017) (collecting cases,
and rejecting Dallas County’s argument that holding individuals based on immigration detainers
was required by federal law), abrogated on other grounds by City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 885 F.
3d 332, 356 n.21 (5th Cir. 2018).
147
See, e.g., Galarza, 745 F.3d at 640–42, 645 (concluding the detainer was a request to
states and localities rather than an order, opening the door to municipal liability for unlawfully
detaining a U.S. citizen); Miranda-Olivares, 2014 WL 1414305, at *11 (county’s reliance on an
ICE detainer to hold a noncitizen for two weeks violated the Fourth Amendment); Morales v.
Chadbourne, 996 F. Supp. 2d 19, 39 (D.R.I. 2014) (immigration detainer issued “for purposes of
mere investigation” is impermissible).
148
A state judge in Miami-Dade County recently held that even voluntary compliance with
immigration detainers violated the Tenth Amendment when it was the result of the threat of funding cuts expressed in the Executive Order. Lacroix v. Junior, No. F201700376, 2017 WL
1037454, at *6–*7 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 3, 2017).
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In 2014, noting “the increasing number of federal court decisions that
hold that detainer-based detention by state and local law enforcement agencies violates the Fourth Amendment,” DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson announced that the “Secure Communities program, as we know it, will be discontinued.” 149 The program was immediately replaced with a different program, the Priority Enforcement Program (“PEP”). 150 PEP’s most significant
innovation was a modification of the detainer policy in effect under Secure
Communities. Under PEP, the federal government often requested that local
law enforcement notify ICE about the release of potentially deportable
noncitizens rather than hold individuals past their release date. 151
The Trump administration has reversed course by terminating PEP. 152
In its place, President Trump has revived the defunct Secure Communities
program, which he characterizes as a “[g]ood program.” 153 As part of this
transition back to Secure Communities, the Trump administration will place
detainers on all immigrants who are arrested, regardless of the reason for
arrest or the seriousness of any suspected conduct. 154

149

Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. to Thomas S. Winkowski et al., Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t 1 (Nov. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Secure
Communities Memo], https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_secure_
communities.pdf [https://perma.cc/59ZT-9UNG] (“Governors, mayors, and state and local law
enforcement officials around the country have increasingly refused to cooperate with the program,
and many have issued executive orders or signed laws prohibiting” police entanglement with Secure Communities).
150
Id. at 1–3 (announcing the establishment of PEP). See generally Stumpf, supra note 25
(discussing the transition from Secure Communities to PEP).
151
Secure Communities Memo, supra note 149, at 2; see also U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
FORM I-247N REQUEST FOR VOLUNTARY NOTIFICATION OF RELEASE OF SUSPECTED PRIORITY
ALIEN, https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Document/2016/I-247N.PDF [https://
perma.cc/EB89-ACWY]. Although PEP was associated with an overall decrease in the number of
detainers issued, the wholesale replacement of requests for detention with requests for notification
did not take place. For example, from July through November 2015 only about 17.4% of federal
actions to obtain custody were requests for notification only. Moreover, requests for notification
were concentrated in jurisdictions that had already stopped holding individuals on detainers in part
or in whole under Secure Communities. TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE,
LATEST DATA: IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT DETAINERS (2017), http://trac.syr.
edu/phptools/immigration/detain/ [https://perma.cc/R2CJ-G76D].
152
Interior Enforcement Executive Order, supra note 3, at 8801 (“The Secretary shall immediately take all appropriate action to terminate the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP) described
in the memorandum issued by the Secretary on November 20, 2014 . . . .”).
153
Golshan, supra note 46 (“We will restore the highly successful Secure Communities program. Good program.”); see also Interior Enforcement Executive Order, supra note 3, at 8801
(calling for reinstatement of Secure Communities Program).
154
Golshan, supra note 46 (“We will issue detainers for illegal immigrants who are arrested
for any crime whatsoever, and they will be placed into immediate removal proceedings if we even
have to do that.”).
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5. Other Joint Operations
In addition to the programs already described, the Trump administration plans to rely on a range of additional cooperative arrangements with
local law enforcement to accomplish mass deportation. As Trump told the
crowd in his Phoenix immigration speech: “2 million people. Criminal aliens. We will begin moving them out day one. As soon as I take office. Day
one. In joint operations with local, state and federal law enforcement.” 155
Similarly, former DHS Secretary Kelly ordered that “task forces” that the
federal government uses to enforce immigration law and enhance border
security should “include participants from other federal, state, and local
agencies . . . .” 156
One type of joint operation is the 287(g) agreements already discussed,
but there are many other similar programs that rely on local law enforcement to accomplish federal enforcement goals. 157 For example, Operation
Community Shield is a joint operation that works together with local law
enforcement to target street gangs for criminal prosecution and deportation. 158 This joint operation initiative has been expanded under the Trump
administration and renamed the “National Gang Unit.” 159 Similarly, since
2003 ICE has run a National Fugitive Operations Team that works with lo155
Id. (“We will end the sanctuary cities that have resulted in so many needless deaths.”). The
promise to “end” sanctuary cities was to be fulfilled by “cancel[ing] all federal funding to sanctuary cities” in Trump’s first 100 days in office. See Trump’s Contract, supra note 2.
156
See Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin McAlaneen et al., Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot. 12 (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.dhs.
gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Implementing-the-Presidents-Border-SecurityImmigration-Enforcement-Improvement-Policies.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3H7-VCC7] (“In addition, the task forces should include participants from other federal, state, and local agencies, and
should target individuals and organizations whose criminal conduct undermines border security or
the integrity of the immigration system, including offenses related to alien smuggling or trafficking, drug trafficking, illegal entry and reentry, visa fraud, identity theft, unlawful possession or use
of official documents, and acts of violence committed against persons or property at or near the
border.”).
157
See generally PEW CHARITABLE TRS., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT WITHIN THE NATION’S BORDERS: FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL EFFORTS 6 (July 2014), http://www.pewtrusts.org/
~/media/assets/2014/07/immigrationenforcementbriefjuly2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/69RS-76BX]
(describing different kinds of joint operations); Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention?
Immigration Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J.
1563, 1579–98 (2010) (describing joint operations).
158
National Gang Unit: Operation Community Shield, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (2017), https://www.ice.gov/national-gang-unit [https://perma.cc/XCG5-QF78]; see also
Jennifer M. Chacón, Whose Community Shield? Examining the Removal of the “Criminal Street
Gang Member,” 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 317, 321–33 (tracing the origin and expansion of Operation Community Shield and ICE’s reliance on lists of individuals identified as gang members
based on criteria controlled by state and local police).
159
National Gang Unit, supra note 158.
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cal, state, and federal law enforcement to locate noncitizens with final orders of deportation. 160
By facilitating local-federal cooperation, joint operations risk entangling
jurisdictions in immigration enforcement. The Santa Cruz Police Department
learned this in February 2017 when it participated in a joint raid following a
five-year investigation with ICE’s gang initiative. 161 Although ICE told Santa
Cruz that the operation would target dangerous gang members, individuals
with no gang affiliation were arrested in the raid and deported by ICE. 162
These kinds of “collateral” arrests involuntarily involve local law enforcement in the routine enforcement of immigration law. In Los Angeles, advocacy groups have similarly raised concerns about participation of the Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”) participation in joint raids with the Homeland Security Investigations (“HSI”) 163 and Enforcement and Removal Operations division of ICE. 164 Although purportedly targeting gang and drug
activity, such joint operations have resulted in the “collateral arrest” of noncit-

160
Fact Sheet: ICE Fugitive Operations Program, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/factsheets/pdf/fugops.pdf [https://perma.cc/CG4H-JESH];
National Gang Unit, supra note 158. See generally MARGOT MENDELSON ET AL., MIGRATION
POL’Y INST., COLLATERAL DAMAGE: AN EXAMINATION OF ICE’S FUGITIVE OPERATIONS PROGRAM 1, 5–7 (Feb. 2009), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/ice-fugitive-operationsprogram [https://perma.cc/B5F7-D6L2].
161
Although the Santa Cruz Police Department participated in the joint raid, the Santa Cruz
County Sheriff steered clear when he was unable to obtain satisfactory guarantees that his deputies
would not end up participating in immigration arrests. Hamed Aleaziz, ‘Collateral’ Immigration
Arrests Threaten Key Crime Alliances, S.F. CHRON. (Apr. 28, 2017), http://www.sfchronicle.com/
bayarea/article/Collateral-immigration-arrests-threaten-key-11106426.php [https://perma.cc/9HZLZ3XT].
162
Richard Winton & James Queally, Santa Cruz and Federal Agents in War of Words over
Whether a Gang Sweep Was Really a Secret Immigration Raid, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2017, 9:20 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-santa-cruz-ice-raid-20170223-story.html
[https://
perma.cc/H4C5-JZAK].
163
HSI is the “largest investigative unit” within the DHS. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, BUDGET OVERVIEW: FISCAL YEAR 2018 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION 63 (Oct. 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/CFO/17_
0524_U.S._Immigration_and_Customs_Enforcement.pdf [https://perma.cc/SK2A-FFDM]. Although
it purports to be principally focused on “significant threats to the safety and security of the American public,” under the Trump administration its mission has expanded to include routine immigration arrests. Id.; Aleaziz, supra note 161 (reporting that HSI “is now mandated to make collateral
immigration arrests of nontargeted individuals” encountered during HSI operations). Given that
there are more HSI agents than ICE deportation officers, this expanded mission would “‘effectively double[] immigration enforcement officers in the U.S.’” Id. (quoting Professor Pratheepan Gulasekaram).
164
See Letter from ICE Out of LA Coal. et al. to Charlie Beck, Chief of Police, L.A. Police
Dep’t (Apr. 26, 2016), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3223904-2016-04-26-Letterto-Chief-Beck.html [https://perma.cc/9BHF-ZNSG].
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izen residents for immigration purposes. Such a result conflicts directly with
local sanctuary policies in place in Los Angeles. 165
II. “SANCTUARY” POLICIES IN AN ERA OF MASS DEPORTATION
Part I described the rise of crimmigration and introduced the major
components of Trump’s deportation apparatus—CAP, administrative warrants, 287(g), Secure Communities, and other joint operations. 166 Collectively, these programs generate significant pressure on localities to make
their law enforcement resources available for federal immigration enforcement. In Part II, we turn to an analysis of the policies of “sanctuary” jurisdictions in the United States. Specifically, we focus on how these policies
function to protect community members and limit the involvement of local
government institutions in furthering the Trump administration’s immigration agenda. 167
In conducting our analysis, we collected a set of over 500 sanctuary
policies spanning nearly four decades. To aid other researchers, we have
made full text versions of the all of the laws and policies we collected available in an accompanying online library. 168 Our library of sanctuary policies
focuses on those policies that explicitly address the degree to which local
criminal justice systems and actors interact with federal immigration enforcement. 169
165
Id.; see also David Noriega, Under Trump, Sanctuary Cities May Not Be So Safe, BUZZFEED
NEWS (Dec. 8, 2016, 10:21 AM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/davidnoriega/the-lapd-says-it-wontwork-with-feds-on-deportations-but-it?utm_term=.pqGW90PNJ#.xrQoEp9gA [https://perma.cc/
UPF3-BHH6] (documenting instances of LAPD collaboration with HSI).
166
See supra notes 68–165 and accompanying text.
167
See infra notes 181–248 and accompanying text.
168
See WESTMINSTER LAW LIBR., supra note 10.
169
Some policies that nevertheless affect immigrants with criminal justice involvement exceed our definition of sanctuary policies because they don’t explicity address the degree of interaction between local law enforcement and federal immigration enforcement, and therefore are not
included in our collection of sanctuary policies. For example, we did not include policies that
reduce sentences for low-level misdemeanors to less than 365 days in an attempt to alleviate immigration consequences of convictions. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 18.5 (West Supp. 2018)
(“Every offense which is prescribed by any law of the state to be punishable by imprisonment in a
country jail up to or not exceeding one year shall be punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for a
period not to exceed 364 days.”); Jon Murray & Noelle Phillips, Denver Is Set to Change Its Sentencing Ordinance to Help Some Immigrants Avoid Deportation, DENV. POST (Apr. 27, 2017, 4:35 PM),
https://www.denverpost.com/2017/04/27/denver-sentencing-reform-immigrants-deportation/ [https://
perma.cc/E6KN-7DVQ]. Policies encouraging or affecting cite-and-release practices (in lieu of arrest) similarly can change the shape of the criminal justice-to-deportation pipeline, but often do
not explicly relate to immigration, and are therefore not included. See Eagly, supra note 138, at
1157–69 (describing various “alienage-neutral” policies in place in Los Angeles, California affecting immigrants).
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We relied on a range of techniques to identify and collect our set of
sanctuary policies for analysis. We identified many policies by scouring
academic sources, 170 issue papers, 171 news articles, 172 and online collections
of policies accumulated by advocacy groups across the political spectrum. 173 We also obtained copies of the policies through public records requests, communications with practitioners, and internet and other online
research. 174 Because our authors have been engaged in scholarship, research, and advocacy relating to sanctuary policies, many policies (particularly those enacted in the last decade) were already known to us. Although
we cannot claim to have surveyed every sanctuary policy, we believe our
collection of policies provides the largest single collection available of the
various policies that have been enacted since the 1980s.
Based on our review of the collected policies, we identified five principle types of legal and policy initiatives adopted by jurisdictions. These
five types, which we discuss in Part II, are: (1) barring investigations into
immigration violations; (2) limiting compliance with ICE detainers and administrative warrants; (3) limiting ICE’s access to local jails; (4) limiting
disclosure of sensitive information; and (5) declining to participate in joint
operations. 175 We introduce each category of policy, drawing on examples
170
See, e.g., Jorge L. Carro, Municipal and State Sanctuary Declarations: Innocuous Symbolism or Improper Dictates?, 16 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 297, 297–98 & nn. 1–4 (1989) (identifying
sanctuary provisions); Daniel D. McMillan, City Sanctuary Resolutions and the Preemption Doctrine: Much Ado About Nothing, 20 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 513, 516–17 & nn.19–21 (1987) (listing
thirteen cities and one state, New Mexico, as self-identified “sanctuary” jurisdictions); Pham,
Constitutional Right, supra note 6, at 1382–84 (examining sanctuary laws enacted in the 1980s);
id. at 1386–91 (examining sanctuary laws passed after 9/11).
171
See, e.g., MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA & KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STATE
AND LOCAL “SANCTUARY” POLICIES LIMITING PARTICIPATION IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
(July 2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43457.pdf [https://perma.cc/M73M-QGRP]; LISA M.
SEGHETTI ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ENFORCING IMMIGRATION LAW: THE ROLE OF STATE
AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 26 & nn.85–87 (Aug. 2006), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/
library/P1072.pdf [https://perma.cc/KWD2-L8WZ].
172
See, e.g., James Coates, In New Sanctuary Debate, Fine Line Divides Criminal, Refugee,
CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 29, 1985), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1985-12-29/news/8503300162_1_
skid-row-ordinance-seattle-city-council [https://perma.cc/W7KP-VJE9] (identifying eleven cities
with “sanctuary ordinances”).
173
See, e.g., FED’N FOR AM. IMMIGRATION REFORM, SANCTUARY POLICIES ACROSS THE U.S.
(Oct. 2013), https://www.scribd.com/document/180487047/Sanctuary-Policies-Across-the-U-S [https://
perma.cc/MJ5A-57C8]; NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., LAWS, RESOLUTIONS AND POLICIES INSTITUTED ACROSS THE U.S. LIMITING ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAWS BY STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES (Dec. 2008), http://www.ailadownloads.org/advo/NILC-LocalLawsResolutions
AndPoliciesLimitingImmEnforcement.pdf [https://perma.cc/2W6T-DMBT].
174
We were able to search archived versions of local policies by using the Internet Archive
Wayback Machine. See WAYBACK MACHINE, http://web.archive.org.
175
In choosing the five most common policy types to analyze, we acknowledge that there are
other important types of policies that also serve to disentangle the immigration system from local
law enforcement. For example, policies to limit courthouse immigration arrests seem to be taking
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of state laws, municipal ordinances and resolutions, and internal sheriff and
police regulations and policies. 176
The Trump presidency has driven localities to clarify their role in immigration enforcement. Local officials must consider how best to respond to
the divisive racial tenor of the Trump administration’s immigration policy
pronouncements within their communities. But whereas some jurisdictions
have newly embraced the sanctuary policies we discuss in this Part since the
election, others have had such policies in place for decades. 177 In addition,
some policies, such as detainer policies, developed in response to developments in federal law or policy that pre-date the Trump presidency.
Regardless of when these policies were enacted, they share some
common characteristics. For example, the Trump administration has sought
to bring sanctuary jurisdictions to heel by claiming that their policies violate
8 U.S.C. § 1373, 178 a provision of the federal code that prohibits localities
from preventing their employees from exchanging citizenship or immigration status information of individuals with federal officials. 179 But, as our
description of the policies in this Part makes clear, many disentanglement
policies do not restrict the sharing of information about citizenship or im-

on greater importance. See generally Christopher N. Lasch, A Common-Law Privilege to Protect
State and Local Courts During the Crimmigration Crisis, 127 YALE L.J. F. 410, 410–14 (2017). For
examples of courthouse policies, see New Mexico, Second Judicial Dist. Court, Policy No. 2017SJDC-010 (Nov. 20, 2017), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=41672578 [https://perma.
cc/3AK2-PG96] (prohibiting courthouse arrests except in narrow circumstances); cf. N.Y. Gov’r
Exec. Order No. 170.1 (Apr. 25, 2018), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=41665592
[https://perma.cc/T2FM-72RW] (prohibiting immigration arrests, except “when accompanied by a
judicial warrant,” in New York “state facilities”).
176
For an alternative approach to organizing policies addressing or limiting cooperation with
federal immigration authorities, see generally Huyen Pham, A Framework for Understanding
Subfederal Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 13 UNIV. ST. THOMAS L. REV. 508, 511–24 (2017)
(introducing six models for local law enforcement participation in immigration enforcement based
on the level of cooperation with federal immigration authorities).
177
According to a study conducted by the Immigrant Legal Resource Center, as of 2016 over
600 counties across the country had in place some rules or regulations limiting local law enforcement participation in federal immigration enforcement. GRABER & MARQUEZ, supra note 25, at
11; see also National Map, supra note 26 (publishing a map that “shows the degree to which local
law enforcement offer assistance to federal immigration authorities, as well as the degree to which
localities have enacted laws or policies limiting their involvement in federal immigration enforcement”).
178
Lai & Lasch, supra note 9, at 557–62 (describing the Trump administration’s use of
§ 1373 against sanctuary jurisdictions).
179
8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2012) (providing that “a Federal, State, or local government entity or
official may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending to,
or receiving from [federal immigration authorities] information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual”). Section 1373 is arguably unenforceable.
See infra notes 222–226 and accompanying text.
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migration status and therefore cannot run afoul of § 1373. 180 Under federal
law, localities have discretion to decide whether they will engage in local
policing activity that may result in deportation.
A. Barring Investigation of Civil and Criminal Immigration Violations
Perhaps the most common type of sanctuary policy is a requirement
that police not investigate civil or criminal immigration violations. 181 These
types of internal policies, which have been called “don’t police” policies, 182
are important given that local law enforcement officers can act as deportation “gatekeepers” when they arrest noncitizens. 183 Such policies generally
prevent law enforcement from asking questions about immigration status or
otherwise enforcing civil immigration law violations. 184 Some “don’t police” policies go further and prevent police from investigating criminal immigration law violations. 185
An early example of a “don’t police” policy is the LAPD’s “Special
Order Number 40,” issued by Chief Daryl Gates in 1979. 186 Special Order
40 prohibits officers from “initiat[ing] police action with the objective of
discovering the alien status of a person.” 187 In addition, it prevents officers
from arresting or booking persons for illegal entry into the United States
under 8 U.S.C. § 1325. 188 Similarly, in 1989, San Francisco adopted a “City
and County of Refuge” ordinance that provides that state and local officials
“have no duty . . . to enforce the civil aspects of the federal immigration
laws.” 189 More recently, in 2008, the City of Hartford, Connecticut enacted
180

See generally Ingrid V. Eagly, Immigrant Protective Policies in Criminal Justice, 95 TEX.
L. REV. 245, 254–64 (2016) (discussing such policies).
181
Id.; see also Eisha Jain, Understanding Immigrant Protective Policies in Criminal Justice,
95 TEX. L. REV. 161 (2017) (noting that protective policing practices can help to ameliorate the
collateral consequences that flow from arrest).
182
Eagly, supra note 180, at 258.
183
Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, State
and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1856 (2011) (noting that
the “core problem” with local enforcement of immigration is that it makes local police and sheriffs
“act as gatekeepers” in the immigration system).
184
Eagly, supra note 180, at 261–64.
185
Id.
186
Office of the Chief of Police, L.A. Police Dep’t, Special Order No. 40, Undocumented
Aliens (Nov. 27, 1979) [hereinafter LAPD Special Order], http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?
content_id=34432079 [https://perma.cc/22MQ-KNBT].
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
S.F., Cal., Ordinance No. 375-89 (Oct. 24, 1989) [hereinafter S.F. Ordinance], http://
libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34432127 [https://perma.cc/8CPS-HLVE] (internal quotation marks omitted). New York City made similar observations about federal responsibility for
immigration enforcement in enacting Executive Order 124. See N.Y.C., N.Y., Exec. Order No.
124 (Aug. 7, 1989) [hereinafter NYC Exec. Order], http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=
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an ordinance restricting any employee from “inquir[ing] about . . . confidential information,” including immigration status, except when “necessary to
the provision of the city service in question.” 190
Some states have also restricted their police agencies from enforcing
civil immigration law. In 1987, Oregon passed a state law prohibiting law
enforcement throughout the state, including political subdivisions of the state,
from enforcing civil immigration law. 191 In 2014 the State of Vermont passed
a law requiring that all local law enforcement agencies adopt a “model fair
and impartial policing policy” that prohibits policing civil immigration violations. 192 Among other restrictions, the model policy adopted in 2017 specifies
that local law enforcement in Vermont may not: (1) ask for a “person’s civil
immigration status unless it is necessary to the ongoing investigation of a
criminal offense”; (2) use suspicion of a person’s undocumented status as a
basis for initiating contact, detaining, or arresting that person; or (3) attempt
“to enforce federal criminal law” where the only violation is “unauthorized
presence in the country[,] . . . a civil infraction.” 193 And, in 2017, the California Values Act was enacted, similarly prohibiting local law enforcement from
expending resources “to investigate, interrogate, detain, detect, or arrest persons for immigration enforcement purposes . . . .” 194

34436598 [https://perma.cc/5NHT-TTYU] (“Federal law places full responsibility for immigration control on the federal government. With limited exceptions, the City therefore has no legal
obligation to report any alien to federal authorities. The executive order, in recognition of this lack
of obligation and the importance of providing the services covered herein, requires City agencies
to preserve the confidentiality of all information respecting law-abiding aliens to the extent permitted by law.”).
190
Hartford, Conn., Mun. Code ch. 2, art. XXI, §§ 2-925 to -929 (2008) [hereinafter Hartford
Ordinance], http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34434291 [https://perma.cc/NDX9-Z9X8].
191
OR. REV. STAT. § 181A.820 (West Supp. 2017) (formerly ORE. REV. STAT. § 181.850,
enacted Laws 1987, c. 467, § 1).
192
2014 Vermont Laws No. 193, § 3 (S. 184) (June 17, 2014), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.
php?content_id= 35254870 [https://perma.cc/BFW4-VS6K] (amending VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,
§ 2366). The 2014 legislation required the State Criminal Justice Training Council to develop a
model fair and impartial policing policy, and further required each law enforcement agency in
Vermont to to adopt a policy “that includes, at a minimum, the elements” of the model policy. Id.
(emphasis added).
193
VT. CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRAINING COUNCIL, MODEL FAIR AND IMPARTIAL POLICING
POLICY ¶¶ VIII, IX (2017) [hereinafter 2017 VERMONT MODEL POLICING POLICY], http://lib
guides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=41582278 [https://perma.cc/65SB-SCMY]. The model policy also specifies that law enforcement may not “arrest or detain any individual based on an immigration ‘administrative warrant’ or ‘immigration detainer.’” Id. ¶ VIII(d).
194
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7284.6 (West Supp. 2018) (enacted as part of California S.B. 54 (Oct.
5, 2017)).
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B. Limiting Compliance with Immigration Detainers and
Administrative Warrants
Federal pressure to participate in immigration enforcement has
prompted a second type of local disentanglement policy: limiting compliance with immigration detainers and administrative immigration warrants.
Given the Secure Communities program’s reliance on immigration detainers, declining these federal requests has become a prominent way by which
localities are expressing resistance to the program.
Practices limiting detainer compliance are found in a range of local ordinances, state laws, and internal policing directives. Early examples of
such policies typically stopped short of denying all requests to extend detention for deportation purposes. For example, the California and Connecticut TRUST Acts mandated that localities decline detainers unless issued
against persons with certain criminal charges or convictions. 195 Similarly,
local policies in Cook County, Illinois and New York City included numerous criminal history-based exceptions to the general rule of not complying
with immigration detainers. 196
More recent policies now provide that juridictions not honor any detainer unless it is accompanied by a judicial warrant or other documentation
establishing probable cause of a crime. For example, the Alameda County
Sheriff’s Office has announced that it will decline all immigration detainers
from ICE, distinguishing between “an arrest warrant signed by a judge, and
an immigration detainer signed by an ICE Agent.” 197 The weight of judicial
195

CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7282 (West 2018); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-192h (2017).
See Cook Cty., Ill. Ordinance No. 11-O-73 (Sept. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Cook Ordinance],
http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34434520 [https://perma.cc/Z87Y-MJBS] (allowing detainer compliance where target of detainer “is convicted of a serious or violent felony offense for which he or she is currently in custody” or “has been convicted of a serious or violent
felony within 10 years of the request, or was released after having served a sentence for a serious
or violent felony within 5 years of the request, whichever is later”); N.Y.C., N.Y., Local Law No.
62 (Nov. 22, 2011) [hereinafter NYC Local Law 62], http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_
id=34436609 [https://perma.cc/5YE9-VNM4] (including numerous crime-based exceptions to
non-compliance with detainers).
197
Memorandum from Colby Staysa, Captain, Alameda Cty. Sheriff’s Office, to Det. & Corr.
Pers. (May 21, 2014) [hereinafter Alameda Memorandum], http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?
content_id=34432481 [https://perma.cc/7DEK-CN8V]; see also Cook Ordinance, supra note 196
(allowing no compliance with detainers whatsoever, absent written agreement for reimbursement
of costs); Walla Walla Cty. Sheriff’s Office, Special Order No. 2014-002 (Apr. 29, 2014),
http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34437104 [https://perma.cc/3GVN-RUMM] (ordering the Walla Walla County Sheriff’s Office to cease holding individuals in custody “when the
only authority for such custody is a request contained in a DHS ICE immigration detainer” unless
there is “independent information” from a law enforcement agency establishing “sufficient legal
basis for detention, such as probable cause or a confirmed warrant”); CTY. SHERIFFS OF COLO.,
WHAT AUTHORITY DO SHERIFFS HAVE RELATING TO IMMIGRATION LAW? 1 (Dec. 2016), http://
libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34434218 [https://perma.cc/SP5Z-SELL] (“Outside of
196
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decisions now firmly establishes that the federal government cannot require
jurisdictions to comply with detainers. 198 Courts have also made clear that
holding someone on a detainer amounts to a new arrest that must comply
with the Constitution. 199
In addition, many jurisdictions have implemented policies prohibiting
detention based not only on immigration detainers but also on administrative immigration warrants for arrest. The Princeton Police Department, for
example, has a General Order prohibiting police from “arrest[ing] or otherwise detain[ing] persons” based on an ICE administrative warrant contained
in the NCIC database. 200 An administrative arrest warrant is a document
issued by an ICE official stating that the officer has determined there is
probable cause to believe that an individual is subject to removal. 201 Unlike
criminal arrest warrants, administrative arrest warrants are neither issued by
a judge nor based on sworn testimony, and the statute and regulation that

legally recognized exigent circumstances, we cannot hold persons in jail at the request of a local
police officer or a federal agent. To do so, would violate the 4th Amendment to the US Constitution.”); Karl S. Leonard, A Special Message from Sheriff Karl Leonard, CHESTERFIELD CTY. SHERIFF’S OFFICE (Oct. 12, 2015), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34436987 [https://
perma.cc/7SK7-2A7X] (explaining that “an ICE detainer request is not issued by the court” and
therefore “is not a legal document allowing the Sheriff’s Office to legally detain an inmate for
additional time unrelated to the original criminal charge”); Alameda Memorandum, supra (declaring that the Sheriff’s Office would henceforth decline immigration detainers from ICE, and distinguishing between “an arrest warrant signed by a judge, and an immigration detainer signed by an
ICE Agent”).
198
See supra notes 145–146 and accompanying text.
199
See Secure Communities Memo, supra note 149, at 2 n.1 (citing cases for this propostion).
200
Princeton, N.J. Police Dep’t, General Order, Enforcement of Immigration Laws 3 (Nov.
11, 2013) [hereinafter Princeton PD General Order], http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_
id=34435940 [https://perma.cc/2H8H-ZRHT] (“Officers shall not arrest or otherwise detain persons who are entered in the NCIC/SCIC system by [ICE] unless the entry is for an actual criminal
arrest warrant . . . . An NCIC/SCIC immigration status warning hit is not an arrest warrant and as
such, officers have no authority to detain or arrest on the basis of an immigration status warning.”); see also Hartford Ordinance, supra note 190, § 2-928 (“Hartford police officers shall not
make arrests or detain individuals based on administrative warrants for removal entered by ICE
into the National Crime Information Center database.”); GRAND ISLE CTY. SHERIFF’S DEP’T, FAIR
AND IMPARTIAL POLICING POLICY ¶ 5 (2016), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=344
37064 [https://perma.cc/LRZ9-CEGH] (“Administrative warrants, immigration detainers, and
requests for notification issued by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) have not been
reviewed by a neutral magistrate and do not have the authority of a judicial warrant. Therefore,
Grand Isle County Sheriff’s Department members shall not comply with such requests.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted); NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEP’T, OPERATIONS MANUAL, ch. 41.6.1,
¶¶ 15–16 (Sept. 25, 2016) [hereinafter NOPD POLICY], http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?
content_id=34434807 [https://perma.cc/6LJ4-AL6A] (providing that “members shall take no action against an individual in response to an ICE administrative warrant” but allowing for execution
of criminal warrants).
201
FORM I-200 WARRANT, supra note 125.
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mention these warrants identify no standard of proof for their issuance. 202
Until March 2017, DHS did not even require ICE officials to obtain an administrative warrant before issuing a detainer. 203 The lack of judicial and
constitutional safeguards for administrative arrest warrants arguably render
the federal government’s reliance on them constitutionally suspect. 204 But
even if they properly authorize ICE to conduct an arrest, they do not necessarily authorize local authorities to do so. 205
C. Refusing ICE Access to Jails
Another way in which local jurisdictions have protected immigrants is
by declining to let ICE agents enter their local jails. Indeed, the CAP program introduced in Part I relied on local jail access to interview and deport
inmates held in local custody. 206 Information obtained from in-person interviews of inmates is also significant for the Secure Communities program, as
it supplements data available through the fingerprint-sharing function.
Limiting ICE access to jails was a critical part of New York City’s effort to disentangle local law enforcement from ICE. On February 14, 2015,
immigration authorities were shut out of the New York City jail at Riker’s
Island pursuant to New York City Local Law 58, which prohibited federal
officials from “maintain[ing] an office or quarters on land over which the
[Department of Corrections] exercises jurisdiction, for the purpose of investigating possible violations of civil immigration law . . . .” 207
202

See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(e)(3) (2017).
ICE POLICY 10074.2, supra note 129, ¶ 2.4.
See El Badrawi v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 579 F. Supp. 2d 249, 276 (D. Conn. 2008)
(finding an ICE detainer was a “warrantless” arrest because its validity had not been inspected by
a “neutral magistrate [or] . . . executive official”); see also United States v. Toledo, 615 F. Supp.
2d 453, 455, 457 n.2 (S.D. W. Va. 2009) (treating ICE warrant as invalid because it could not be
executed by local law enforcement officials); Ochoa v. Campbell, 266 F. Supp. 3d 1237, 1252–53
(E.D. Wash. 2017), appeal dismissed as moot sub nom. Sanchez Ochoa v. Campbell, 716 Fed.
App’x 741 (9th Cir. 2018) (noting infirmities in administrative warrant in that it was not issued by
a neutral official and provided no factual details to support probable cause determination).
205
The Supreme Court has noted that administrative immigration arrest warrants are “executed by federal officers who have received training in the enforcement of immigration law.” Arizona
v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 408 (2012) (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.2(b), 287.5(e)(3) (2012)).
206
See, e.g., Letter from Jim McDonnell, Sheriff, Cty. of L.A., to Bd. of Supervisors, Cty. of
L.A. (Sept. 22, 2015), http://libguides.law.ucla.edu/ld.php?content_id=16697631 [https://perma.cc/
PLA2-35CM] (describing a policy under which ICE would be permitted to interview certain jail
inmates and “allowed access to all inmates” during the release process); Vanessa Rancano, Fresno
Sheriff’s ICE Partnership May Give a Glimpse of Trump-Era Deportations, KQED NEWS (Mar. 3,
2017), https://ww2.kqed.org/news/2017/03/03/fresno-sheriffs-ice-partnership-may-give-a-glimpseof-trump-era-deportations/ [https://perma.cc/H43B-ETTV] (describing partnership between Fresno Sheriff and ICE that allows for interviews of immigrants in the jail).
207
N.Y.C., N.Y., Local Law No. 58, § 4 (Nov. 14, 2014), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?
content_id= 35216927 [https://perma.cc/878M-V6JJ]; see also Mayor Bill de Blasio Signs into
203
204
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Similar measures are now in place in other jurisdictions. For example,
in Cook County, Illinois and Richmond, California ICE agents are not allowed to enter the local jails without a criminal warrant or other legitimate
law enforcement purpose other than civil immigration enforcement. 208 In
the District of Columbia, local law enforcement may not provide ICE “an
office, booth, or any facility or equipment for a generalized search of or
inquiry about inmates . . . .” 209 Santa Clara, California will not allow ICE
agents to enter their county jails for “investigative interviews or other purposes . . . .” 210
And, although not an absolute bar to jail access, some policies have attempted to create a procedural firewall between noncitizens and federal immigration authorities by requiring a Miranda-type warning in the event ICE
seeks to interview inmates. As one example, the California TRUTH Act requires inmates be provided with a “written consent form” and be given the
opportunity to decline an ICE interview or have a representative present before proceeding. 211 These sorts of protections help fill a gap created by
Law Bills to Dramatically Reduce New York City’s Cooperation with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Deportations, NYC.GOV (Nov. 14, 2014), http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-themayor/news/520-14/mayor-bill-de-blasio-signs-law-bills-dramatically-reduce-new-york-city-scooperation-with#/0 [https://perma.cc/5WXE-FW7R].
208
Cook Ordinance, supra note 196 (“Unless ICE agents have a criminal warrant, or County
officials have a legitimate law enforcement purpose that is not related to the enforcement of immigration laws, ICE agents shall not be given access to individuals or allowed to use County facilities for investigative interviews or other purposes . . . .”); RICHMOND POLICE DEP’T, POLICY
MANUAL ¶ 428.2.4 (Aug. 2013), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34433110 [https://
perma.cc/TK4A-UBJ8] (prohibiting ICE from accessing holding facilities without “federal warrant
or order signed by a judge” and prohibiting access to police booking records without supervisor’s
authorization); see also ORLEANS PARISH SHERIFF’S OFFICE, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (ICE) PROCEDURES (June 21, 2013) [hereinafter ORLEANS PARISH POLICY], http://
libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34434891 [https://perma.cc/BN2N-8KHK] (“Absent a
criminal warrant or court order transferring custody, no ICE agent shall be permitted into the secure area of the Intake and Processing Center.”).
209
D.C. Act 19-379 (June 15, 2012), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34434376
[https://perma.cc/DEF4-KHH8].
210
Santa Clara Cty., Cal., Policy Res. No. 2011-504, Exhibit A, § 3.54 (Oct. 18, 2011) [hereinafter 2011 Santa Clara Policy], http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34432167 [https://
perma.cc/E2GV-QV8W] (mandating that ICE agents “shall not be given access to individuals or
be allowed to use County facilities for investigative interviews or other purposes”).
211
A.B. 2792, ch. 768, 2015–16 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?
content_id=34433572 [https://perma.cc/N832-HKMJ]; see also D.C. Act 19-379, supra note 209,
sec. 2, § 7(d)(1) (prohibiting the District from “permit[ting] an ICE agent to conduct an individualized interview of an inmate without giving the inmate an opportunity to have counsel present”);
D.C., Mayor’s Order No. 2011-174 (Oct. 19, 2011), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_
id=34434367 [https://perma.cc/WA3P-XLBB] (requiring, prior to interview of inmate by ICE, “a
disclosure to the inmate that all information provided to federal agents, including ICE agents, may
be used in a criminal, immigration, deportation, or other collateral cases”); ORLEANS PARISH
POLICY, supra note 208 (requiring as precondition to ICE interviews of inmates held by the sheriff
that ICE “notify the subject inmate’s attorney, provide a reasonable opportunity for counsel to be
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federal court decisions extending the booking exception for Miranda to
questioning by ICE agents—even if the information elicited is inculpatory—
so long as there is an administrative purpose to the questioning. 212
D. Limiting Disclosure of Sensitive Information
Many sanctuary jurisdictions have sought to impose limits on the unnecessary sharing of sensitive information about their residents. Sensitive information may include citizenship and immigration status as well as other information that residents would be fearful of being disclosed to third parties. 213
Two types of limitations on the sharing of sensitive information appear
in the local policies we studied. First, some jurisdictions limit the sharing of
confidential information about residents by city or county officials, including law enforcement, to encourage residents to feel safer when accessing
local services or interacting with local government authorities. These limitations can encompass information about citizenship or immigration status,
but often are not limited to such. 214 Hartford’s restriction on disclosure of
“confidential information,” for example, encompasses an individual’s sexual orientation, status as a victim of domestic violence or sexual assault, status as a crime witness, receipt of public assistance, as well as immigration
status and “all information contained in any individual’s income tax records.” 215 Los Angeles takes a functional approach, protecting personally
identifying information, described as information the City possess which
could allow someone to determine citizenship or immigration status. 216
Second, local jurisdictions have established policies declining to provide information in response to requests by ICE about the release dates of
present during the interview, and certify to OPSO that this notice and opportunity has occurred”);
PHILA. DEP’T OF PRISONS, INMATE CONSENT FORM—ICE INTERVIEW (on file with authors).
212
See Anjana Malhotra, The Immigrant and Miranda, 66 SMU L. REV. 277, 322–23 (2013)
(discussing the overreliance on the subjective purpose of questioning in applying the booking
exception to Miranda).
213
See NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., SAMPLE LANGUAGE FOR POLICIES LIMITING THE
ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAW BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES 3, 6 (Nov. 2004), http://www.
ailadownloads.org/advo/NILC-SampleLanguageForPolicies.pdf [https://perma.cc/KN6W-DNQK]
(defining “confidential information” to include immigration status as well as sexual orientation,
status as a victim of domestic violence or sexual assault, receipt of public benefits, and all information disclosed in income tax records).
214
See, e.g., Hartford Ordinance, supra note 190, § 2-926 (defining “confidential information” to include immigration status); id. § 2-929 (limiting disclosure of “confidential information”); Seattle, Wash., Res. No. 31730, § 1(M) (Jan. 30, 2017) [hereinafter Seattle Resolution],
http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34437121 [https://perma.cc/L24Q-TXTY]; Los
Angeles, Cal., Exec. Directive No. 20 (Mar. 21, 2017) [hereinafter L.A. Directive], http://lib
guides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=35642839 [https://perma.cc/LE8K-MXGN].
215
Hartford Ordinance, supra note 190, § 2-926.
216
L.A. Directive, supra note 214, at 4.
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inmates held in local jails. 217 By not notifying immigration authorities about
the time and place of an individual’s release from custody, these jurisdictions are refusing to facilitate the individual’s arrest by ICE. For example, a
2011 Cook County, Illinois ordinance directed that, without a “criminal
warrant” or “legitimate law enforcement purpose . . . not related to the enforcement of immigration laws,” County officials “shall not expend their
time responding to ICE inquiries or communicating with ICE regarding individuals’ incarceration status or release dates while on duty.” 218 New York
City similarly requires a judicial warrant as a requisite to notification of
release dates. 219
The Trump administration has claimed that policies limiting the exchange of information between local officials and federal immigration officials violate federal law, pointing to 8 U.S.C. § 1373. 220 But many of the
policies that the administration has criticized on this basis do not limit the
sharing of citizenship and immigration status information and thus fall outside the reach of § 1373. This is particularly true of policies that limit notification of release dates of individuals in local custody. 221
217
These policies are sometimes a part of broader policies limiting compliance with ICE
detainers, which also cover ICE’s requests for prolonged detention of inmates otherwise entitled to
release. See supra notes 195–205 and accompanying text (discussing resistance to complying with
immigration detainers).
218
Cook Ordinance, supra note 196; see also NYC Local Law 62, supra note 196, § 9131(b)(1) (prohibiting notification in certain circumstances); ORLEANS PARISH POLICY, supra
note 208 (prohibiting sheriffs from notifying ICE of release dates); 2011 Santa Clara Policy, supra
note 210 (“County personnel shall not expend County time or resources responding to ICE inquiries or communicating with ICE regarding individuals’ incarceration status or release dates.”).
219
See NYC Local Law 62, supra note 196, § 9-131(b)(1).
220
See supra note 186 and accompanying text; Sessions Remarks, supra note 52 (pointing to
§ 1373 in support of the claim that sanctuary jurisdictions “violate federal law”).
221
Steinle v. City & Cty. of S.F., 230 F. Supp. 3d 994, 1015 (N.D. Cal. 2017). The court in
Steinle explained that the restrictions of § 1373 are plain, and that “no plausible reading of
[§ 1373’s] ‘information regarding . . . citizenship or immigration status’ encompasses the release
date of an undocumented inmate.” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a)). Many other types of disentanglement likewise do not implicate § 1373’s narrow mandate because they do not address “information regarding . . . citizenship or immigration status.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
For examples, policies that prohibit police from investigating the civil immigration status of local
residents, see supra notes 181–194 and accompanying text, do not violate § 1373 because they
regulate the circumstances in which officers may inquire into citizenship and immigration status,
not whether they can maintain or voluntarily share that information with federal authorities. Likewise, policies that determine whether local law enforcement should detain inmates beyond their
release date at the request of federal immigration officials, see supra notes 195–205 and accompanying text, do not implicate § 1373 because such policies are directed at whether local law enforcement may take action, i.e., hold someone based on suspected immigration status, rather than
at communication with ICE. See Sturgeon v. Bratton, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 718, 731 (Ct. App. 2009)
(holding that LAPD Special Order Number 40 “addresses only the initiation of police action and
arrests for illegal entry,” and § 1373 “does not address the initiation of police action or arrests for
illegal entry; it addresses only communications with ICE”).
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Furthermore, § 1373 arguably amounts to an unconstitutional intrusion
on state sovereignty. 222 At a minimum, it must be construed narrowly to
avoid unduly infringing on state sovereignty. 223 In City of New York v. United States, the only federal court decision to directly address § 1373’s constitutionality, the Second Circuit rejected New York City’s facial challenge to
§ 1373 but acknowledged that applying § 1373 to bar “generalized confidentiality policies that are necessary to the performance of legitimate municipal functions” could run afoul of the Tenth Amendment. 224 Following
the decision, the City Mayor issued precisely the kind of “generalized confidentiality policy” the court suggested would be permissible, 225 and as discussed earlier, other jurisdictions have followed suit. 226
222

See Robert A. Mikos, Can the States Keep Secrets from the Federal Government?, 161 U.
PA. L. REV. 103, 159–64 (2012) (arguing that § 1373 imposes information-sharing requirements that
violate Tenth Amendment’s anti-commandeering principle); see also Ilya Somin, Why Trump’s Executive Order on Sanctuary Cities Is Unconstitutional, WASH. POST (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/01/26/constitutional-problems-with-trumpsexecutive-order-on-sanctuary-cities/?utm_term= .3db1ce3a9223 [https://perma.cc/65MX-UXB8]
(arguing that § 1373 violates the Tenth Amendment because it is an attempt by the federal government “to prevent states from controlling their employees’ use of information that ‘is available
to them only in their official capacity’”). The City and County of San Francisco, in its lawsuit
challenging President Trump’s executive order threatening to defund sanctuary jurisdiction, has
argued that § 1373 is facially unconstitutional. S.F. Complaint, supra note 57, at 20 (arguing
§ 1373 cannot be constitutionally applied to prohibit confidentiality requirements in San Francisco’s Sanctuary City law “enacted to further legitimate local interests grounded in the basic police
powers of local government and related to public health and safety”).
223
See Letter from Christopher N. Lasch et al., Assoc. Professor, Univ. of Denver Sturm Coll.
Of Law, to Bob Goodlatte, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary & Zoe Lofgren, Ranking Member,
Subcomm. on Immigration & Border Sec. 6–10 (Sept. 26, 2016), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/
JU/JU01/20160927/105392/HHRG-114-JU01-20160927-SD003.pdf [https://perma.cc/BDT7-BPNZ]
(arguing § 1373 must be “construed narrowly” to avoid “serious constitutional concerns”).
224
City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 36–37 (2d Cir. 1999) (emphasis added).
The Second Circuit explained that New York’s policy, far from being a generalized confidentiality
provision, “single[d] out a particular federal policy for non-cooperation while allowing City employees to share freely the information in question with the rest of the world.” Id. at 37.
225
N.Y.C., N.Y., Exec. Order No. 41 (Sept. 17, 2003), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?
content_id=34436585 [https://perma.cc/AX85-X8S4]; McCormick, supra note 14, at 188–89; see
also Winnie Hu, Mayor Widens Privacy Rights for Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2003),
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/18/nyregion/mayor-widens-privacy-rights-for-immigrants.html
[https://perma.cc/CCE2-SHL4] (discussing Mayor Bloomberg’s 2003 executive order).
226
See supra note 214 (collecting policies); see also New Haven Dep’t of Police Serv., General Order No. 06-2, Disclosure of Status Information: Policies and Procedures ¶ III.B (Sept. 22,
2006) [hereinafter New Haven PD Order], http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34434251
[https://perma.cc/TC76-62RY] (justifying non-disclosure policy on the ground that “[o]btaining
pertinent information may in some cases be difficult or impossible if some expectation of confidentiality is not preserved, and preserving confidentiality in turn requires that the department regulate the use of such information by its employees”); S.F. Complaint, supra note 57, at 20 (arguing
§ 1373 cannot be constitutionally applied to prohibit confidentiality requirements in San Francisco’s Sanctuary City law “enacted to further legitimate local interests grounded in the basic police
powers of local government and related to public health and safety”).
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In addition to the examples discussed above, Santa Ana, California recently passed an ordinance with broad confidentiality protections distinguishable from the problematic policy at issue in City of New York. The
Santa Ana City Council decreed that sensitive information would not be
disclosed unless required by law, but the ordinance defines “sensitive information” broadly to include:
any information that may be considered sensitive or personal by
nature, including a person’s status as a victim of domestic abuse or
sexual assault; status as a victim or witness to a crime generally;
citizenship or immigration status; status as a recipient of public assistance; sexual orientation; biological sex or gender identity; or
disability. 227
Local confidentiality policies such as Santa Ana’s are particularly important in the Trump era. The Trump administration has abandoned policies
previously in place under the Obama administration that allowed certain
immigrants to be considered for a favorable exercise of prosecutorial discretion, including victims, witnesses, and those who had experienced violations of their civil rights, employment, or housing rights. 228 These and other
individuals who have important reasons to interact with local government
officials will no longer receive protection from deportation if they end up in
the hands of ICE.
E. Precluding Participation in Joint Operations with
Federal Immigration Enforcement
A fifth type of sanctuary policy limits local participation in joint operations with federal immigration officials. Joint operations are collaborative
law enforcement efforts in which federal law enforcement relies on local
law enforcement to provide boots on the ground. When joint operations target immigrants for deportation, local law officials become participants in
the federal government’s deportation efforts.
Local law enforcement is under renewed pressure in the Trump era to
designate local officers to enforce immigration law through a common type

227
Santa Ana, Cal., Ordinance No. NS-2908 §§ 3–4, 9 (Jan. 17, 2017), http://libguides.law.
du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34432113 [https://perma.cc/2HEA-QGU2]. The limitation applies to all
city agencies and employees, including law enforcement.
228
See Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, to All
Field Office Dirs. et al. (June 17, 2011), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/
certain-victims-witnesses-plaintiffs.pdf [https://perma.cc/7GYJ-N2NH].
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of joint operation, 287(g) agreements. 229 Sanctuary jurisdictions have responded by declaring their intent not to participate in this program. 230 For
example, Seattle’s “Welcoming City” resolution, which was adopted following President Trump’s inauguration, clarifies that the city “will reject
any offer from the federal government to enter into a Section 287(g) agreement.” 231 In 2012 the town of Amherst, Massachusetts adopted a similar
policy that explicitly prohibits 287(g) agreements. 232 The New York State
Attorney General’s Office has also distributed a “model sanctuary” policy
that, among other provisions, provides that local law enforcement “shall not
perform the functions of a federal immigration officer or otherwise engage
in the enforcement of federal immigration law—whether pursuant to
§ 1357(g) of Title 8 of the United States Code or under any other law, regulation, or policy.” 233
Beyond 287(g) agreements, there are other types of joint operations
that may involve immigration enforcement as well, such as when local police team up with HSI’s “National Gang Unit” or the “National Fugitive
Operations Team.” 234 Some jurisdictions have barred local participation in
such joint operations. Often, such policies prohibit local criminal justice
229

See DORIS MEISSNER ET AL., MIGRATION POL’Y INST., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN
UNITED STATES: THE RISE OF A FORMIDABLE MACHINERY 112–13 (Jan. 2013),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/immigration-enforcement-united-states-rise-formidablemachinery [https://perma.cc/N3DK-Z4NH] (describing DHS partnerships with local law enforcement).
230
287(g) agreements cannot be entered without local consent. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(9)
(2012) (“Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to require any State or political subdivision
of a State to enter into an agreement with the Attorney General under this subsection.”).
231
Seattle Resolution, supra note 214, § 1(B). Moreover, the resolution requires the Seattle
Police Department (“SPD”) and the Law Department to examine the city’s “mutual aid agreements” with other jurisdictions and propose “amendments to the City’s mutual aid agreements
with jurisdictions that have not explicitly rejected offers to enter into a Section 287(g) agreement
to be consistent with the SPD and The City of Seattle’s position related to focusing its limited law
enforcement resources on criminal investigations rather than civil immigration law violations.” Id.
§ 1(C).
232
Amherst, Mass., Article 29. Petition Article—Bylaw Regarding Sharing of Information
with Federal Agencies (May 21, 2012) [hereinafter Amherst Resolution], http://libguides.law.du.
edu/ld.php?content_id=34434966 [https://perma.cc/PBM5-SV4P] (providing that the Town of
Amherst “shall not participate in federal law enforcement programs relating to immigration enforcement, including but not limited to, Secure Communities, and cooperative agreements with the
federal government under [which] town personnel participate in the enforcement of immigration
laws, such as those authorized by Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act”).
233
ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, N.Y. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., GUIDANCE CONCERNING
LOCAL AUTHORITY PARTICIPATION IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND MODEL SANCTUARY
PROVISIONS 9 (Jan. 2017, & Supp. Mar. 2017), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=
35849877 [https://perma.cc/X7FD-2JSJ].
234
See supra notes 157–160 and accompanying text (introducing two joint operation programs that rely on coordination between federal immigration officials and local law enforcement
officers).
THE
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agencies from participating in “civil” immigration enforcement, 235 but some
jurisdictions’ negative experiences with joint operations have pushed them
even further.
In Oakland, California, for example, one of the nation’s early sanctuary city resolutions called on city employees to refrain from providing assistance or cooperation “relating to the alleged violations of the civil provisions of the immigration laws.” 236 In 2007, Oakland reaffirmed its “City of
Refuge” status through a resolution condemning the immigration raids taking place under the administration of President George W. Bush. 237 The
2007 resolution maintained the same focus on disentangling city officials
from civil immigration enforcement while explicitly allowing joint operations “in matters involving criminal activity and the protection of public
safety.” 238 A resolution passed in the wake of the 2016 presidential election
likewise maintained a distinction between civil and criminal enforcement,
condemning cooperation with respect to the former but not the latter. 239
Six months into the Trump presidency, however, Oakland changed
course. The City Council resolved to “immediately” cancel a memorandum
of understanding with HSI that allowed local officers to be designated as
“U.S. Customs Title 19 Task Force Officers.” 240 In support of the resolution
canceling the MOU, the council cited the Trump administration’s plans for
mass deportation and ICE’s “willing[ness] to lie . . . to their local law en235

In New Mexico, for example, the Doña Ana County Commissioners passed a resolution
stating that “no County funds or resources” would be used for immigration enforcement, and specifically prohibiting “[a]ssisting or cooperating, in one’s official capacity,” with federal operations
“relating to alleged violations of the civil provisions of the federal immigration law.” Doña Ana
Cty., N.M., Bd. of Comm’rs, Res. No. 2014-91 (Sept. 9, 2014), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?
content_id=34435968 [https://perma.cc/G3KX-ETQC]; see also Boulder Ordinance, supra note
17 (prohibiting use of city funds to “assist with any investigation into a person’s immigration
status” or “assist in the detention of any person based on a person’s suspected immigration status”); Office of Wash. Governor Jay Inslee, Exec. Order No. 17-01 ¶ 8 (Feb. 23, 2017), http://lib
guides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34437156 [https://perma.cc/A7WC-LBSL] (broadly prohibiting use of “agency or department monies, facilities, property, equipment, or personnel for the
purpose of targeting or apprehending persons for violation of federal civil immigration laws”);
NOPD POLICY, supra note 200, ¶¶ 6, 7 (“In the event a member receives a request to support or
assist in a civil immigration enforcement action he or she shall report the request to his or her
supervisor, who shall decline the request and document the declination in an interoffice memorandum to the Superintendent through the chain of command.”).
236
Oakland, Cal., Res. No. 63950, at 2–3 (July 8, 1986), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?
content_id=39060312 [https://perma.cc/9C2R-6YE7].
237
Oakland, Cal., Res. No. 80584, at 2 (May 15, 2007) [hereinafter Oakland Resolution],
http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34432505 [https://perma.cc/4479-EA2V].
238
Id.
239
Oakland, Cal., Res. No. 86498, at 2 (Nov. 29, 2016), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?
content_id=39018764 [https://perma.cc/V7XJ-8TXC].
240
Oakland, Cal., Res. No. 86860, at 1–2 (July 18, 2017), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?
content_id=39019055 [https://perma.cc/2EAS-P5DH].
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forcement partners (e.g. Santa Cruz Police Department).” The last reference
was to a February 2017 joint operation between Santa Cruz officials and
HSI. 241
Oakland soon determined to go beyond even this step. Although it had
been directed to terminate its MOU with HSI, on August 16, 2017, the Oakland Police Department provided traffic control for an HSI raid that resulted
in the arrest of members of a Guatamalan family in West Oakland. 242 Following a public outcry, in 2018 the City Council reframed Oakland’s policy
to eliminate all cooperation with immigration enforcement, whether related
to civil or criminal violations. 243 Oakland’s Mayor Libby Schaaf also took
affirmative steps to warn residents of an impending ICE raid in February
2018. 244
Santa Cruz adopted a resolution in 2007, declaring that “to the fullest
extent possible by law, the City of Santa Cruz shall not cooperate with ICE
and shall prohibit the use of City funds or resources for any Federal immigration enforcement.” 245 On the eve of Trump’s inauguration, the city council reaffirmed that no city resources or assistance would be used to aid federal immigration enforcement efforts, and explicitly prohibited local officials from “assisting with or participating in any immigration enforcement
operation or joint operation . . . .” 246 The City soon learned that would be
insufficient when the Santa Cruz Police Department’s joint raid with ICE in
241

See supra notes 161–162 and accompanying text.
Memorandum from Brian M. Hofer, Chair, Privacy Advisory Comm’n, City of Oakland,
Cal., to Privacy Advisory Comm’rs (Oct. 5, 2017), https://oaklandprivacy.org/wp-content/uploads/
2017/10/PAC_-_ICE_Raid_Memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/5M4A-HVSC] (describing events of August
16).
243
Oakland, Cal., Res. No. 87036 (Jan. 16, 2018), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_
id=39153876 [https://perma.cc/F7HD-TH35] (resolving that “OPD shall not provide law enforcement assistance, including traffic support, to ICE, including any subdivision of ICE, in any capacity, except to respond to a public safety emergency”). The California Values Act also limits local
law enforcement participation in joint task forces if “the primary purpose of the joint law enforcement task force is [] immigration enforcement.” CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7284.6 (West Supp.
2018).
244
This step by Oakland’s Mayor reportedly caused the Department of Justice to investigate
possible obstruction-of-justice charges against Mayor Schaaf and set off a heated media-media
exchange between Attorney General Sessions and Mayor Schaaf, but so far has not resulted in any
action by federal authorities. See Thomas Fuller, Who Is Libby Schaaf, the Oakland Mayor Who
Warned of Immigration Raids?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/
01/us/oakland-mayor-libby-schaaf.html [https://perma.cc/JNY3-YKFL]; Kimberly Veklerov et al.,
Attorney General Blasts Oakland Mayor Schaaf, She Fires Back, SFGATE (Mar. 7, 2018, 8:48
PM), https://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Jeff-Sessions-to-Oakland-Mayor-Libby-Schaaf-1273
5135.php [https://perma.cc/KA98-SPAW].
245
Santa Cruz, Cal., Res. No. NS-27,504 (Apr. 10, 2007), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?
content_id=38569294 [https://perma.cc/5EVU-UWFM].
246
Santa Cruz, Cal., Res. No. NS-29,187 (Jan. 10, 2017), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?
content_id=39154376 [https://perma.cc/K3A3-7P4R].
242
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February 2017, less than a month after the city council’s resolution, resulted
in the deportation of community members with no gang ties. 247 This
prompted the city council to quickly enact an ordinance specifically prohibiting such joint operations. 248
III. LEGAL AND POLICY RATIONALES FOR “SANCTUARY”
The imminent threat of deportation has caused more localities to move
toward implementing more of the protective policies discussed in Part II. 249
In addition, the administration’s attacks on sanctuary cities appear to have
prompted local leaders to articulate more precisely their reasons for maintaining such policies. 250 In Part II we described some of the different policies localities have adopted to distance their employees from federal immigration enforcement efforts. 251 Part III analyzes the legal and policy rationales for these immigrant protective criminal justice policies.
In identifying the rationales that support sanctuary policies, we focus
on expressly articulated rationales found in the language of the policies
themselves, including in their preambles, whereas clauses, or findings sections. 252 We chose this methodology for for two reasons. First, sanctuary
policies themselves have an important expressive function. 253 They are
statements made by local officials to their communities, and the words that
are used indicate the expressive function being served. Just as there is a
meaningful difference between a jurisdiction that explicitly declares itself a
“sanctuary” and one that does not, 254 there is a meaningful difference be247

See supra notes 161–162 and accompanying text.
Santa Cruz, Cal., Ordinance No. 2017-06 (Mar. 14, 2017), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.
php?content_id=39154393 [https://perma.cc/FPU8-39E6].
249
See supra notes 181–248 and accompanying text.
250
See infra notes 259–356 and accompanying text. See generally Eagly, supra note 180
(describing common policy rationales for what she terms “immigrant protective policies” in the
criminal justice system).
251
See supra notes 181–248 and accompanying text.
252
See, e.g., Cook Ordinance, supra note 196 (justifying its detainer policy in a whereas
clause concerned with confusion about “the proper boundaries of the relationship between local
law enforcement” and ICE); Seattle Resolution, supra note 214 (setting forth in the preamble and
first “whereas” clause the rationale that the resolution would further inclusion and intergration).
We did not attempt to mine legislative histories or other contemporaneous materials to determine
whether there were additional sub rosa rationales that were not expressed in the policies.
253
See Rodríguez, supra note 6, at 605 (noting that jurisdictions with sanctuary laws make
expressive claims by promoting a “self-conception as immigrant-friendly” and sanctuary laws
constitute “critical integration measures”); Emily Ryo, On Normative Effects of Immigration Law,
13 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 95, 109 (2017) (arguing that ambivalence and conflict over immigration
may lead the public to perceive immigration policies “not only as a source of reliable information
about immigration and immigrants, but also as an embodiment of the community’s consensus on
immigrants’ proper ‘place’ in society”).
254
See supra notes 17–22 and accompanying text.
248
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tween a jurisdiction that prohibits its police from participating in immigration enforcement in order to conserve local criminal justice resources and
another that does so in order to foster community trust. Second, stated rationales can materially inform what substantive policy provisions are adopted. For example, a sanctuary policy that is primarily motivated by a desire
to encourage crime victims and witnesses to report crime may be susceptible to carve outs based on criminal history. 255 But if a locality’s disentanglement policy is grounded in a commitment to diversity and inclusion, that
may give stakeholders a stronger basis to argue against provisions that treat
members of the community differently based on prior criminal history. 256
Applying this approach, the six most significant policy rationales that
emerged from our research are: (1) the conviction that localities (and not the
federal government) should control their own criminal justice priorities and
resources; (2) a desire to avoid unlawful arrests and detentions; (3) the concern that entangling police with immigration enforcement erodes trust among
minority community members; (4) a commitment to preventing improper
discrimination in policing based on race, ethnicity or national origin; (5) a
desire to further diversity and inclusion; and (6) a wish to express disagreement with federal immigration policy. There are, of course, other policy rationales that would support a jurisdiction’s decision to disentangle local law
enforcement from immigration enforcement, 257 but we focus here on the most
commonly invoked rationales for the policy types introduced in Part II.
In featuring expressed policy rationales, we acknowledge that there is
not always a neat and discernible connection between the expressed rationales and the sanctuary policy actions taken. This can occur because multiple
255

See Cook Ordinance, supra note 196 (allowing detainer compliance in some cases involving serious or violent felony offenses); NYC Local Law 62, supra note 196 (including numerous
crime-based exceptions to non-compliance with detainers).
256
See Seattle Resolution, supra note 214 (prohibiting any participation by Seattle in 287(g)
agreements and refusing compliance with detainer requests unless accompanied by a criminal
warrant issued by a federal judge or magistrate).
257
A desire to avoid family separation and economic disruption are examples of rationales
that occur in some policies but are not developed in this Article. See, e.g., Multnomah Cty., Or.,
Res. No. 2013-032 (Apr. 4, 2013) [hereinafter Multnomah Resolution], http://libguides.law.du.
edu/ld.php?content_id=34436634 [https://perma.cc/YA3X-CYWQ] (“Multnomah County families
are being separated and isolated by deportation, and in many cases, these removals are disrupting
and damaging the lives and support networks of spouses, children and young adults who are US
citizens.”); King Cty., Wash., Ordinance No. 17706, § 1(A) (Dec. 10, 2013) [hereinafter King
County Ordinance], http://libguides/law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34437163 [https://perma.cc/
2F6T-653T] (noting testimony concerning the “dislocation of families, the loss of jobs and housing, economic loss to families and the community, and harms to children” caused by immigration
detainers); Berkeley, Cal., Res. No. 63,711-N.S. (May 22, 2007), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.
php?content_id=34432521 [https://perma.cc/2PEM-R39K] (noting separation of children from
parents caused by ICE raids, and “increased climate of fear and intimidation among Latino families and students” caused by deportations).
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rationales support a single policy action, or because the written document
does not draw explicit connections between rationales and actions. Additionally, we recognize that, although we attempt to ascertain identifiable
categories of rationales, there can be some slippage across the categories
that we introduce.
Although the Trump administration has attempted to paint sanctuary
cities as undermining public safety and defying the rule of law, 258 this Part
reveals the sound legal principles and considered policy judgments that underlie the six common rationales that we outline here. Sheriffs, police chiefs,
mayors, and governors have defended their sanctuary policies not only as
legally and practically justified, but also as a necessary moral and ethical response to the administration’s policies. Further, the Trump administration’s
reliance on white nationalist rhetoric has fostered greater awareness about the
need for sanctuary policies that address discrimination and multiculturalism.
A. Maintain Local Control Over Criminal Justice
One common rationale cited by local policymakers for sanctuary policies is the idea that local criminal justice resources should be allocated
based on local, not federal, priorities. This rationale is grounded in three
principles: a distinction between criminal and immigration law, an understanding that immigration is a generally a federal responsibility, and the
Tenth Amendment guarantee of freedom from federal commandeering of
local resources.
As described earlier, cases dating back to the late nineteenth century
have separated civil deportation law from criminal law and imposed strict
scrutiny on subfederal regulation that discriminated on the basis of alienage. 259 This jurisprudence placed responsibility for immigration enforcement with the federal government and largely prevented states from treating
citizens and noncitizens differently in the enforcement of criminal laws. 260
The Supreme Court’s landmark Tenth Amendment jurisprudence of the
1990s rounded out support for disentanglement policies. The Court’s decisions in New York v. United States 261 and Printz v. United States 262 established
that the federal government may not compel or coerce states into participating
258
See, e.g., Press Release 17-826, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Sessions Announces
Immigration Compliance Requirements for Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Programs (July 25, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-sessions-announcesimmigration-compliance-requirements-edward-byrne-memorial [https://perma.cc/2ZCZ-BBLU].
259
See supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text.
260
See supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text.
261
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
262
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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in a federal regulatory program. 263 Today, these decisions support the prerogative of states to resist requests by federal authorities to detain community
members for transfer to ICE or otherwise do the federal government’s bidding. For example, jurisdictions that have adopted “don’t police” policies barring their own officers from participating in immigration enforcement have
insisted that enforcing immigration laws is the federal government’s responsibility. 264 San Francisco noted in adopting its “City and County of Refuge”
ordinance in 1989 that state and local officials are under no obligation “to
enforce the civil aspects of the federal immigration laws.” 265 Pittsburgh based
its 2004 direction that police “[r]efrain from participating in the enforcement
of federal immigration laws” on the rationale that immigration laws “are solely the responsibility of the federal government . . . .” 266 The same rationale
has bolstered sanctuary policies that bar disclosure of sensitive information.
In justifying its policy on nondisclosure of sensitive information, the City of
New Haven, Connecticut declared that “[a] community member’s potential
status as an undocumented immigrant has no relation to the mission or goals
of the New Haven Police Department.” 267
Relatedly, policies limiting compliance with detainers and administrative warrants have also been justified by the rationale of maintaining local
autonomy over criminal justice resources. For local jurisdictions, the federal
government’s attempts to press local officers into federal service conflict
with their desire to preserve scarce resources for local priorities. 268 An ex263
See id. at 925 (holding that “the Federal Government may not compel the States to implement, by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory programs”); New York, 505 U.S. at 166
(noting that “even where Congress has the authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring
or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit
those acts”).
264
Cook Ordinance, supra note 196; see also Santa Clara Cty., Cal., Res. No. 2010-316 (June
22, 2010) [hereinafter 2010 Santa Clara Resolution], http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_
id=34432102 [https://perma.cc/2WJD-FHF6] (noting that “the enforcement of federal civil immigration law is the responsibility of the federal government and not of the County”).
265
S.F. Ordinance, supra note 189. New York City similarly connected federal responsibility
for immigration enforcement to its enactment of Executive Order 124. See NYC Exec. Order,
supra note 189, at 3 (“Federal law places full responsibility for immigration control on the federal
government. With limited exceptions, the City therefore has no legal obligation to report any alien
to federal authorities. The executive order, in recognition of this lack of obligation and the importance of providing the services covered herein, requires City agencies to preserve the confidentiality of all information respecting law-abiding aliens to the extent permitted by law”).
266
Pittsburgh, Pa., Bill No. 2004-0295 (Apr. 26, 2004) [hereinafter 2004 Pittsburgh Resolution], http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34436690 [https://perma.cc/9X9M-XZUR].
267
New Haven PD Order, supra note 226; see also NYC Exec. Order, supra note 189.
268
See, e.g., Cook Ordinance, supra note 196 (“Cook County can no longer afford to expend
taxpayer funds to incarcerate individuals who are otherwise entitled to their freedom”); 2010 Santa Clara Resolution, supra note 264 (noting that “in this time of economic difficulties, the Board
of Supervisors remains committed to maximizing public safety, public health and vital services”);
Multnomah Resolution, supra note 257 (noting that the “uncompensated detention of individuals
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ample is the 2011 Cook County Ordinance, which created an absolute requirement that the sheriff decline any detainer request in the absence of a
written agreement with federal officials guaranteeing reimbursement of the
costs of compliance. 269 To date, the federal government has refused to reimburse local law enforcement for the significant costs associated with honoring detainers. 270
Although the anti-commandeering argument was an obvious fit for justifying limits on street-level immigration policing by localities, 271 relatively
few jurisdictions explicitly invoked it until the height of Secure Communities
under the Obama administration in 2011 and then later under Trump. 272 Until
then, there was little need to resort to the anti-commandeering argument because the federal government had not yet attempted to directly co-opt local
law enforcement into immigration enforcement without localities’ consent.

in county jails, for violations of civil immigration laws, places an undue burden on the county”
and that “unmitigated compliance with ICE detainers requests has the potential of further straining
the resources of the Multnomah County Sheriff’s Office and occupying scarce and costly jail beds
that should be reserved for those who pose the greatest threat to public safety”); see also Eagly,
supra note 180, at 291–94 (discussing policies limiting entanglement due to budgetary constraints).
269
Cook Ordinance, supra note 196; see also 2010 Santa Clara Resolution, supra note 264
(noting that “the enforcement of federal civil immigration law is the responsibility of the federal
government and not of the County”); 2004 Pittsburgh Resolution, supra note 266 (requesting
mayor to direct police to “[r]efrain from participating in the enforcement of federal immigration
laws which are solely the responsibility of the federal government”) (emphasis in original).
270
See, e.g., California TRUST Act, supra note 27, § 1(B) (“State and local law enforcement
agencies are not reimbursed by the federal government for the full cost of responding to a detainer, which can include, but is not limited to, extended detention time and the administrative costs of
tracking and responding to detainers”); Phila., Pa., Exec. Order No. 1-14 (Apr. 16, 2014), http://lib
guides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34436655 [https://perma.cc/D5Z7-6L4D] (noting that “the
Secure Communities program shifts the burden of federal civil immigration enforcement onto
local law enforcement, including shifting costs for detention of individuals in local custody who
would otherwise be released”); Memorandum from R.A. Cuevas, Jr., Cty. Attorney, to Rebeca
Sosa et al., Chairwoman, Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, Miami-Dade Cty., Fla. (Dec. 3, 2013) [hereinafter
Miami-Dade Resolution], http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34434395 [https://perma.
cc/QF63-FSZC] (reciting costs to Miami-Dade taxpayers of detainer compliance and pointing out
that “the federal government does not directly reimburse Miami-Dade County” for those costs).
271
See Gardner, supra note 6, at 331 (describing the “slate of immigrant sanctuary policies
passed after 2001 and predicated on the Court’s interpretation of the Tenth Amendment in
Printz”).
272
Two early exceptions were Lawrence, Kansas and Milwaukee, Wisconsin. See Lawrence,
Kan., Res. No. 6541 (Apr. 20, 2004), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34434777
[https://perma.cc/MY2G-LN69] (explicitly citing Printz in resolution affirming Lawrence’s
“strong support for the rights of immigrants and oppos[ing] measures that single out individuals
for legal scrutiny or enforcement activity based on their country of origin”); Milwaukee, Wis., File
No. 031413 (Mar. 2, 2004), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34437224 [https://
perma.cc/5D5G-MJBL] (noting the city’s opposition to “any unfunded federal mandates instructing local police to attempt to enforce the complex civil immigration laws of the U.S.”).
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The Third Circuit’s 2014 decision in Galarza v. Szalczyk vindicated the
claims of jurisdictions that had grounded anti-detainer policies in the Tenth
Amendment. 273 The district court had declined to hold the county liable for
U.S. citizen Ernesto Galarza’s detention, even though it was unsupported by
probable cause because, in its view, detainers “impose[d] mandatory obligations on state or local law enforcement agencies . . . including municipalities, to follow such a detainer once it is received.” 274 The Third Circuit reversed. 275 Relying on New York and Printz, the court held that understanding “a federal detainer filed with a state or local [law enforcement agency]
[as] a command to detain an individual on behalf of the federal government,
would violate the anti-commandeering doctrine of the Tenth Amendment.” 276 Detainers, the court said, must therefore be understood as “only
requests that state and local law enforcement agencies detain suspected
[noncitizens] subject to removal.” 277 Subsequent cases have followed
Galarza’s Tenth Amendment reasoning to conclude that the federal government cannot command localities to hold individuals on its behalf. 278
The Trump administration has sidestepped the court decisions about
state sovereignty and threatened to cancel federal funding if sanctuary jurisdictions do not cooperate with immigration enforcement efforts. As discussed earlier, these efforts to withhold federal funds have likewise generally not been tolerated by the courts. 279 The value of local autonomy will likely continue to play a significant role in sustaining sanctuary policies in the
years to come. 280
273

See Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 638 (3d Cir. 2014).
Id. (citations omitted) (summarizing district court holding).
275
Id. at 645.
276
Id. at 644.
277
Id. at 645.
278
See, e.g., Mercado v. Dall. Cty., 229 F. Supp. 3d 501, 514 (N.D. Tex. 2017) (citing cases
that agree with Galarza), abrogated on other grounds by City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 885 F. 3d
332, 356 n.21 (5th Cir. 2018)
279
See supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text.
280
The rationale of local control is not without its downsides. The “states’ rights” frame has
historically been associated with conservative recalcitrance to federal reform efforts, including in
the civil rights arena. With respect to the treatment of immigrants, local autonomy is sometimes
deployed in defense of anti-immigrant measures. Nevertheless, such assertions of local control are
frequently bounded by equality principles acting either directly through the Equal Protection
Clause or indirectly through the doctrine of preemption. See, e.g., Lucas Guttentag, The Forgotten
Equality Norm in Immigration Preemption: Discrimination, Harassment, and the Civil Rights Act
of 1870, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 1, 40–51 (2013) (arguing that “immigrant equality
is an essential—and forgotten—ingredient in contemporary Supremacy Claus analysis”); Hiroshi
Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and Immigration Outside the Law, 59 DUKE L.J.
1723, 1730–46 (2010) (describing how anti-discrimination arguments on behalf of undocumented
immigrants tend to be obliquely asserted through institutional competence claims like preemption).
274
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B. Prevent Unlawful Arrests
A second important rationale for sanctuary policy is avoiding unlawful
arrests. While local officials were of course familiar with limitations on arrest authority in the criminal context, they initially did not appreciate such
concerns as applied to their entanglement with federal immigration authorities. It took constitutional litigation to reveal that unlawful arrests are a key
issue for localities considering sanctuary policies.
The concern over unlawful arrests comes from three related lines of
cases. The first line of cases established that local officials generally do not
have authority to make civil immigration arrests. As described in Part I,
when the federal government began to encourage states and localities to
participate in immigration enforcement after 9/11, some jurisdictions eagerly embraced that role on the theory that they possessed “inherent authority”
to enforce federal immigration laws. 281 When the Supreme Court struck
down much of Arizona’s immigration enforcement law as preempted by
federal law in 2012, it confirmed that the power of local law enforcement to
make immigration arrests is limited to the specific circumstances enumerated by Congress. 282 An example of a policy basing disentanglement on this
lack of federal authorization is the 2013 general order of the Princeton Police Department, 283 which provided that: “State and local police have no
authority to arrest and detain a person for a civil violation. There are federal
agencies specifically charged with the enforcement and application of the
complex immigration laws and regulations.” 284
The second line of cases supporting sanctuary policies to prevent unlawful arrests addressed the application of Fourth Amendment protections to detention by local authorities on an immigration detainer. As discussed in Part I,
the Secure Communities program was terminated by the Obama administration largely because of “the increasing number of federal court decisions that
281
See generally Gabriel J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, The Unconstitutionality of State Regulation of Immigration Through Criminal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 251 (2011) (explaining the “mirror
image” theory and arguing its unconstitutionality as inconsistent with longstanding precedent).
282
Arizona, 567 U.S. at 410 (“Congress has put in place a system in which state officers may
not make warrantless arrests of aliens based on possible removability except in specific, limited
circumstances.”); id. at 413 (observing that nonfederal law enforcement arrests of individuals
“solely to verify their immigration status would raise constitutional concerns”).
283
Princeton PD General Order, supra note 200.
284
Id. at 2; see also VT. CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRAINING COUNCIL, MODEL FAIR AND IMPARTIAL POLICING POLICY ¶ V(B) (2016) [hereinafter 2016 VERMONT MODEL POLICING POLICY],
http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34437002 [https://perma.cc/CRM4-SM7X] (noting
“Federal law does not grant local and state agencies authority to enforce civil immigration law”);
NOPD Policy, supra note 200, ¶ 4 (“The enforcement of civil federal immigration laws falls exclusively within the authority of the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency
(ICE).”).
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hold that detainer-based detention by state and local law enforcement agencies violates the Fourth Amendment.” 285 These decisions, many of which followed the Third Circuit’s decision in Galarza, 286 established that detention on
an immigration detainer constitutes a warrantless arrest. 287 As with any other
warrantless arrest, the Fourth Amendment requires such seizures to be justified. Suspicion of a civil immigration violation alone generally would not
justify an arrest by local officials. 288 In April 2014 a federal judge in Oregon
made clear that the decision to comply with federal immigration officials’
requests to prolong the detention of inmates otherwise entitled to be released
could violate the Fourth Amendment. 289 The prolonged custody of the plaintiff, Maria Miranda-Olivares, was not the exceptional detention of a U.S. citizen but rather a prototypical target of a detainer: a noncitizen whom ICE
wished to investigate as removable. 290 Immediately following the Oregon
court decision, a wave of counties across the country, now facing the potential
for liability for hundreds of unlawful arrests, declared they would no longer

285

See Secure Communities Memo, supra note 149, at 2 & n.1 (citing cases).
See supra notes 144–148 and accompanying text (describing the line of cases concluding
that police violated the Fourth Amendment by holding individuals in custody pursuant to immigration detainers).
287
E.g., Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cty., No. 3:12–cv–02317–ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at
*9 (D. Or. Aug. 22, 2014) (holding that “detention based on the ICE detainer embarked Miranda–
Olivares on a subsequent and new ‘prolonged warrantless, post-arrest, pre-arraignment custody’”);
id. at *11 (“Absent probable cause, that detention was unlawful.”); see also Moreno, 213 F. Supp.
3d at 1005 (noting federal government’s concession that detention “pursuant to an ICE immigration detainer constitutes a warrantless arrest”).
288
See Arizona, 567 U.S. at 407 (“If the police stop someone based on nothing more than
possible removability, the usual predicate for an arrest is absent”); see also, e.g., CTY. SHERIFFS
OF COLO., supra note 197 (noting that “Colorado Sheriffs do not have the authority to enforce
federal laws”). Consistent with this line of reasoning, a federal district court held Indiana’s law
authorizing its law enforcement officials to arrest and detain persons subject to immigration detainers likely violated the Fourth Amendment because it would “authorize[] the warrantless arrest
of persons for matters and conduct that are not crimes.” Buquer v. City of Indianapolis, 797 F.
Supp. 2d 905, 919 (S.D. Ind. 2011) (preliminary injunction); see also Villars v. Kubiatowski, 45
F. Supp. 3d 791, 807 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (noting that after Arizona v. United States, the law is settled
that local officials cannot prolong detention on the basis of suspected civil immigration violations,
and whether local officials can prolong detention on the basis of suspected criminal immigration
violations remains an open question) (citing Santos v. Frederick Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 725 F.3d
451, 464 (4th Cir. 2013)); Roy v. Cty. of Los Angeles, CV1209012ABFFMX, 2018 WL 914773,
at *23 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2018) (holding that detaining inmate who was otherwise entitled to release, based on immigration detainer, was new arrest that sheriff could only justify if there was
“probable cause to suspect that the individuals were involved in criminal activity”). But see City of
El Cenizo, 885 F.3d at 355–56 & n.21 (reversing district court’s conclusion that detention on an
immigration detainer violated the Fourth Amendment because probable cause of a crime was
lacking, and disavowing similar district court decisions).
289
Miranda-Olivares, 2014 WL 1414305, at *11.
290
See id. at *9.
286
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accede to any ICE detainer requests. 291 Sheriffs like those in Clark County,
Washington and the City and County of San Francisco relied explicitly on
these federal decisions in crafting policies limiting compliance with immigration detainers. 292
Finally, a third important line of cases built on the notion, reflected in
some sanctuary policies, that civil immigration arrests by local officials must
not only be authorized by federal law but by state or local law as well. 293 This
theory that immigration arrests had to be separately authorized under state
law is what carried the day in Lunn v. Commonwealth. 294 In Lunn, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that because Massachusetts law did not authorize state and local law enforcement “to arrest and hold an individual solely on
the basis of a Federal civil immigration detainer, beyond the time that the individual would otherwise be entitled to be released from State custody,” they
could not honor such federal detainers as a matter of state law. 295 The Illinois
291
Jennifer Medina, Fearing Lawsuits, Sheriffs Balk at U.S. Request to Hold Noncitizens for
Extra Time, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/06/us/politics/fearinglawsuits-sheriffs-balk-at-us-request-to-detain-noncitizens-for-extra-time.html
[https://perma.cc/
B4PK-E44T] (reporting the decision by cities and counties across the country to refuse to honor
detainer requests following an Oregon court ruling that a sheriff had violated a woman’s civil
rights by holding her in response to an ICE detainer request).
292
Clark Cty. Sheriff’s Office, Written Directive (Apr. 30, 2014), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.
php?content_id=34437175 [https://perma.cc/JF5K-SEPM] (“As a result of the [Miranda-Olivares
decision], and upon review of legal counsel, the Clark County Sheriff’s Office shall cease to hold
individuals in custody when the only authority is a request from DHS ICE in the form of a detainer.”); Ross Mirkarimi, San Francisco Sheriff’s Dep’t, No Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Detainers (May 29, 2014), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34432181 [https://perma.
cc/T3P8-58PJ] (announcing policy of honoring ICE detainers only if accompanied by “judicial
determination of probable cause or with a warrant of arrest”) (referencing Galarza and MirandaOlivares); see also News Release, Lane Cty. Sheriff’s Office, Lane County Sheriff’s Office Changes
Policy on Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Detainers (Apr. 21, 2014), http://lib
guides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34436626 [https://perma.cc/7QU9-UUAF] (“In response to
a recent federal court decision, the Lane County Jail will no longer hold inmates on Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Detainers without a warrant or a court order.”) (referencing Miranda-Olivares); CTY. SHERIFFS OF COLO., supra note 197 (noting that “the courts have ruled that
we have no authority to hold arrestees on administrative holds that have not been reviewed and
approved by federal judges or magistrates”) (referencing Galarza and Miranda-Olivares).
293
See, e.g., Princeton PD General Order, supra note 200 (“Local police agencies must comply with the laws of their own municipalities and states as well as the policies imposed by the
police agency. State law may not authorize local police to detain persons for immigration violations . . . .”); 2016 VERMONT MODEL POLICING POLICY, supra note 284, ¶ V(B) (noting “state law
does not grant local and state agencies authority to enforce civil immigration laws”); Associated
Press, Some Colorado Sheriffs Ending Immigrant Detainers, DAILY MAIL (Apr. 29, 2014),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-2616407/Some-Colorado-sheriffs-ending-immigrantdetainers.html [https://perma.cc/Q9PS-4KPN] (reporting email from Boulder County Sheriff stating there is “no state statutory authority for holding people on detainers”).
294
78 N.E.3d 1143 (Mass. 2017).
295
Id. at 1156–58, 1160; see also Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Cisneros v. Elder, No. 2018CV30549, at 10–11 (Dist. Ct. Colo. El Paso Cty. Mar. 19, 2018)
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Trust Act, enacted in August 2017, is an example of a post-Lunn sanctuary
policy. 296 Starting from the premise “that State law does not currently grant
State or local law enforcement the authority to enforce federal civil immigration laws,” the act forbids detaining a person “solely on the basis of any immigration detainer or non-judicial immigration warrant.” 297
The individual and cumulative effect of these doctrinal developments
has been dramatic. Today, they support policies barring local officers from
holding individuals for any amount of time based on a detainer or administrative immigration warrant. Significantly, because of their grounding in broad
questions about the legality of civil immigration arrests effected by local officers, these policies leave little room for carveouts based on criminal history
and instead broadly prohibit local officers from taking action based on suspected removability.
C. Strengthen Community Trust
A third widely proffered justification for sanctuary policies is that entangling street-level policing with immigration enforcement erodes community trust. Community trust is critical for effective policing programs. 298
As the Major Cities Chiefs Association warned in 2006, the entanglement of
local police in immigration enforcement can “undermine the level of trust
and cooperation between local police and immigrant communities,” creating a divide that undermines public safety. 299

(holding plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of success on their claim that a Colorado sheriff
lacked the authority to make civil immigration arrests pursuant to immigration detainers and that
such arrests violated the Colorado Constitution).
296
S.B. 31, 100th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Session (Ill. 2017).
297
Id.
298
See generally DORIS MARIE PROVINE ET AL., POLICING IMMIGRANTS: LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ON THE FRONT LINES (2016) (examining the evolution of immigration enforcement
from federally-managed border to control to a more widespread, piecemeal local law enforcement
system).
299
CRAIG E. FERRELL, JR. ET AL., M.C.C. IMMIGRATION COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAWS BY LOCAL POLICE AGENCIES 6 (June 2006), https://
www.majorcitieschiefs.com/pdf/MCC_Position_Statement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SM3R-S6E6];
Conn. Judiciary Comm., Joint Favorable Report, Bill No. HB-6659 (Apr. 22, 2013), https://www.
cga.ct.gov/2013/jfr/h/2013HB-06659-R00JUD-JFR.htm [https://perma.cc/23YB-JD7K]. Sanctuary jurisdictions have also relied on the testimony of community members and community organizations for support about the chilling effect of deportation fears on crime reporting. See, e.g., King
County Ordinance, supra note 257, § 1(A); Multnomah Resolution, supra note 257 (noting
“[d]ocumented public testimony has demonstrated that members of our community are not reporting crimes . . . for fear of deportation through the Secure Communities program and I-247 Immigration Detainers”); Miami-Dade Resolution, supra note 270. For more information about the
relationship between sanctuary policies and public safety, see supra note 43.
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Social science research has found that involving local law enforcement
with immigration policing can strain relationships between community
members and police. 300 That fear can cause immigrants and individuals in
mixed status families to refrain from coming forward as victims of, or witnesses to, crime. 301 Consistent with these findings, in the months following
President Trump’s election, the LAPD observed a drop in reporting of sexual assaults and spousal abuse among Latinos, leading the department to believe “deportation fears may be preventing Hispanic members of the community from reporting when they are victimized.” 302
The concern that entanglement can undermine community trust has
supported a range of sanctuary policies. For example, a general order issued
by the New Haven, Connecticut Department of Police Service in 2006 limited police officers’ ability to inquire into immigration status, 303 prohibited
enforcement of civil immigration law, 304 and limited disclosure of information to federal immigration officials. 305 The policy was justified in part
based on the community trust rationale:
The department relies upon the cooperation of all persons, both
documented citizens and those without documentation status, to
achieve our goals of protecting life and property, preventing
crime and resolving problems. Assistance from immigrant populations is especially important when an immigrant, whether documented or not, is the victim of or witness to a crime. These persons must feel comfortable in coming forward with information
and in filing reports. 306
300
Marjorie S. Zatz & Hilary Smith, Immigration, Crime, and Victimization: Rhetoric and
Reality, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 141, 150 (2012) (concluding that “laws and policies involving local police in immigration enforcement have thwarted community policing and other efforts
to cultivate improved relations with communities that include significant numbers of immigrants”).
301
See THEODORE, supra note 141, at 5–17 (linking police involvement in immigration enforcement with Latinos’ perceptions about public safety and their reluctance to contact police).
302
News Release, L.A. Police Dep’t, Decline in Reporting of Crime Among Hispanic Population (Mar. 21, 2017), http://www.lapdonline.org/home/news_view/61998 [https://perma.cc/GNS6PUTA].
303
New Haven PD Order, supra note 226, ¶¶ II.C.1–2 (allowing inquiry into immigration
status only while “investigating criminal activity”).
304
Id. ¶¶ II.C.4–5. The general order permitted officers to investigate and enforce federal
immigration crimes. Id. ¶ II.C.3.
305
Id. ¶ III.B (justifying non-disclosure policy on the ground that “[o]btaining pertinent information may in some cases be difficult or impossible if some expectation of confidentiality is
not preserved, and preserving confidentiality in turn requires that the department regulate the use
of such information by its employees”).
306
Id. ¶ II.A
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Interest in protecting community trust has supported not only streetlevel policies disentangling policing, but also jail-level policies against
complying with immigration detainers. For example, Milwaukee County’s
2012 resolution prohibiting the use of detainers in county jails relied on the
assertion that “when local law enforcement honors all ICE detainer requests, including those that target non-criminal aliens, community residents
become less likely to cooperate with local agencies, eroding public trust and
unnecessarily hindering the law enforcement abilities of [Milwaukee County Sheriff’s Office] [d]eputies on patrol.” 307
Similarly, the California TRUST Act, a 2013 state-level sanctuary law,
explicitly justified its policy on ways in which immigration enforcement
can threaten community trust, warning that enganglement will make “immigrant residents who are victims of or witnesses to crime, including domestic violence, . . . less likely to report crime or cooperate with law enforcement when any contact with law enforcement could result in deportation.” 308 This concern about harming community trust led to a broad prohibition on honoring ICE detainer requests except in circumstances involving
individuals charged with or convicted of certain criminal offenses. 309 Boston’s Trust Act is a similar example of a sanctuary policy based in part on a
desire to protect community trust in law enforcement:
When local law enforcement officials indiscriminately honor all
ICE civil immigration detainer requests, including those that target non-criminal aliens, immigrant residents are less likely to cooperate and public trust erodes, hindering the ability and effectiveness of Boston’s police force. 310

307
See, e.g., Milwaukee, Wis., File No. 12-135 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 Milwaukee Resolution], http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34437215 [https://perma.cc/ETZ4-DJ2C]; see
also Multnomah Resolution, supra note 257 (noting that the “deterioration of trust in local government, as a result of ICE’s Secure Communities program and I-247 Immigration Detainers,
hampers the county’s ability to provide public safety”) (emphasis added).
308
California TRUST Act, supra note 27, § 1(d); see also LONI HANCOCK, CHAIR, CAL. SEN.
COMM. ON PUB. SAFETY, IMMIGRATION DETAINERS 7 (July 2, 2013), https://leginfo.legislature.
ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id=201320140AB4 (follow “07/01/13- Senate Public
Safety” hyperlink to download) [https://perma.cc/VR8M-G6UX] (noting that California localities
had complained that participating in Secure Communities was costly and harmed law enforcement
relationships with the community).
309
California TRUST Act, supra note 27, § 1(d).
310
Bos., Mass., An Ordinance Establishing a Boston Trust Act (June 27, 2014) http://lib
guides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34435561 [https://perma.cc/V5A6-SD83] (“When local law
enforcement officials indiscriminately honor all ICE civil immigration detainer requests, including
those that target non-criminal aliens, immigrant residents are less likely to cooperate and public
trust erodes . . . .”).
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And as in California, this concern about undermining trust between
police and immigrant communities led to a refusal to honor ICE detainer requests except in limited circumstances. 311
Like the policy justification that localities should control local resources,
the community trust rationale supports an array of policy types. The community trust rationale, however, particularly resonates with the following policy
types introduced in Part I: barring investigation of immigration status, declining detainers, and declining to provide sensitive information. Each of these
policies inserts a wedge of neutrality between a locality’s criminal justice system and federal immigration enforcement. At the same time, some scholars
have warned against placing too great an emphasis on community trust as a
justification for disentanglement policies, as it draws on the idea that immigrants are “innocents needing protection from the police,” thus affirming the
logic of crime and punishment for those, including immigrants, who do not
meet exacting “standards of respectability.” 312 The call for a return to
“healthy relationships between police and communities may [also] ring hollow for [people of color and others] who are targeted by the police whether or
not ICE is collaborating with them.” 313
D. Safeguard Equal Protection
Many jurisdictions have adopted disentanglement measures for a fourth
reason: to promote the equal protection of law. 314 The Fourteenth Amend311

Id. (allowing adherence to an immigration detainer request for up to forty-eight hours in
cases involving individuals with a criminal warrant, a conviction for a violent crime, a felony
conviction within ten years, current registration on the list of sex offenders, or placement on the
federal government’s terrorist watchlist).
312
Angélica Cházaro, Challenging the “Criminal Alien” Paradigm, 63 UCLA L. REV.. 594,
651–53 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).
313
Id. at 653.
314
See, e.g., LAPD Special Order, supra note 186 (adopting disentanglement policy in part
because “the Constitution of the United States guarantees equal protection to all persons within its
jurisdiction”); Takoma Park, Md., Ordinance No. 2007-58 (Oct. 29, 2007), http://libguides.law.
du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34435656 [https://perma.cc/4USY-4YAD] (basing disentanglement in
part on equal protection); King County Ordinance, supra note 257 § 1(F) (adopting policy limiting
detainer-based detention in part to “further advance the county policy of providing all county
residents with fair and equal access to services, opportunities and protection”); Cook Cty., Ill.,
Res. 07-R-240 (June 5, 2007), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34434649 [https://
perma.cc/GPW6-ANYS] (adopting policy limiting inquiry into immigration status by county sheriffs, relying in part on the county’s “dedicat[ion] to providing all of its residents with fair and
equal access to the services, opportunities, and protection county government has been established
to administer”); OAKLAND POLICE DEP’T, TRAINING BULLETIN: ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL IMMIGRATION LAWS 1 (June 25, 2008), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=35757904 [https://
perma.cc/TH8J-QRRC] (declaring commitment “to equal enforcement of the law and equal service to the public regardless of immigration status”).
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ment to the U.S. Constitution declares that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 315 Under the
Equal Protection Clause, classifications based on race, ethnicity, nationality,
and alienage are subject to strict judicial scrutiny, and any attempt by state
and local governments to discriminate on those grounds will ordinarily be
struck down. 316 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act likewise imposes clear obligations on state and local officials to ensure that no program or activity receiving federal financial assistance denies benefits or otherwise discriminates “on the ground of race, color, or national origin.” 317 Additionally,
states and localities may have their own anti-discrimination laws. 318 Policies
that distance local policing from immigration enforcement have accordingly
been enacted in some cases to ensure that these legal commands are satisfied.
Sanctuary jurisdictions recognize that involving police and sheriff’s
departments in immigration enforcement efforts heighten the risk of discriminatory policing. First, law enforcement officers who engage in immigration policing may be more likely to treat community members differently on the basis of citizenship or immigration status. Furthermore, in determining whom to target for further investigation, officers may employ perceived proxies for immigration status like race, ethnicity, and Englishlanguage ability. 319 As a result, citizens as well as noncitizens can be subject
to equal protection violations. The Town of Amherst, Massachusetts made
this point when explaining the motivation for its disentanglement policy.
The sanctuary policy adopted by the town in 2012 rejected local participation in immigration enforcement programs and specifically noted that the
315
316

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
As the Supreme Court famously observed more than a century ago:

Though the law itself be fair on its face, and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so
as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar
circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the
prohibition of the constitution.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886). See also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365, 372 (1971) (determining that state classifications based on alienage “are inherently suspect
and subject to close judicial scrutiny”); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 215, 216 (1944)
(stating “that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect”).
317
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012).
318
See, e.g., Amherst Resolution, supra note 232 (adopting policy of declining detainers requesting prolonged detention of inmates who would otherwise be released, in part on grounds that
the Secure Communities program “violates the Town of Amherst Bylaws, including the Human
Rights Bylaw”).
319
Id.; see also Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented Criminal Procedure,
58 UCLA L. REV. 1543, 1545–47 (2011) (discussing the use of race as proxy for citizenship).
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Secure Communities program “explicitly promot[e]s discrimination on the
basis of nation of origin and implicitly promotes discrimination on the basis
of race, color, and socio-economic status . . . .” 320
Law enforcement leaders have long recognized that the elimination of
bias in policing requires a proactive approach. 321 Police agencies around the
country are already facing a crisis of legitimacy as a result of police brutality and discrimination in criminal justice administration. 322 Conscious of
these dynamics, disentanglement policies are often adopted as part of a
broader effort to avoid bias in policing. 323
Consider Vermont’s state law requiring that local police not engage in
immigration enforcement. 324 This law was precipitated in part by specific
instances of discriminatory traffic stops of noncitizens. 325 For example, a
Vermont sheriff’s department paid nearly $30,000 to settle a case in which
the state’s Human Rights Commission found that a sergeant had illegally
detained a Mexican national after a traffic stop, “chiefly because of his nationality and skin color,” and held him for about an hour to contact the Border Patrol. 326 This and other similar incidents prompted the state legislature
to mandate that all jurisdictions adopt fair and impartial policing practices
and order the crafting of a model policy. 327
Threaded throughout Vermont’s model policy are anti-bias and equality
rationales for its disentanglement provisions. The model policy states that
police “shall not use an individual’s personal characteristics [as a reason] to
320
Amherst Resolution, supra note 232. The fact that discrimination cannot be confined to
undocumented residents and is broadly based on race and ethnicity is consistent with scholar Kevin Johnson’s view that the treatment of noncitizens affords a window into current racial attitudes.
Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A “Magic Mirror”
into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111, 1114 (1998).
321
See, e.g., INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, PROTECTING CIVIL RIGHTS: A LEADERSHIP
GUIDE FOR STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 153–55 (Sept. 2006), http://www.
theiacp.org/Protecting-Civil-Rights-A-Leadership-Guide-for-State-Local-and-Tribal-LawEnforcement# (follow “Part 1,” “Part 2,” “Part 3” to access report chapters).
322
See, e.g., Nick Bayer, Poll Shows Millennials Increasingly Worried About Police Brutality,
Criminal Justice, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 16, 2016, 6:10 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com.
mx/entry/millennials-police-criminal-justice-poll_us_57b38ceee4b04ff883994fef [https://perma.cc/
6YDV-H834].
323
See, e.g., 2010 Santa Clara Resolution, supra note 264 (finding that “laws like Arizona’s
SB 1070 erode the relationship of trust between immigrant communities and local governments
[and] subject individuals to racial profiling” and noting that the Board of Supervisors seeks “to
protect the rights of all County residents to be free from discrimination”).
324
See supra notes 192–193 and accompanying text (stating the specific laws that prohibit
Vermont police officers from engaging in civil immigration enforcement).
325
Kathleen Masterson, Vermont Sheriff Department Pays to Settle Instance of Discrimination,
VPR (June 14, 2016), http://digital.vpr.net/post/vermont-sheriff-department-pays-settle-instancediscrimination#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/74RK-E2MY].
326
Id.
327
See supra note 192.
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ask about or investigate [a person’s] immigration status.” 328 Noting that the
Fourth Amendment and analogous provisions of Vermont’s Constitution “apply equally to all individuals residing in Vermont,” 329 the model policy prohibits Vermont law enforcement from initiating or prolonging stops based on
civil immigration matters, such as suspicion of undocumented status. 330 Similarly, it instructs that Vermont officers “shall not facilitate the detention of
undocumented individuals or individuals suspected of being undocumented
by federal immigration authorities for suspected civil immigration violations.” 331
Vermont is not alone in grounding its policing policy in equal protection rationales. Other jurisdictions have adopted “don’t police” policies after finding that local law enforcement participation in immigration policing
led to racial profiling and discrimination. For instance, jurisdictions like
East Haven, Connecticut, New Orleans, Lousiana and Maricopa County,
Arizona have each adopted “don’t police” policies following litigation over
discriminatory police practices that resulted in substantial settlements, consent decrees or injunctions. 332 More broadly, equal protection principles
328

2017 VERMONT MODEL POLICING POLICY, supra note 193, ¶¶ VIII(a), IX(a).
Id. ¶ VIII.
330
Id. ¶ VIII(c).
331
Id. ¶ VIII(b).
332
See, e.g., Agreement for Effective and Constitutional Policing, United States v. Town of
East Haven, No. 3:12-cv-01652-AWT (D. Conn. Dec. 21, 2012); Consent Decree Regarding the
New Orleans Police Department ¶ 183, United States v. City of New Orleans, No. 2:12-cv-1924
(E.D. La. July 24, 2012) (requiring New Orleans Police Department (“NOPD”), among other
measures to achieve “bias-free policing,” to ensure that NOPD officers “not take law enforcement
action on the basis of actual or perceived immigration status” and “not question victims of, or
witnesses to, crime regarding their immigration status.”); NOPD POLICY, supra note 200, ¶¶ 2, 3
(“Members shall not initiate an investigation or take law enforcement action on the basis of actual
or perceived immigration status, including the initiation of a stop, an apprehension, arrest, or any
other field contact. . . . NOPD members shall not make inquiries into an individual’s immigration
status, except as authorized by this Chapter.”); Supplemental Permanent Injunction/Judgment
Order ¶ 28(b), Ortega Melendres v. Arpaio, No. CV-07-02513-PHX-GMS (D. Ariz. Oct. 2, 2013)
(requiring, as a remedy for violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of class
members, that the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO), among other things, not “detain[]
any individual based on actual or suspected ‘unlawful presence’” or initiate any immigrationrelated investigation without reasonable suspicion or probable cause of a crime, and obtain supervisor approval before initiating any such investigation or contact with ICE or Border Patrol); Evan
Lips, East Haven Board of Police Commissioners Approves $450,000 Settlement, NEW HAVEN
REGISTER (June 10, 2014, 10:42 PM), http://www.nhregister.com/general-news/20140610/easthaven-board-of-police-commissioners-approves-450000-settlement [https://perma.cc/43M3-7CQV]
(reporting on policy adopted in response to DOJ lawsuit alleging that the East Haven Police Department had engaged in systematic discrimination of Latinos requiring officers to “not undertake
immigration-related investigations and [] not routinely inquire into the specific immigration status
of any person(s) encountered during normal police operations.”); see also News Release, ACLU
Washington, Victory in Lawsuit: Spokane Police Will No Longer Unlawfully Detain Immigrants
(Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.aclu-wa.org/news/victory-lawsuit-spokane-police-will-no-longer329
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also support policies that guard against policing practices that systematically deprive certain communities of police services. 333 As referenced earlier,
some sanctuary policies have been justified by a desire to ensure “fair and
equal access” to services and protection for all members of a community,
including immigrants and U.S. citizens in mixed-status families who may
be concerned that a call to the police could lead to deportation of a parent or
spouse. 334
Finally, the equal protection rationale can sustain disentanglement policies that go beyond the “don’t police” category to address participation in
joint operations. The City and County of San Francisco recently withdrew
from the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force, in part based on “concerns that
participation in the task force might violate local laws protecting immigrants and religious minorities.” 335 As a spokesperson for the San Francisco
Police Department explained, “[w]e want all persons to feel comfortable in
contacting SFPD . . . to report crimes and emergencies without concern as
to their immigrations status.” 336
E. Promote Diversity and Inclusivity
Following the election of President Trump, the friction between federal
immigration policy and the vision of inclusive communities held by many
localities has intensified. The federal government’s deportation agenda is
now seen by many as anti-immigrant, at a minimum, and even implicitly or
overtly racist. 337 This has spurred a new wave of immigrant protective poliunlawfully-detain-immigrants [https://perma.cc/L4HH-8FSP] (describing settlement whereby City
of Spokane, Washington, following an incident where officers referred a traffic accident victim to
Border Patrol because he was Latino, “has agreed to modify its policies to clarify, among other
things, that police officers shall not contact, question, delay, detain or arrest an individual
be[cause] s/he is suspected of violating immigration laws”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
333
See Elliot-Park v. Manglona, 592 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[D]iminished police
services, like the seat at the back of the bus, don't satisfy the government's obligation to provide
services on a nondiscriminatory basis.”); Estate of Macias v. Ihde, 219 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir.
2000) (“There is a constitutional right . . . to have police services administered in a nondiscriminatory manner—a right that is violated when a state actor denies such protection to disfavored persons.”); Grenier v. Stratton, 44 F.Supp.3d 197, 203–04 (D. Conn. 2014) (“The State may not, of
course, selectively deny its protective services to certain disfavored minorities without violating
the Equal Protection Clause.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
334
King County Ordinance, supra note 257, § 1.
335
Ellen Nakashima, San Francisco Police Department Pulls Out of FBI Anti-Terrorism Task
Force, WASH. POST (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/sanfrancisco-police-department-pulls-out-of-fbi-anti-terrorism-task-force/2017/03/10/62e05bcc-fd0911e6-8f41-ea6ed597e4ca_story.html?utm_term=.976e502469e6 [https://perma.cc/F97C-A7SW].
336
Id.
337
See supra notes 34–165 and accompanying text (discussing the rise of “crimmigration”); see
also Joint Statement from California Legislative Leaders on Result of Presidential Election, KEVIN
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cymaking rooted in a fifth rationale: promoting the values of diversity and
inclusivity. 338
The diversity and inclusivity rationale is related to but distinct from the
more legalistic emphasis on equality and nondiscrimination that is seen in
some disentanglement policies. It reflects a respect for and appreciation of
diverse communities, even embodying a certain solidarity with those who
have been historically marginalized. It recognizes that immigration enforcement today spreads across workplaces, homes, schools, and neghborhoods, 339
and adversely impacts entire communities, including citizens as well as
noncitizens. 340 The rationale also embraces a broad view of inclusiveness,
taking care not to single out certain groups of immigrants as more deserving
than others. 341
A 2016 enactment from Santa Monica, California reveals the vitality of
the diversity and inclusivity rationale for inspiring disentanglement policies.
Following the election, Santa Monica’s mayor declared that the Trump administration’s actions did not “align with our vision of diversity and inclusion,” and the city passed a resolution that used the city’s embrace of individuals of diverse religious, racial, national or ethnic origin, gender, and

LEÓN (Nov. 9, 2016), http://sd24.senate.ca.gov/news/2016-11-09-joint-statement-californialegislative-leaders-result-presidential-election [https://perma.cc/S8FP-F2AF] (describing Californians’ votes against Trump as “overwhelmingly reject[ing] politics fueled by resentment, bigotry,
and misogyny”); see also Seattle Resolution, supra note 214, at 3 (noting the “alarming” level of
“anti-immigrant and anti-refugee rhetoric during the 2016 Presidential campaign, racist hate
speech toward immigrant and refugee communities, and anti- immigrant and anti-refugee policies
proposed by the current Presidential administration”).
338
See generally Eagly, supra note 180, at 298–99 (noting emergence of equality-based reform movements).
339
MOTOMURA, supra note 6, at 146 (noting that when some “states and localities” adopt
laws that “insulate migrants from federal enforcement,” they “reflect efforts to include unauthorized migrants in communities built through interactions in neighborhoods, schools, and workplaces”).
340
Rachel Rosenbloom’s important work discussing the deportation of United States citizens
has revealed the “enduring fragility of the citizen-alien distinction that forms the bedrock of immigration law” and ongoing role of “race in the construction of . . . citizenship.” Rachel E. Rosenbloom, The Citizenship Line: Rethinking Immigration Exceptionalism, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1965,
1969–70, 2015, 2018–20 (2013). For instance, the Chicago Welcoming ordinance lays out in its
purpose statement, “[t]he City Council further finds that assistance from a person, whether documented or not, who is a victim of, or a witness to, a crime is important to promoting the safety of
all its residents.” Chicago Welcoming City Ordinance, supra note 20.
341
See generally Serin D. Houston & Charlotte Morse, The Ordinary and Extraordinary:
Producing Migrant Inclusion and Exclusion in US Sanctuary Movements, 11 STUD. SOC. JUST. 27,
27 (2017) (arguing that traditional sanctuary framing come “with the cost of limiting activist support only to particular groups of migrants, flattening the performances of migrant identities, and
positioning migrants as perpetually exterior to the US”); Yukich, Model Immigrant, supra note 16
(discussing inclusiveness of the original sanctuary movement).
DE
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sexual identity or orientation as a touchstone for a new policing policy.342
On that basis, and acknowledging the diverse foreign-born population in the
city, Santa Monica crafted a resolution that wove together most of the sanctuary policies discussed in Part II: a “don’t police” provision, a broad prohibition on the use of city resources for civil immigration enforcement, and a
nondisclosure provision to protect the privacy of residents from a variety of
segments of the community. 343 In announcing these policies, the mayor
made clear that disentangling Santa Monica from immigration enforcement
was part of a larger strategic plan to “maintain[] a diverse and inclusive
city.” 344
The diversity and inclusivity rationale has the capacity to undergird the
full typology of common disentanglement policies. This rationale has supported numerous detainer policies, 345 restrictions on participating in joint
operations, and broadly crafted resolutions to prevent local criminal justice
resources from being diverted for immigration enforcement. 346

342

Letter from Ted Winterer, Mayor, Santa Monica, Cal., to Resident of Santa Monica (Mar.
1, 2017) [hereinafter Winterer Letter], https://beta.smgov.net/strategic-goals/inclusive-diversecommunity/diversity [https://perma.cc/6LW2-2BXC] .
343
Santa Monica, Cal., A Resolution of the City Council of Santa Monica Embracing Diversity, Rejecting Hate and Discrimination, Clarifying the City’s Role in Enforcing Federal Immigration Law, and Promoting an Environment in Which Fear and Intimidation Do Not Chill Cooperation with Local Law Enforcement and Other First Responders (Feb. 28, 2017), http://libguides.
law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=35254558 [https://perma.cc/G5J4-Z545].
344
Winterer Letter, supra note 342, at 2.
345
See, e.g., King County Ordinance, supra note 257, ¶ 7 (grounding detainer policy in part
on county’s “dedicat[ion] to providing all of its residents fair and equal access to services, opportunities and protection” and county’s “fair and just principle” meant to ensure “everyone feels safe
to live, work and play in any neighborhood”); 2010 Santa Clara Resolution, supra note 264 (beginning by describing Santa Clara as “home to a diverse and vibrant community of people representing many races, ethnicities, and nationalities, including immigrants from all over the world”);
Multnomah Resolution, supra note 257 (grounding detainer policy in similar findings).
346
See, e.g., McMinville Resolution, supra note 18 (declaring McMinville “an Inclusive City
that embraces, celebrates, and welcomes the collective contributions to the prosperity of the City
of all persons” and prohibiting the use of city resources for immigration enforcement); Maplewood, N.J., Res. No. 3-17 (Jan. 3, 2017), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34435908
[https://perma.cc/BM5D-F3Y5] (declaring the “Township of Maplewood has long embraced and
welcomed individuals of diverse racial, ethnic, religious and national backgrounds” and resolving
not to “expend Township funds or resources” for immigration enforcement). Lansing, Michigan’s
proposed sanctuary resolution was crafted in the City Council’s Ad Hoc Committee on Diversity
and Inclusion that was formed for that purpose. See Lawrence Cosentino, Promise and Peril,
LANSING CITY PULSE, http://lansingcitypulse.com/print-article-14223-permanent.html [https://
perma.cc/T2H2-UL7E] (proposing to bar “assisting or voluntarily cooperating with investigation
or arrest procedures, public or clandestine, relating to alleged violations of immigration laws” and
cooperating with ICE “to perform immigration law enforcement functions to identify, process and
detain immigration offenders they encounter during their regular, daily, law-enforcement activity”).
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F. Express Disagreement with Federal Immigration Policy
Finally, our catalogue of stated rationales for sanctuary policies would
be incomplete if it did not acknowledge a sixth rationale: explicit disagreement with federal immigration policy. Many of the sanctuary policies of the
1980s, for example, were express responses to what was perceived as the
federal government’s unjust treatment of Central American asylumseekers. 347 In the post-9/11 period, sanctuary policies were often a way that
localities registered opposition to the USA PATRIOT Act, 348 to federal immigration raids, 349 and to Congress’s failure to enact comprehensive immigration reform. 350
Disagreement with federal immigration policy continued to serve as a
rationale for sanctuary policies during the Obama administration. Jurisdictions regularly cited the failure of Secure Communities to achieve its stated
priorities—particularly before the legal problems with detainers were fully
exposed—as a reason for declining requests for detainer-based detention. 351
Jurisdictions that used failed federal policy as a basis for enacting policies
concerning immigration detainers often stopped short of declining requests
for detention altogether. 352 This had the effect of imposing local immigra347
See supra note 23 and accompanying text; Pham, Constitutional Right, supra note 6, at
1382–87.
348
See, e.g., Balt., Md., Bill No. 03-1122, J. City Council Balt. 3335, 3336 (May 19, 2003),
http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34435679 [https://perma.cc/S4SR-NAZ6] (finding
that “federal policies adopted since September 11, 2001, including provisions in the USA PATRIOT Act . . . and related executive orders, regulations and actions threaten fundamental rights
and liberties”).
349
See, e.g., Oakland Resolution, supra note 237 (stating opposition to immigration raids and
calling for a moratorium); Mayor & Council of Princeton, N.J., Res. No. 2004-R271 (Nov. 10,
2004), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34435922 [https://perma.cc/BH4T-EHTM]
(responding to October 2004 raid and expressing strong disapproval); see also Gardner, supra note
6, at 326 (noting that “most of the policy actions taken between 2006 and 2008 expressed concern
that home raids by ICE damaged the relationship between police and local immigrant communities”).
350
See, e.g., Oakland Resolution, supra note 237 (finding that “local legislative action is an
important way for cities . . . to positively influence the continuing national discussion about immigration reform”).
351
See, e.g., Cook ordinance, supra note 196 (noting that “ICE detainers are routinely imposed on individuals without any criminal convictions or whose cases are dismissed”); COUNCIL
OF D.C., COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON BILL 19-585, “IMMIGRATION DETAINER COMPLIANCE AMENDMENT ACT OF 2012,” at 4 (May 8, 2012), http://dcclims1.dccouncil.us/images/
00001/20120604161227.pdf [https://perma.cc/8585-9HNL] (Chairman Phil Mendelson reporting
to all Council members) (noting that “[w]hile ICE has stated that the [Secure Communities] program was meant to target the most serious criminals, there are still reports nationwide of individuals who were arrested—not convicted—for minor crimes, and then ended up held under an ICE
detainer and eventually caught up in deportation proceedings”).
352
For example, in 2012 Milwaukee adopted a policy of responding to detainer requests depending on the criminal history of the targeted individual. 2012 Milwaukee Resolution, supra note
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tion enforcement priorities on a federal government viewed as incapable of
making measured enforcement choices on its own. 353
Policies enacted since the 2016 election offer more recent examples of
political resistance. The City of Richmond, California, for example, positioned itself in opposition to President Trump and his immigration policies
by passing a resolution finding that “President-elect Donald Trump ran a
campaign on a message of hate and bigotry,” and stating that “no matter the
threats made by President-elect Trump, Richmond will continue our sanctuary polices.” 354 Officials in South Orange, New Jersey also passed a sanctuary ordinance after the election, viewing the label as a “badge of honor” in
the current political climate. 355
Although we highlight this recurrent rationale, care should be taken
not to dismiss sanctuary policies as simply statements in opposition to the
federal government. Our research reveals that sanctuary cities are pursuing
affirmative policy choices that are theirs to make. 356 Seen in this light, disentanglement is not simply an attempt to frustrate federal policy, but an effort to ensure that local governments and the federal government can operate independently in their respective policymaking arenas.
307 (noting that “despite ICE’s prioritization of certain classes of criminal aliens, ICE detainers
are routinely imposed on individuals without any criminal convictions or whose cases have been
dismissed, resulting in possible deportation proceedings against non-criminal aliens”); see also,
e.g., King County Ordinance, supra note 257, ¶¶ 10–11 (reporting that 78% of detainers received
at the King County adult jail between 2008 and 2011 targeted persons with no prior criminal history, and limited detainer compliance to those convicted of a “violent or serious crime”).
353
This policy rationale for limiting local involvement in immigration enforcement embraces
the idea that immigration enforcement is related to local public safety. In contrast to more inclusive frameworks, see supra notes 337–346 and accompanying text, this policy rationale accepts
the idea that immigrants can be sorted into “deserving” and “undeserving” along an axis of criminality. As Ingrid Eagly has put it: “[I]ntegration-framed criminal justice policy debates have focused on whether the federal government is in fact deporting criminals, or whether the crimes
committed by deportees are in fact serious. Even worse, the dominant conversation on integrating
worthy immigrants has given way to allowing ‘criminal aliens’ to be used as what Rebecca Sharpless calls a ‘foil’ to advocate on behalf of immigrant-friendly policies only for law-abiding immigrants that everyone agrees should be integrated.” Eagly, supra note 180, at 290 (citing Rebecca
Sharpless, ‘‘Immigrants Are Not Criminals”: Respectability, Immigration Reform, and Hyperincarceration, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 691, 692 (2016)).
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In conclusion, the rich array of rationales for sanctuary policies that
this Part has laid out illustrates that sanctuary policies rest on a nuanced
theoretical framework. Our discussion of these rationales also demonstrates
that different localities may rely on different or multiple rationales for their
sanctuary policies. Finally, Part III highlights some of the practical consequences of entanglement that localities are responding to. Detainer policies,
for example, may be grounded on the practical reality of avoiding liability
for constitutional rights violations. Similarly, retaining local control over
local criminal justice resources may have financial consequences because
most joint operations, including through 287(g) agreements, require the investment of considerable local resources.
CONCLUSION
The Obama administration deported a record 2.7 million people over
the course of eight years. The Trump administration promises to ratchet up
both the level and modes of enforcement. In the words of former White
House Press Secretary Sean Spicer, the President has removed the “shackles” from enforcement agents. 357 This unshackling of deportation resources
has raised the stakes of the “sanctuary city” debate, prompting local jurisdictions to confront hard questions about whether and how to disentangle
local criminal justice actors from federal immigration enforcement efforts
and protect their residents from the harm and disruption of detention and
deportation.
The goal of this Article has been to present the facts necessary for a
fuller understanding of the complex issues embedded in the sanctuary debate. Our examination of local resistance to federal immigration enforcement initiatives reveals that the Trump administration’s broad claim that
sanctuary policies flout federal law are misplaced. The actions that jurisdictions have undertaken to effectuate disentanglement are supported by deeply rooted rationales designed to achieve a multiplicity of local policy goals.
Indeed, many jurisdictions adopted disentanglement policies specifically to
comply with federal law, sometimes even as a remedial measure for apparent constitutional violations. The only specific federal law cited by opponents of sanctuary policies as being undermined—8 U.S.C. § 1373—is narrow in scope, and jurisdictions have worked to craft their disentanglement
policies to avoid violating it. Far from finding a legal conflict that must be
reconciled in favor of the administration, our Article shows that sanctuary
357
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cities are engaging in activity that falls within their long-established domain
of local criminal justice policymaking.

